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Editorial: Comparative Survey Analysis – 
Models, Techniques, and Applications
Bart Meuleman1, Eldad Davidov2 & Daniel Seddig2
1 KU Leuven 
2 University of Cologne and University of Zurich
The use of comparative data is of paramount importance for the understanding 
of societies and their change patterns. Fortunately, today more than ever, social 
researchers are equipped  with a large number of national, international, and lon-
gitudinal comparative survey data, some of which contain repeated cross-sectional 
data whereas others include panel data. These data allow social scientists to test 
theories, generalize them across cultures, and address diverse topics of major social 
relevance such as attitudes toward the state and its functioning, democracy atti-
tudes, trust in people and institutions, immigration and integration, values, and 
behavioral patterns, just to name a few. 
However, comparative data is often characterized by a high level of complex-
ity. The presence of multiple countries or time points can lead to complicated data 
structures that offer great opportunities for research but also require special meth-
ods of analysis (Van de Vijver & Leung 1997; Davidov, Schmidt, Billiet, & Meule-
man 2018). This special issue is devoted to studies that demonstrate advanced 
techniques for analyzing comparative survey data and present applications of 
comparative analysis on a diverse range of topics. The special issue includes five 
studies. Some analyze comparative cross-sectional data, while others examine lon-
gitudinal data or a combination of both types of data. Below we provide a short 
overview of the studies.
The first paper, ‘Modeling multiple-country repeated cross-sections: A soci-
etal growth curve model for studying the effect of the economic crisis on perceived 
ethnic threat’, by Bart Meuleman, Eldad Davidov, and Jaak Billiet demonstrates 
how to exploit the richness of comparative data which cover both multiple coun-
tries and multiple time points. It presents a novel application for cross-national time 
series survey data using societal growth curve modeling. While growth curve mod-
eling has been often applied to individual data, this study shows how it may also 
be employed for contextual country-level data. The method is illustrated using six 
rounds of data from the European Social Survey (2002-2012). It inquires whether 
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indicators of economic downturn are systematically related to increased levels of 
economic and cultural threat due to immigration. The societal growth curve mod-
eling approach makes it possible to differentiate longitudinal effects from cross-
sectional differences thus overcoming the weaknesses of analyses relying on sin-
gle-shot cross-sectional data.
The second study, ‘Demonstrating how to best examine group-based segrega-
tion: A statistical and conceptual multilevel approach’ by Christoph Spörlein and 
Elmar Schlueter addresses the topic of segregation between ethnic or sociodemo-
graphic groups from a comparative perspective. The authors claim that segregation 
has been often studied by researchers from a descriptive perspective and, conse-
quently, these studies lack an inferential statistics approach. In their paper, they 
present the multilevel binomial response approach that provides a particularly flex-
ible framework for describing and explaining segregation to better understand the 
role of individual- and contextual-level drivers of segregation. The authors employ 
three case studies using survey data from urban, national, and cross-national set-
tings: the German urban monitoring survey, individual data from the European 
Labor Force Surveys in 15 EU member states, and a single wave from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel Study. They focus on different manifestations of ethnic and 
gender segregation.
The third study, ‘Surpassing simple aggregation: Advanced strategies for 
analyzing contextual-level outcomes in multilevel models‘ by Dominik Becker, 
Wiebke Breustedt, and Christina Isabel Zuber introduces two advanced analytical 
strategies for analyzing contextual-level outcomes in multilevel models: the multi-
level SEM and the two-step approach. The authors first discuss the methodological 
and statistical advantages of the two approaches and then illustrate their advantages 
in a substantive study. Their substantive study examines the effect of citizens’ sup-
port for democratic values on the persistence of democracy, drawing on data from 
the World Values Survey and the Quality of Government project.
The fourth paper, ‘Simultaneous feedback models with macro-comparative 
cross-sectional data’ by Nate Breznau addresses advantages and limitations of 
comparative cross-sectional data from a different angle. The author argues that 
while many authors do not have access to longitudinal data, they are nevertheless 
interested in assessing relationships of reciprocal causality that are postulated by 
their theories. The paper discusses the conditions that make it possible to assess 
simultaneous feedback models of reciprocal causality using cross-sectional survey 
research. The author shows how to construct simultaneous feedback models using 
a structural equation modeling perspective. The method is exemplified using three 
commonly used software packages (MPlus, Stata, and R) and data from the Inter-
national Social Survey Program covering 70 country-time points (between 1985 
and 2006) to model simultaneous feedback relations between public opinion and 
social spending.
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Finally, the fifth paper, ‘Blaming the young misses the point: Re-assessing 
young people’s political participation over time using the “identity-equivalence 
procedure”’, by Christian Schnaudt and Michael Weinhardt addresses the topic 
of construct equivalence when comparing data over time and across age groups. 
They suggest that construct equivalence is more important for a meaningful com-
parison than identical instruments that are in fact not equivalent. They exemplify 
the application of construct equivalence on the topic of political participation of 
young and older people. Specifically, they apply a procedure that they name “iden-
tity equivalence” on the measurement of political participation across three differ-
ent age groups and over the time period between 2002-2014 using data from the 
European Social Survey.
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Model for Studying the Effect of the 
Economic Crisis on Perceived Ethnic 
Threat
Bart Meuleman 1, Eldad Davidov 2 & Jaak Billiet 1
1 University of Leuven 
2 University of Cologne and University of Zurich 
Abstract
While multiple-country repeated cross-sectional datasets are increasingly available, few 
cross-national studies fully exploit the richness of such data. This paper contributes to the 
practical knowledge on statistical analysis of cross-national time series data. For that pur-
pose, we present a novel application of a societal growth curve model (Fairbrother, 2014) 
analyzing the pressing question whether the economic crisis of the past years has stirred up 
immigration-related threat perceptions among European citizens. Concretely, we analyze 
six rounds of European Social Survey data (2002-2012) to investigate whether indicators of 
economic downturn are systematically related to increased levels of economic and cultural 
threat. The societal growth curve modeling approach makes it possible to set longitudinal 
effects apart from cross-sectional differences and thus overcomes the weaknesses of analy-
ses relying on single-shot cross-sectional data. Our results provide evidence that grow-
ing unemployment as well as decreasing rates of economic growth instigate feelings of 
economic threat. Rather than affecting citizens’ opinion uniformly, the economic crisis is 
found to have the strongest impact on economic threat among low educated people. While 
this study provides evidence that economic shocks affect concerns that immigration is bad 
for the economy, feelings of cultural threat are not affected by economic crises.
Keywords: group conflict theory, economic vs. cultural threat, societal growth curves, 
European Social Survey
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Over the course of the last decades, cross-national data collections – such as the 
European Social Survey (ESS), the European Values Study (EVS), or the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme (ISSP) – have accumulated trend data rendering 
it possible to monitor change in citizens’ values, attitudes and behavior. These data 
can be characterized as cross-national repeated cross-sections: Multiple countries 
are observed across a time range, but at each point of observation a different cross-
section of the national population is surveyed. The potential contribution of this 
design to social scientific insights is very large. The longitudinal aspect can help to 
partially overcome the well-known but crucial causality problem that single-shot 
cross-national studies suffer from. Cross-sectional studies can demonstrate that dif-
ferences in a context variable tend to coincide with particular patterns in public 
opinion at a given time point. Such correlational patterns only provide a very shaky 
empirical foundation to make claims about causality. Cross-national trend data can 
provide additional insights in the temporal order of the relationship, which is a nec-
essary (yet insufficient) condition for causality. However, according to the seminal 
work of Campbell and Stanley (1966; see also Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2001), a 
multi-location time series design can provide interesting insights, especially when 
experimental manipulation is not feasible.
While multiple-country repeated cross-sections are increasingly available, 
knowledge on statistical tools to optimally analyze such data is limited. As a 
result, many current cross-national studies do not fully exploit the richness of the 
available data. This paper demonstrates the practical implementation of a statisti-
cal model to analyze multi-country repeated cross-sectional datasets. The second 
purpose of this paper is to utilize the model to analyze the effect of the economic 
crisis on threat due to immigration among Europeans. We do this by providing 
a novel application of the societal growth curve model introduced by Fairbrother 
(2014). This model uses multilevel techniques to estimate how a particular aggre-
gated individual characteristic – such as ethnic threat - develops over time on the 
country level, and to assess whether contextual variables can explain the observed 
over-time developments. We apply this model to test whether the 2008 economic 
crisis has affected perceptions of ethnic threat among European citizens. Numerous 
single-shot cross-national studies have presented empirical evidence that economic 
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conditions are related to prejudice, perceived threat, and anti-immigrant sentiments 
(for reviews, see Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). 
Studying the development of exclusionary attitudes over time in multiple countries, 
however, provides a more stringent test of the causal impact of economic condi-
tions (for examples, see Meuleman, Davidov & Billiet, 2009; Semyonov, Raijman 
& Gorodzeisky, 2006). The societal growth curve approach allows disentangling 
longitudinal and cross-sectional effects of economic context.
Concretely, we employ the societal growth curve model in the current study 
to address the following research questions: (1) In what way has the prevalence of 
perceived immigrant threat in European societies evolved in the period before and 
after the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008? (2) Are the observed develop-
ments in perceived threat driven by changes in economic conditions due to the 
crisis? (3) Does the crisis affect threat perceptions across the whole population, 
or are crisis effects instead contingent on social positions in the form of education 
level? To answer these questions, we analyze data from the European Social Sur-
vey (ESS) across the years 2002-2012, providing information about immigration-
related threat perceptions in 28 countries before, during, and after the outbreak of 
the economic crisis.
The paper starts by providing the theoretical background and formulating our 
research hypotheses. Second, we explain how societal growth curve models can be 
used to test our hypotheses using multiple-country repeated cross-sections. Sub-
sequently, we present the data and measures we use. The paper concludes with a 
discussion on the results of the analysis and the usefulness of the societal growth 
curve model.
Theoretical Background:  
A Dynamic Formulation of Group Conflict Theory
Group Conflict Theory (GCT) offers a framework to understand possible effects 
of the economic crisis on prejudice, threat perceptions and anti-immigration senti-
ments. The central proposition of GCT is that negative attitudes toward outgroups 
– such as immigrants and ethnic minorities – develop as a defensive reaction of 
the majority group to the perception that prerogatives of the own group are threat-
ened (Blumer, 1958; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2016; Olzak, 1992; Quillian, 1995). 
Not only economic goods (such as well-paid jobs, affordable housing, or the scarce 
resources of the welfare state), but also cultural goods (such as cultural traditions or 
society-specific norms and values) can become the subject of intergroup competi-
tion (Stephan et al., 1998). The distinction between the different sources of threat 
perceptions is of crucial importance, as economic and cultural threat perceptions 
can differ in their antecedents (such as social class basis) as well as in their conse-
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quences (e.g., prejudice or voting behavior) (Harell et al., 2012; Lucassen & Lub-
bers, 2012; Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004).
According to GCT, majority-members’ threat perceptions are influenced by 
contextual factors, such as economic conditions or immigrant group size (Blalock, 
1967). In times of poor economic conditions, the material goods that are the object 
of intergroup competition become scarcer, thereby leading to an intensification of 
(mainly economic) threat perceptions. Furthermore, a more sizeable immigrant 
group implies that the native population is confronted with a larger number of com-
petitors, again causing intergroup competition to become stronger. Several empiri-
cal studies have confirmed that anti-immigration attitudes are more widespread 
in adverse economic contexts (Quillian, 1995; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov et al., 
2006) with high levels of ethnic diversity (Lahav, 2004; Quillian, 1995; Scheep-
ers, Gijsberts & Coenders, 2002; Schneider, 2008), although these effects could not 
always be replicated (Sides & Citrin, 2007). A serious limitation that can be often 
observed in this body of research is its reliance on cross-sectional data sources 
(Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). However, the finding that international differences 
in economic performance coincide with variations in public opinion at a given time 
point hardly proves that economic downturns may be a cause of threat perceptions. 
After all, numerous other variables – such as the immigration history of a country, 
the broader political climate, the media, or the implemented migration and integra-
tion policies – might intervene in the relationship between economy and public 
opinion (Schlueter, Meuleman & Davidov, 2013).
A dynamic reformulation of GCT (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Meuleman et 
al., 2009) instead proposes to study how attitude changes are driven by changes in 
the actual level of competition. The theoretical rationale for this focus on changes is 
that sudden shifts in economic prosperity or immigrant presence could have more 
substantial effects on public opinion than high but stable levels of actual competi-
tion (Hopkins, 2010). Sudden changes affect labor, housing, and other markets more 
strongly than slow-paced evolutions (Olzak, 1992) and usually receive wide media 
coverage (Schlueter & Davidov, 2013; McLaren, Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 
2017). A crucial methodological advantage of focusing on longitudinal changes is 
that it offers a more stringent test of the causal relationships articulated in the GCT.
The – relatively few – empirical studies using a dynamic approach often 
support the propositions derived from GCT. Economic downturns were found to 
instigate threat perceptions and anti-immigrant attitudes in the United States (Quil-
lian, 1996), Canada (Wilkes & Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Wilkes, Guppy & Farris, 
2008), Germany (Coenders & Scheepers, 2008), and the Netherlands (Coenders & 
Scheepers, 1998; Coenders et al., 2008). Also, studies combining a cross-national 
and longitudinal perspective confirm the role of economic conditions (Semyonov 
et al., 2006; Meuleman et al., 2009; Kuntz et al., 2017). Pichler (2010) furthermore 
demonstrates that economic conditions can also alter the mechanisms through 
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which threat perceptions are formed. During periods of unfavorable economic con-
ditions economic concerns come to the fore in the formation of threat perceptions, 
while cultural concerns are suppressed.
A limitation of existing studies is that they span periods with only relatively 
small economic fluctuations. Yet, the recent economic turmoil might be conceived 
as a new critical juncture that sets in motion different mechanisms, compared to 
those active during more modest economic fluctuations (Billiet, Meuleman & De 
Witte, 2014; Semyonov et al., 2006). Little is known about the impact of a serious 
economic crisis. This study therefore tests whether the economic downturn Europe 
has been experiencing in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has affected 
economic and cultural threat perceptions among majority-group citizens. Based on 
GCT, we expect that threat perceptions have increased in Europe since the begin-
ning of the crisis in 2008 (Hypothesis 1) and that changes in threat perceptions in 
European countries are related to country-level changes in economic conditions 
(Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, building on Pichler’s (2010) argument on the shifting 
foundations of threat perceptions, we expect that indicators of the economic con-
text will have a stronger impact on economic than on cultural threat perceptions 
(Hypothesis 3). Finally, the individual-level component of GCT suggests that the 
threat-inducing effect of the crisis might be stronger among individuals in social-
structurally vulnerable positions  in the form of low education levels, whereas there 
is no such effect among those who are highly educated (as a proxy for being well 
off). This would, in other words, imply that the effect of the crisis on threat percep-
tions interacts (negatively) with education (Hypothesis 4). 
Modeling Multiple-Country Repeated Cross-
sections: Societal Growth Curves
The aforementioned hypotheses can be tested by means of multiple-country 
repeated cross-sectional data, that is, data consisting of several countries that are 
observed at different time points, by surveying a large number of individuals. Such 
data contain a three-level hierarchical structure, with countries at the highest level, 
country-years at the middle level, and individuals at the lowest level. This nested 
structure can be taken into account by fitting a societal growth curve model (Fair-
brother, 2014) that estimates how an individual characteristic evolves over time 
within countries - see equation (1). 
0 1 1 0 0β β ν ν= + + + + +itj tj j tj j tj itjY Time Time u e   (1)
( )2 ~ 0,σitj ewithe N
methods, data, analyses | Vol. 12(2), 2018, pp. 185-210 190 
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( )20 0~ 0, νν σj N
( )21 1~ 0, νν σj N  
Yitj represents a measured characteristic (e.g. perceived threat) for an individual 
i, surveyed at time point t in country j. β0 is the grand intercept in this model, 
referring to the predicted level of Y at the beginning of the time series averaged 
across all countries. By including the variable ‘time’ as a fixed effect at the second 
level (country-years), the overall evolution of the dependent variable Y is modeled, 
which is an essential feature of the growth curve approach. In equation (1), the time 
effect is linear (with an effect parameter 
 
β1), but the model can be extended in a 
straightforward way to include more complex functional forms of growth. Random 
effects for the intercept (ν0j) and the slope (ν1j) of the growth curve are included to 
accommodate the country specificity of threat developments over time, that is, how 
the growth curve in a specific country deviates from the average developmental 
pattern. The model also contains random components at the middle (uotj) and lowest 
(eitj) levels. uotj reflects how country-years deviate from the country-specific growth 
curve. eitj captures the individual-level residuals. This approach shows similarity to 
conventional multilevel growth curve models for panel data (e.g. Andreß, Golsch 
& Schmidt, 2013). The main difference is that the occurrence of repeated measure-
ments is not at the level of individuals, but rather at the level of the countries. As 
a consequence, the intercepts of the growth curve are situated at the level of the 
country-years (level 2), and the intercept variation is captured by its variance com-
ponent ν0j. The slope of the growth curve is estimated by the linear effect of the 
time variable, the slope variation is absorbed in its variance component ν1j. As such, 
the societal growth curve model is essentially a classical two-level growth curve 
model for countries, with an additional layer of individuals underneath.
One could add to this baseline model individual-level as well as contextual 
predictors. Of crucial importance is that the societal growth curve approach makes 
it possible to partition the impact of contextual variables into a cross-sectional 
and a longitudinal component. This decomposition takes place by simultaneously 
including a time-invariant (i.e., the average over the complete time series) and a 
time-varying component (the year-specific deviation of that average) of the contex-
tual variables into the models (Fairbrother, 2014; this decomposition is similar to 
disentangling between- and within-cluster covariate effects in clustered data – see 
Neuhaus & Kalbfleisch, 1998). 
Take a contextual variable Ztj that varies across countries as well as time 
points (e.g., the unemployment rate). Time-invariant component Z•j equals the 
value of this contextual variable for a particular country averaged over the whole 
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observed time series (e.g., the average unemployment rate of a specific country 
between 2001 and 2012). The parameter for this time-invariant component captures 
the cross-sectional relationship between context and threat levels, irrespective of 
changes over time. The time-varying component is calculated as the deviation of 
the observed value at a specific time point from the country average over the whole 
time series (Ztj - Z•j). The parameter for the time-varying component describes lon-
gitudinal relationships, that is, how variations in perceived threat over time within 
countries (from their longitudinal average) are associated with changes in a contex-
tual variable. Because Z•j and (Ztj - Z•j) are included simultaneously in the model, 
the parameter for the time-varying component reflects the pure longitudinal effect, 
controlling for its average over the whole time series. If there is a causal impact of 
a particular context variable, its longitudinal effect should be different from zero. 
Finally, cross-level interactions between the longitudinal variations of contex-
tual variables and individual characteristics can be included to investigate whether 
the growth curve components (intercept and slope) vary across different categories 
of individuals. 
Materials and Methods
Dataset: European Social Survey, 2002-2012
We analyze data from a time series of six rounds of the European Social Survey 
(ESS), spanning the period before and after the crisis (2002-2012). This multi-
location time-series design is one of the strongest alternatives when experimental 
manipulation is not feasible, under the condition that the event that should bring 
about change in the time series (the quasi treatment) is well specified a priori 
(which is the case here) (Campbell & Stanley, 1966: 38; see also Shadish, Cook 
& Campbell, 2001). The logic behind it is that it is unlikely that particular quasi-
experimental treatments are followed by an outcome change in multiple locations, 
if the effect is not causal. 
Since the focus is on change, we include only countries that participated in 
at least two ESS rounds. Our dataset comprises 28 countries with a total of 137 
country-year combinations. In all countries, strict probability samples of the resi-
dent population aged 15 years and older were drawn. Because we are interested in 
the attitude patterns among members of the majority population, respondents who 
were born outside the country, who have a foreign nationality, or who consider 
themselves as a member of an ethnic minority group are removed from the sample 
(see also Sarrasin, Green, Fasel & Davidov, 2015). The total sample size equals 
228,331 individuals (for sample sizes per country and year and country abbrevia-
tions, see Appendix 1).
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Measurements
Dependent variables – The ESS core module contains two items that were designed 
to measure economic and cultural threat perceptions.1 Respondents are invited to 
position themselves on an 11-point scale of which the endpoints refer to perceiving 
immigration as a disadvantage or as an advantage for the economy (‘Would you say 
it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here 
from other countries?’) or the cultural life (‘Would you say that [country]’s cultural 
life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other 
countries?’). The scales are reversed, so that 0 indicates low and 10 high threat. 
While these items have been used as indicators of a single concept of general group 
threat in previous research (Sides & Citrin, 2007), we analyze them separately to 
render the difference between economic and cultural sources of threat visible (for a 
similar approach, see Pichler, 2010).2 This approach is justified by the fact that both 
items contain – especially at the individual and country-year level – considerable 
unique information. The correlation between economic and cultural threat equals 
0.60 at the individual level, 0.71 at the country-year level, and 0.83 at the country 
level, implying that the two items share 36.0, 50.1, and 69.3 percent of their vari-
ance at these respective levels. These unique components allow sufficient room for 
differential effects of individual as well as contextual predictors (see below).
Contextual predictor variables – All contextual variables were retrieved 
from the Eurostat website (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). The economic context is 
captured by means of the real GDP growth rate (Eurostat indicator nama_gdp_k) 
and the harmonized unemployment rate (Eurostat indicator une_rt_a). Changes 
in immigrant group size are measured by the inflow of foreign immigrants (Euro-
stat indicator migr_imm1ctz) per capita. We include the time-invariant as well as 
the time-varying components of these contextual variables. Concretely, we aver-
age contextual information over two years to indicate the time-varying component 
referring to a specific time point (e.g., the average unemployment rate of 2001 and 
2002 is taken to predict threat perceptions in the 2002 survey). This choice reflects 
1 The core module of the ESS contains a third item measuring immigration-related 
group threats (ESS item imwbcnt). Because the wording of this item is very general and 
does not refer to specific sources of threat, we do not include it in the analysis.
2 The use of single items instead of multi-item batteries makes it difficult to assess the 
reliability, validity, and cross-cultural comparability of the measurements. To get an in-
dication of the measurement quality, we performed multiple group confirmatory factor 
analysis (Davidov et al., 2014) on the three threat items included in the ESS across our 
137 country-year combinations. Partial measurement equivalence could be established 
for all countries but Ireland (the output can be obtained from the first author upon 
request). As a result, the data allow us to conduct meaningful comparisons across all 
countries and time points. To rule out that the outlier Ireland biases our conclusions, 
we re-estimated all our models excluding the Irish data as a robustness check, but the 
effects of the economic context remained unchanged.
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that the impact of economic contexts may be lagged. The time-invariant component 
is the average across the whole time series (2002-2012).
Individual-level predictor variables – In order to control for compositional 
differences – that is, the fact that European populations have a different composi-
tion in terms of several individual characteristics - we include a series of variables 
capturing social-structural positions and cultural dispositions that were shown to be 
relevant in previous research (e.g. Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Meuleman, Davi-
dov & Billiet 2009; Meuleman, Abts, Slootmaeckers, & Meeusen, 2018; Semyonov, 
Raijman & Gorodzeisky 2006). The social-structural variables are gender, age, 
number of years of education completed, degree of urbanization (from 1 = coun-
tryside to 5 = big city), employment status (distinguishing self-employed, higher 
service class, white collar, blue collar, unemployed, retired, in education, doing 
housework, disabled, and other) and subjective income. The latter variable is used 
as a proxy for the household income and is operationalized by the individual assess-
ment of whether one finds it difficult or comfortable to live on the present income 
(1 = very difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 = coping; 4 = living comfortably). Based on 
previous literature, we expect people in socially vulnerable positions, that is with 
lower education and lower subjective income, the unemployed and the low-skilled 
workers to feel more threatened by immigrants. Furthermore, older individuals are 
expected to be more negative toward immigrants (e.g., Hercowitz-Amir, Raijman & 
Davidov 2017; Meuleman, Davidov & Billiet, 2009; Semyonov, Raijman & Goro-
dzeisky, 2006).
Religious involvement is the mean of items measuring subjective religiosity 
(ESS item rlgdgr), attendance of religious services (rlgatnd) and frequency of pray-
ing (pray). Political orientation is measured by self-placement on a left (0) to right 
(10) scale. This scale was categorized into three groups, namely, left (scores 0-4), 
center (5), and right (6-10). To handle the considerable nonresponse of this item, 
we added a fourth category for the missing values. Secular persons as well as left-
leaning individuals are assumed to express lower levels of perceived ethnic threat 
(see, e.g., Hercowitz-Amir et al., 2017).
Descriptive statistics for the variables are displayed in Appendix 2.
Statistical Modeling
The random effect models are estimated by means of the MIXED procedure of 
SAS 9.3, using a restricted maximum likelihood estimation method. To obtain stan-
dard errors that are robust against deviations of the distributional assumptions of 
the random effects (such as non-normality), we furthermore used the “sandwich 
estimator” (Verbeke & Molenberghs, 2000: 87ff). All analyses are weighted to 
correct for cross-national differences in sampling design (dweight). All continuous 
individual-level predictor variables were centered around their grand mean prior to 
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the analysis. Apart from political orientation – where a separate category for the 
missing values is created – we applied listwise deletion to deal with the item non-
response. The amount of missing values in the data was quite limited and lower 
than 5% on average ranging between 4.6% for the variable economic threat and 
0.1% for gender. Therefore, we do not expect that using listwise deletion distorts our 
conclusions (see Schafer & Graham, 2002).
Results
Trends in Perceived Threat, 2002-2012
Before presenting the societal growth curves, we explore the development in threat 
perceptions over the period 2002-2012. Considerable cross-country differences 
can be observed in the level of perceived economic threat (see Figure 1), rang-
ing from as low as 3.36 (Luxemburg, 2002) to as high as 7.22 (Cyprus, 2012) (on 
a scale from 0 to 10). These differences follow regional patterns, with the lowest 
levels of economic threat in Northern Europe and the highest scores in Eastern 
and Southern Europe. Longitudinal developments within countries appear to be 
smaller than between-country differences. The most notable change is observed in 
Ireland, where economic threat shifts from 4.04 (2006) to 5.85 (2010). Progression 
of economic threat is patterned along regional lines as well. In the Nordic coun-
tries, which already displayed comparatively low threat in 2002, economic threat 
perceptions tend to stabilize or even diminish. In Southern Europe, by way of con-
trast, a clear upward trend is notable. It is revealing to observe that between 2008 
(the outbreak of the financial crisis) and 2010 (when its impact on the economy was 
becoming clear), economic threat perceptions became more prevalent in 20 coun-
tries, while they became weaker in 3 countries only (see also Kuntz et al., 2017). 
Regarding cultural threat (Figure 2), the specific position of Scandinavian 
countries becomes even more distinct. Northern Europeans perceive substantially 
less cultural threat compared to citizens in Western, Eastern, and Southern Europe. 
Importantly, longitudinal changes in cultural threat are less outspoken than in the 
case of economic threat. At least during our time window of observation, cultural 
threat perceptions seem to be a more stable phenomenon, while economic threat 
perceptions tend to fluctuate substantially. 
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Figure 1 Development of perceived economic threat in 28 countries  




Figure 2 Development of perceived cultural threat in 28 countries  
(by region) – 2002-2012
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Societal Growth Curves: The Longitudinal Impact of 
Economic Conditions
To examine the effects of economic conditions on threat perceptions, we estimate a 
series of societal growth curve models for economic and cultural threat (see Tables 
1 and 2). An empty three-level model (not shown) indicates that economic and cul-
tural threat perceptions vary significantly across individuals, country time points 
combinations as well as countries. The lion’s share of the total variation can be 
attributed to the individual level. Variations of threat between countries (7.5% of 
the total variance for economic threat vs. 12.9% for cultural threat) are considerably 
larger than longitudinal variations of threat within countries. Notably, the longitu-
dinal variation of economic threat (2.0%) is more than double than that of cultural 
threat (0.9%).
Models 1E (Table 1) and 1C (Table 2) estimate growth curves by including 
time as a predictor. A linear time trend combined with a dummy for 2010 (picking 
up an additional change in 2010 over and above the linear process) provides the 
most appropriate description of the data. For both forms of threat, the linear time 
effect is insignificant, but does have significant random slope variation. This means 
that, on average across all countries, threat perceptions remain stable between 
2002 and 2012; the linear trend does vary cross-nationally, however, with increases 
in some countries and decreases in others. One particular ripple disturbs the linear 
development of threat perceptions. The dummy for 2010 has a significant and posi-
tive effect. In 2010 (i.e., following the outbreak of the financial crisis), economic 
and cultural threat perceptions were respectively 0.116 and 0.120 units higher than 
what is expected based on the general time trend. This pattern confirms that immi-
grant-related threat perceptions have increased across Europe after the 2008 crisis 
(supporting Hypothesis 1), although the magnitude of the increase should not be 
overrated. Furthermore, the 2010 increase in threat perceptions was instantaneous 
and had receded by 2012. 
Indicators of the economic context as well as individual characteristics are 
added in Models 2E and 2C. Economic and cultural threat perceptions are – to a 
large extent but not completely – driven by the same set of individual predictors. As 
expected by theories of ethnic competition, threat perceptions are most outspoken 
among individuals with a lower socioeconomic status. Fewer years of education 
and a lower (subjective) income seem conducive towards increased threat percep-
tions. Concerning employment status, the highest levels of threat perceptions are 
observed among blue collar workers, followed by persons who are unemployed, 
retired, disabled, or homemakers. Members of the higher service class and those in 
education feel least threatened. Furthermore, also persons living in a rural environ-
ment express higher levels of economic and cultural threat. Consistent with previ-
sous research (e.g. Semyonov, Raijman & Gorodzeisky, 2006), political orientation 
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is among the strongest predictors of perceived threat: left-leaning individuals feel 
culturally as well as economically less threatened. Apart from these similarities, 
three individual variables have a differential impact. Males feel economically less 
threatened than females, while no gender gap is present for cultural threat. Further-
more, the highest levels of cultural threat are found among respondents between the 
ages of 55 and 74 years, while this age group does not deviate from the reference 
category (aged 45-54 years) on economic threat. Finally, religiosity has a small 
tempering effect on economic threat but shows no significant relationship with cul-
tural threat. 
To find out whether changes in the economic context affect threat percep-
tions, Models 2E and 2C include the country time-invariant (cross-sectional) and 
the time-varying (longitudinal) components of two economic variables, namely, 
the unemployment rate and the real GDP growth. The longitudinal components of 
unemployment and economic growth have a significant impact on feelings of eco-
nomic threat. In times of rising unemployment rates and plummeting growth rates, 
citizens’ anxieties that immigration poses a threat to the national economy gain 
momentum (supporting Hypothesis 2). These longitudinal effects of economic con-
text are substantial. Spain, for example, experienced an increase in unemployment 
rate of 12.4 percentage points and a drop in economic growth of 3.8 percentage 
points between 2005-6 (the 3rd ESS round) and 2010-11 (the 5th ESS round). Model 
2E predicts that the combination of these economic shocks increased economic 
threat perceptions across the whole Spanish population with more than 0.6 points, 
which implies a considerable increase. It is of crucial importance to reiterate that 
these parameters refer to longitudinal effects, capturing the impact that national 
economic conditions at particular time points have on the evolution of threat per-
ceptions within countries. At the same time, no significant cross-sectional rela-
tionships between the average country levels of economic context and economic 
threat are detected. Model 2E explains 7.8% of the individual variation, 42.7% of 
the variation between country-years and 25.1% of the between-country differences 
in economic threat. The model is thus quite successful in explaining why a coun-
try’s level of economic threat is higher at particular time points than in other years. 
Note that the effect of the dummy for 2010 has become insignificant, indicating 
that the high levels of economic threat in that particular year are indeed driven by 
economic changes.
Whereas economic conditions shape the development of perceived economic 
threat, no such contextual effects are found for cultural threat. The idea that immi-
gration threatens the nation’s cultural life is not only relatively stable over time, but 
also completely detached from economic changes. Crisis-induced threat percep-
tions seem to be limited to concerns about economy, and do not generalize to the 
cultural realm. This finding is in line with Hypothesis 3. For cultural threat, Model 
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2C explains 22.7%, 37.3%, and 8.0% of the variance of the dependent variable at the 
country, country-time, and individual levels respectively.
One of the specific features of the societal growth curve approach is that con-
textual variables are decomposed into a cross-sectional and a longitudinal com-
ponent. In order to scrutinize the similarities and differences with the classical 
approach –that is, including the raw context variables, without decomposition- we 
additionally estimated models in which only the unemployment rates and GDP 
growth scores in the year of the survey are included.3 We find that the effects of 
unemployment rate (on economic threat: 0.0351; on cultural threat: 0.0043) and 
GDP growth (on economic threat: -0.0530; on cultural threat: -0.0031) are very 
similar to the longitudinal effects found in Models 2E and 2C. This similarity is 
however particular for the current analysis. It is most likely a result of the fact that 
the cross-sectional effects per se in our growth models are quite small and insignifi-
cant. This may not always be the case, however. In some cases the cross-sectional 
component of a country score may have an effect on the dependent variable that is 
stronger or even opposite compared to the effect of the longitudinally varying com-
ponent. Without decomposition, the estimated context effect is a mixture between 
the cross-sectional and the longitudinal effect. If both effects are considerable and 
different, omitting the decomposition can lead to incorrect conclusions.
As an additional robustness check, we re-estimated the effect of economic 
conditions on economic and cultural threat respectively, controlling for the inflow 
of foreign immigrants (per capita).4 Neither the longitudinal nor the cross-sectional 
components of foreign immigration are related to either economic or cultural threat 
perceptions. The most important conclusion from this additional model is that the 
longitudinal effects of the economic variables unemployment and economic growth 
on economic threat remain significant, and are thus not driven by a possible con-
nection between migration movements and the severity of the economic crisis.
3 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. The full results are 
not shown here, but can be obtained from the first author.
4 The full results are not shown here, but can be obtained from the first author. This 
control variable was only included in this stage of the modeling process because the 
migration flow statistics contain several missing values and lead to the exclusion of the 
following country-years: FR 2002; FR 2004; GR 2002; GR 2004; IS 2004; PT 2002; 
PT 2004; PT 2006).
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Table 1 Societal growth curve models for economic threat
Model 1E Model 2E Model 3E
Fixed effects - indiv. level Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE
Intercept 5.155 (0.124)*** 5.195 (0.287)*** 5.650 (0.348)***
Time -0.006 (0.025) -0.031 (0.016) -0.040 (0.025)
Dummy: time-point 2008 0.116 (0.055)* -0.122 (0.068) -0.159 (0.087)
Gender
male -0.264 (0.028)*** -0.261 (0.027)***
female (ref.cat.)
Age category
16-24 years 0.155 (0.056)** 0.141 (0.055)*
25-34 years 0.103 (0.031)*** 0.100 (0.030)***
35-44 years 0.049 (0.021)* 0.050 (0.020)*
45-54 years (ref.cat.)
55-64 years 0.023 (0.033) 0.025 (0.032)
65-74 years 0.023 (0.058) 0.029 (0.057)
75 years and over 0.047 (0.064) 0.044 (0.064)
Education -0.099 (0.006)*** -0.101 (0.006)***
Activity status
Self-employed -0.300 (0.044)*** -0.295 (0.044)***
Higher service class -0.632 (0.056)*** -0.614 (0.054)***
White collar -0.393 (0.039)*** -0.389 (0.038)***
Blue collar (ref.cat.)
Unemployed -0.102 (0.040)* -0.103 (0.040)*
Retired -0.183 (0.033)*** -0.187 (0.033)***
In education -0.764 (0.045)*** -0.758 (0.044)***
Doing housework -0.235 (0.037)*** -0.219 (0.034)***
Disabled -0.022 (0.049) -0.032 (0.050)
Other -0.405 (0.066)*** -0.391 (0.065)***
Subjective income -0.300 (0.013)*** -0.307 (0.012)***
Urbanization -0.068 (0.008)*** -0.069 (0.007)***
Religious involvement -0.030 (0.009)*** -0.028 (0.009)**
Left-right placement
Left (ref.cat.)
Centre 0.370 (0.053)*** 0.357 (0.053)***
Right 0.308 (0.082)*** 0.300 (0.082)***
Missing 0.600 (0.060)*** 0.593 (0.060)***
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Model 1E Model 2E Model 3E
Fixed effects - indiv. level Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE
Fixed effects - context variables
Unemp. rate - Longitudinal 0.035 (0.012)** 0.033 (0.016)*
Unemp. - Cross-sectional 0.049 (0.042) 0.010 (0.051)
GDP growth - Longitudinal -0.052 (0.015)*** -0.050 (0.023)*
GDP growth -  
Cross-sectional -0.115 (0.106) -0.180 (0.134)
Education x Unemp. rate - 
Longit. -0.004 (0.001)***
Random effects
Level 3: Var. country inter-
cept 0.366 (0.114)*** 0.326 (0.102)*** 0.311 (0.155)**
Level 3: Var. slope time 0.010 (0.005)* 0.003 (0.003) 0.005 (0.004)
Level 2: Var. country-year 
intercept 0.083 (0.013)*** 0.065 (0.011)*** 0.065 (0.023)***
Level 2: Var. slope education 0.000 (0.000)***
Level 1: Residual variance 5.224 (0.016)*** 4.817 (0.015)*** 4.787 (0.015)***
Deviance 941487.7 924925.3 924479.9
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; Nindividuals=205,759, Ncountry-years=137, Ncountries=28
Table 2  Societal growth curve models for cultural threat
Model 1C Model 2C Model 3C
Fixed effects - indiv. level Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE
Intercept 4.488 (0.160)*** 4.173 (0.336)*** 5.087 (0.388)***
Time 0.006 (0.021) 0.014 (0.020) 0.002 (0.028)
Dummy: time-point 2008 0.120 (0.035)** 0.085 (0.065) 0.050 (0.098)
Gender
male 0.057 (0.036) 0.062 (0.036)
female (ref.cat.)
Age category
16-24 years 0.133 (0.061)* 0.113 (0.061)
25-34 years 0.002 (0.035) -0.002 (0.033)
35-44 years -0.026 (0.016) -0.025 (0.015)
45-54 years (ref.cat.)
55-64 years 0.066 (0.028)* 0.069 (0.028)*
65-74 years 0.146 (0.054)** 0.159 (0.052)**
75 years and over 0.234 (0.059)*** 0.238 (0.058)***
Table 1 continued
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Model 1C Model 2C Model 3C
Fixed effects - indiv. level Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE
Education -0.103 (0.008)*** -0.105 (0.008)***
Activity status
Self-employed -0.228 (0.042)*** -0.219 (0.043)***
Higher service class -0.505 (0.060)*** -0.473 (0.056)***
White collar -0.407 (0.041)*** -0.400 (0.040)***
Blue collar (ref.cat.)
Unemployed -0.144 (0.051)** -0.146 (0.050)**
Retired -0.099 (0.036)** -0.103 (0.036)**
In education -0.722 (0.052)*** -0.712 (0.051)***
Doing housework -0.199 (0.039)*** -0.176 (0.038)***
Disabled 0.000 (0.055) -0.018 (0.053)
Other -0.377 (0.077)*** -0.363 (0.076)***
Subjective income -0.230 (0.015)*** -0.243 (0.015)***
Urbanization -0.059 (0.013)*** -0.064 (0.012)***
Religious involvement -0.014 (0.009) -0.011 (0.009)
Left-right placement
Left (ref.cat.)
Centre 0.492 (0.064)*** 0.468 (0.063)***
Right 0.564 (0.105)*** 0.548 (0.105)***
Missing 0.682 (0.079)*** 0.669 (0.078)***
Fixed effects - context variables
Unemp. rate - Longitudinal 0.004 (0.012) -0.012 (0.021)
Unemp. - Cross-sectional 0.033 (0.049) -0.051 (0.052)
GDP growth - Longitudinal -0.003 (0.012) -0.011 (0.026)
GDP growth -  
Cross-sectional -0.084 (0.138) -0.198 (0.138)
Education x Unemp. rate - 
Longit. -0.003 (0.002)
Random effects
Level 3:  
Var. country intercept 0.713 (0.202)** 0.619 (0.184)** 0.673 (0.210)**
Level 3: Var. slope time 0.008 (0.004)* 0.008 (0.004)* 0.009 (0.006)
Level 2: Var. country-year 
intercept 0.034 (0.006)*** 0.034 (0.006)*** 0.083 (0.019)***
Level 2: Var. slope education 0.002 (0.000)***
Level 1: Residual variance 5.344 (0.017)*** 4.917 (0.015)*** 4.885 (0.015)***
Deviance 946739.0 929758.3 928820.8
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; Nindividuals= 205,905, Ncountry-years=137, Ncountries=28
Table 2 continued
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The fourth hypothesis – namely, that the longitudinal effects of the eco-
nomic context are stronger among low-educated individuals – is tested in Models 
3E and 3C. These models now contain a random slope for education (implying 
that the educational gradient of threat perceptions can vary across countries and 
time points) as well as a cross-level interaction effects between education and the 
time-varying component of the unemployment rate (testing whether the longitudi-
nal effect of unemployment rates differs across educational groups).5 In the case of 
economic threat, the longitudinal effects of unemployment are indeed different for 
various educational groups (see Figure 3). For an individual with an average level 
of education (12.5 years), represented by the middle line in Figure 3, economic 
threat perceptions increase by 0.033 point for every percentage point increase in 
unemployment rate. The negative cross-level interaction parameter (-0.004) indi-
cates that this effect of unemployment becomes weaker as education increases. For 
individuals who have had 19 years of education (i.e., 6.85 years more than the aver-
age, corresponding to the 90th percentile in the dataset), the longitudinal effect of 
unemployment approaches zero, meaning that unemployment rates are no longer 
related to threat levels. For respondents with only 7 years of formal education (i.e., 
5.85 years less than the average, corresponding to the 10th percentile), the impact 
of unemployment context is twice as strong as for the average person. This signifi-
cant cross-level interaction effect shows that contextual labor market processes do 
not instigate economic threat perceptions uniformly across the whole population. 
Instead, this sociotropic source of threat seems to affect, in the first place, persons 
with lower education (i.e., those with a more vulnerable position in the society and 
the labor market), while the threat perceptions of the highly educated are more 
immune to the impact of labor market changes.
A similar test (not shown here) revealed that the cross-level interaction between 
real GDP growth rate and education is insignificant. Hereby, Hypothesis 4 is only 
partially supported by the data. In the case of cultural threat, none of the cross-level 
interactions was significant (which is not surprising given that the main effect of the 
economic context was insignificant for cultural threat). 
In sum, this analysis reveals that economic threat perceptions have increased 
after the 2008 crisis (supporting Hypothesis 1), although the increase was only tem-
porary. Furthermore, the changes in threat perceptions are driven by changes in 
the economic context (supporting Hypothesis 2) and are only observed for the eco-
nomic component of threat (Hypothesis 3). Finally, the effects of economic condi-
tions are more outspoken of the lower-educated individuals (Hypothesis 4).
5 We test the cross-level interaction for education rather than for employment status, 
because the latter variable is categorical which makes the estimation and interpreta-
tion of the interaction more difficult and less insightful. A similar hypothesis could in 
principle be tested for subjective income. However, including multiple interactions of 
connected variables at the same time makes the results less insightful.
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Conclusions and Discussion
The first purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the practical implementation of 
a statistical model to analyze multi-country repeated cross-sectional datasets. 
While such datasets are increasingly available, few cross-national studies opti-
mally exploit the richness of datasets containing information on citizens surveyed 
in various countries and at different time points. The second purpose of this paper 
is to utilize the model to analyze the effect of the economic crisis on threat due 
to immigration among Europeans. We do this by providing a novel application of 
the societal growth curve model introduced by Fairbrother (2014) testing whether 
the 2008 economic crisis has affected perceptions of ethnic threat among Euro-
pean citizens. More concretely, drawing on the dynamic version of group conflict 
theory, the current study addressed the following three research questions: (1) In 
 
This figure represents predicted levels of economic threat for various values of education 
(10th percentile in the highest curve, 50th percentile in the middle curve, 90th percentile in 
the lowest curve) and the time-varying component of the unemployment rate (full range), 
as well as 95% confidence bands for these predictions (the grey zone around the curves). 
Figure 3 The interaction effect between education and the time-varying com-
ponent of national unemployment rates
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what way has the prevalence of perceived immigrant threat in European societies 
evolved in the period before and after the peak of the economic crisis in 2008? (2) 
Are the observed developments in perceived economic and cultural threat driven 
by crisis-related changes in economic conditions? (3) Does the crisis affect threat 
perceptions across the whole population, or are crisis effects instead contingent on 
socioeconomic status? We answered these questions by analyzing ESS data from 
28 different European countries spanning the years 2002 to 2012. 
Societal growth curve analysis substantiates in various ways that economic 
contexts shape the majority group perceptions that immigration poses a threat to 
the national economy. Between 2008 (just before or during the outbreak of the 
financial crisis) and 2010 (i.e., when the impact of the crisis on the “real economy” 
was becoming clear), we detected an increase – albeit short-lived – in economic 
threat perceptions in 20 European countries. Even more conclusive is the finding 
that rates of unemployment and economic growth have a longitudinal effect on eco-
nomic threat perceptions: In times when unemployment rates increase and growth 
rates plummet, citizens’ perceptions that immigrants threaten the economy become 
more widespread. These effects are purely longitudinal in the sense that they refer 
to the dynamics within countries (instead of cross-sectional differences between 
countries), and therefore lend strong support to the dynamic version of group threat 
theory. The deterioration of economic conditions in Europe indeed instigated fears 
that immigrants threaten economic prerogatives of the majority group, which might 
in turn open the door to exclusionary attitudes and discriminatory behavior. The 
difficult economic situation that Europe has been facing over the past years offers a 
breeding ground in which economic threat perceptions can easily take root. Finally, 
the model demonstrated that the effect of the economic crisis (i.e., increasing unem-
ployment rates) is stronger among individuals with lower educational credentials.
The impact of economic conditions on threat perceptions is substantial, but 
should not be overstated and qualified in several respects. First of all, despite the 
fact that our analysis covered a period of unprecedented economic instability, 
changes in threat perceptions remain relatively limited. Differences between coun-
tries or citizens are markedly more outspoken than longitudinal variation. A severe 
economic shock (comparable to what a country like Spain experienced) produces 
an effect similar in size to the effect of social class (blue-collar workers vs. higher 
service class) or political orientation (left vs. right), but does not exceed the joint 
impact of individual-level predictors. Second, our results suggest that the economic 
crisis had an instantaneous effect rather than a long-lasting one. Threat percep-
tions did increase in the aftermath of the 2008 outbreak of the crisis, but had fallen 
back to pre-crisis levels by 2012. As soon as the labor market recovers and eco-
nomic production takes off again, economic threat perceptions dissipate. Third, the 
impact of the economic crisis appears to be restricted to economic threat. Feelings 
of cultural threat are found to be relatively stable over time and to be completely 
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detached from economic dynamics. At least within our window of observation, 
crisis-induced threat perceptions do not generalize to the idea that immigrants pose 
a threat to cultural life. 
In sum, societal growth curve models offer promising opportunities to inves-
tigate the drivers and timing of attitude change. Further research could take this 
argument and method even further, for example by investigating shorter time spans, 
and linking public opinion to monthly instead of yearly context data. Our study 
shows that the societal growth curve models offer opportunities to analyze cross-
national repeated cross-sections. Most importantly, by distinguishing between 
cross-sectional and longitudinal context effects, this approach successfully avoids 
the problem of weak internal validity that one faces when analyzing single-shot 
cross-sectional data. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1  Sample sizes per country and year
Round 1  
2002
Round 2  
2004
Round 3  
2006
Round 4  
2008
Round 5  
2010
Round 6  
2012
Total
Austria (AT) 1,973 2,023 2,198 - - - - - - 6,194
Belgium (BE) 1,700 1,574 1,611 1,535 1,473 1,565 9,458
Bulgaria (BG) - - - - 1,179 1,816 1,978 1,844 6,817
Switzerland (CH) 1,610 1,671 1,402 1,338 1,094 1,079 8,194
Cyprus (CY) - - - - 932 1,105 1,000 985 4,022
Czech Republic (CZ) 1,278 2,851 - - 1,937 2,281 1,929 10,276
Germany (DE) 2,648 2,575 2,619 2,459 2,686 2,597 15,584
Denmark (DK) 1,417 1,404 1,404 1,491 1,453 1,518 8,687
Estonia (EE) - - 1,395 958 1,147 1,383 1,714 6,597
Spain (ES) 1,616 1,489 1,682 2,305 1,660 1,633 10,385
Finland (FI) 1,924 1,977 1,824 2,118 1,797 2,079 11,719
France (FR) 1,314 1,621 1,762 1,861 1,532 1,715 9,805
Great Britain (GB) 1,796 1,662 2,086 2,037 2,070 1,946 11,597
Greece (GR) 2,279 2,135 - - 1,886 2,370 - - 8,670
Croatia (HR) - - - - - - 1,272 1,407 - - 2,679
Hungary (HU) 1,562 1,414 1,406 1,433 1,447 1,874 9,136
Ireland (IE) 1,866 2,111 1,538 1,462 2,146 2,218 11,341
Iceland (IS) - - 553 - - - - - - 691 1,244
Italy (IT) 1,171 1,487 - - - - - - 883 3,541
Lithuania (LT) - - - - - - - - 1,519 1,938 3,457
Luxembourg (LU) 951 1,043 - - - - - - - - 1,994
Netherlands (NL) 2,167 1,690 1,688 1,572 1,657 1,639 10,413
Norway (NO) 1,881 1,607 1,596 1,394 1,351 1,384 9,213
Poland (PL) 2,027 1,672 1,682 1,576 1,707 1,843 10,507
Portugal (PT) 1,412 1,922 1,995 2,199 1,990 2,002 11,520
Sweden (SE) 1,766 1,745 1,690 1,591 1,300 1,585 9,677
Slovenia (SI) 1,349 1,316 1,338 1,161 1,255 1,127 7,546
Slovakia (SK) - - 1,388 1,558 1,666 1,727 1,719 8,058
Total 35,707 40,325 34,148 38,361 40,283 39,507 228,331
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higher service class 6.3 14,185
white-collar workers 20.9 47,052
blue-collar workers 14.9 33,576
unemployed 5.2 11,835
retired 24.5 55,458










Mean SD Min Max N
Economic threat perceptions 5.21 2.39 0 10 217917
Cultural threat perceptions 4.50 2.49 0 10 218073
Education (in years) 12.10 4.03 0 30 225821
Subjective income 2.98 0.86 1 4 222897
Urbanization 3.04 1.21 1 5 227676
Religious involvement 4.40 2.55 0.71 10 227353
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Abstract
Segregation between ethnic or sociodemographic groups represents a longstanding key in-
dependent and dependent variable for the social sciences. However, researchers have only 
recently begun to take advantage of inferential rather than descriptive statistical techniques 
in order to assess various aspects of segregation. Specifically, this paper shows that the 
multilevel binomial response approach suggested by Leckie et al. (2012) provides a particu-
larly flexible framework for describing and explaining segregation in ways not previously 
possible. Taking the index of dissimilarity (D) as an example we demonstrate how the mul-
tilevel binomial response approach helps to reduce the problem of small unit bias, allows to 
asses segregation at different scales and enables researchers to better understand the role of 
individual- and contextual-level explanatory variables in shaping segregation. To this end, 
we employ three case studies focusing on different manifestations of ethnic and gender 
segregation using survey data from urban, national and cross-national settings.
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An important question in comparative social science research is this: To what extent 
and why do members of different groups live or work segregated from another? 
For example, ethnic residential segregation – broadly defined here as the extent to 
which members from distinct ethnic groups are unequally distributed across resi-
dential areas – is often seen as a core independent variable driving multiple forms 
of ethnic inequality, e.g. in education or on the labour market (Lieberson 1980). 
Likewise, several social science approaches seek to understand the factors shaping 
ethnic residential segregation as dependent variable (Massey 1985, Alba and Logan 
1993). Segregation, however, is certainly not limited to occur between members of 
different ethnic groups or with regard to residential areas only. To name just one 
further example, a longstanding and influential literature deals with the causes and 
consequences of differences in the distribution of men and women across occu-
pations and related settings, a phenomenon known as gender segregation in the 
labour market (Chafetz 1988). Empirically, in order to assess different forms of 
segregation researchers commonly rely on official census data. For sheer size and 
scope alone, such data certainly represent a very broad and hence useful empirical 
source. However, the administrative and financial constraints to obtain census data 
often still are far from trivial. Also, the availability of census data sometimes is 
restricted to aggregate data only. While sufficient for several purposes, aggregate 
data might not always meet the requirements of the research question of interest. 
At this point, the increasing availability of large-scale survey data in conjunction 
with recent statistical and computational advances opens up new possibilities for 
research on segregation. Accordingly, this contribution seeks to illustrate the syn-
ergies to be achieved when using publicly available survey data in concert with 
state-of-the-art inferential methods of data analysis in order to adequately describe 
and explain segregation in different fields. We do so by demonstrating the virtues 
of using the multilevel binomial response approach to assess segregation recently 
developed by Leckie et al. (2012). As we explicate below, this statistical frame-
work enables researchers to draw inferential rather than descriptive conclusions, 
to account for small unit bias, to assess segregation at multiple scales as well as 
to evaluate the contribution of explanatory variables at different levels of analysis. 
Given multiple forms of segregation and researchers’ interest to quantify segrega-
tion by a single number, today a great variety of different so-called segregation 
indices is available (Massey and Denton 1998). While we endorse this plurality of 
segregation measures, for pragmatic reasons here we focus on the index of dissimi-
larity (D) as a particularly well-known and popular measure of segregation.
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Modelling the Index of Dissimilarity
The index of dissimilarity (D) is perhaps the most widely used measure in the 
social sciences when interest lies in quantifying the degree to which two groups A 
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∑  (1)
Here, aj is the observed proportion of group A in unit j, bj the corresponding 
observed proportion of group B in unit j and A as well as B refer to the total pro-
portions of groups A and B (Duncan and Duncan 1955). D ranges from 0 to 1 
where 0 indicates no segregation and 1 describes a scenario with total segregation. 
Values of D within this range are commonly interpreted as the fraction of either 
group A or B that would have to change across units J in order to achieve an even 
distribution across the J units. While intuitively appealing and easy to compute 
using simple cross-tabulation, researchers long have noticed several limitations of 
D.  For example, researchers typically calculate D from observed proportions. An 
important drawback of this approach is that it fails to recognize the underlying sto-
chastic processes that generate these proportions (Leckie et al. 2012). This means 
that even if the allocation of individuals to units (i.e., ethnic minority and majority 
members to neighborhoods, men and women to occupations) was purely random, 
D will most likely be non-zero due to random sampling that drives unevenness in 
the distribution to some non-negligible extent. Further, this upward bias in D is 
known to systematically vary with the proportions of individuals per unit such that 
the likelihood of observing highly segregated units is inversely related to unit size 
(i.e., small cell bias, Carrington and Troske 1997, Allen et al. 2009, Mazza and 
Punzo 2015). Accordingly, when segregation is investigated for a relatively large 
number of sparsely populated units, random sampling alone might produce some 
highly segregated units, which in turn generates a disproportionate upward bias in 
D. Drawing on earlier work by Goldstein and Noden (2003), Leckie et al. (2012) 
developed an elegant statistical solution that overcomes these limitations. These 
authors demonstrate that a binomial response multilevel model effectively takes 
into account the binomial sampling variation when modelling observed propor-
tions of individual observations in units and reduces the risk of small cell bias. Sta-
tistically, this approach takes advantage of multilevel shrinkage (Raudenbush and 
Bryk 2012) where units with fewer observations contribute less to the estimation of 
parameters compared to units with more observations. Consider the following basic 
two-level binomial response multilevel model:






















where yj denotes the probability that an individual in unit j belongs to group A, nj 
is the total number of individuals in units j and πj is the unknown underlying pro-
portion of group A in unit j. The underlying proportion πj is determined by β0 + uj 
through a logit link. β0 denotes the intercept and when exponentiated represents the 
average proportion of group A in the ‘median’ unit j. uj denote the random effects 
varying across units j. The random effects uj are central to the multilevel framework 
of segregation because they effectively serve as a naïve estimator of the degree 
of segregation across unit j: the larger the random effects, the larger the variation 
of the average proportion of group A across units j. Conversely, if uj is zero, then 
the proportion of group A across unit j is constant and therefore no segregation is 
observed. Once we obtained the estimates for the model described in equation (2), 
we can calculate D using a simulation approach described in Leckie et al. (2012) to 
compute adjusted counts per unit where M is the number of iterations. Specifically, 
the simulation proceeds in four steps that build incrementally:
Step 1: Simulate one value for each of the J unit-level random effects using the 
model estimate of the unit-level variance ( )2 ( ) 2: ~ 0,mu j uu Nσ σ .
Step 2: Compute the estimated proportion of group A per unit 
( )( ) ( )0: : logitm mj jj anti uπ β− + .
Step 3: Compute the adjusted counts of group A per unit 
( ) (m): m A
j j j
j n nπ= ; with 
the adjusted counts of group B per unit j computed as ( )m A
j jn n− .
Step 4: The dissimilarity index is then computed as 
 
                                                                                                (3). 
Summarizing the resulting vector of M dissimilarity indices by its mean and the 
corresponding 95% confidence interval yields the desired measure of uncertainty. In 
this way, uneveness due to binomial sampling variation respectively small cell bias 
is adequately taken into account when calculating D, with the confidence interval 
providing additional information about the statistical significance of D.  However, 
approaching segregation from a statistical and conceptual multilevel perspective 
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offers additional and equally important advantages. Perhaps most interestingly, the 
multilevel approach outlined above enables researchers to model segregation as a 
function of explanatory variables at different levels of analysis. Typical (two-level) 
applications of multilevel modelling often seek to model between-context vari-
ance (e.g., cross-national differences in respondents’ average income or explain-
ing school differences in pupils’ average math-skills). This level-two variance can 
potentially be explained by compositional differences across the level-two units, 
level-two characteristics or a combination thereof (Raudenbush and Byrk 2002, 
Hox 2010, Snijders and Bosker 2011). Consequently, adding level-one respectively 
level-two explanatory variables will likely reduce the level-two variance1. One 
issue with this modelling approach lies with the fact that the comparison of nested 
non-linear models is problematic because the individual level variance is fixed to 
π2/3 (Hox 2010). When including independent variables, parameter estimates of 
the model will be rescaled in such a way that the variance on the individual level 
remains constant at π2/3. Obviously, this is problematic when these parameter esti-
mates are fundamental to the simulation steps of the multilevel framework. Hence, 
as one extension of Leckie et al.’s (2012) modelling approach, we aim to remedy 
this drawback by bringing all models to the same baseline scale of the respec-
tive null models through multiplication of all parameter estimates with the squared 
“scale correction factor” (Hox 2010: 133ff). The scale correction factor is defined as 
 
(4), 
where ( )ˆvar π denotes the variance of the linear estimator and the index (0) refers to 
parameters from the null model (i.e., a model to estimate the unadjusted segrega-
tion). This correction is applied throughout all analyses presented in this article.
In terms of multilevel modelling of segregation, a decrease in the random 
effects means that some part of the observed segregation pattern is due the explana-
tory variables added to the model2. Apparently, this option is particularly advanta-
1 In some instances, adding level-1 variables may increase level-2 variation. Typically, 
this occurs when variables are added to the model that contain no or only very little 
between-unit variation (Hox 2010: 74). For instance, the sex distribution across city 
districts is unlikely to vary substantially thus adding individual’s sex may increase the 
variation on the district level. Dropping variables with little level-2 variation should 
solve the issue.
2 Kalter (2001) proposed a multinomial logit framework to adjust D for compositional 
differences across two groups. However, this framework does not take into account 
small cell bias nor does it enable researchers to add unit-specific explanatory variables 
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geous for examining the individual respectively contextual level factors presumed 
to generate or maintain segregation between groups. At the same time, conceptu-
alizing segregation in a multilevel framework opens up the possibility to model 
segregation across multiple scales. Thus, in terms of residential segregation, this 
means that one could model segregation with respect to neighborhoods and cities in 
one model by introducing a hierarchical city level (level 3) in addition to the neigh-
borhood level (level 2) and individual residents (level 1). Note that this framework 
also can easily incorporate non-hierarchical segregation structures using a cross-
classified design, e.g. occupational and industrial gender segregation (see study 3). 
Three Case Studies
In the empirical part of our paper, we present three case studies of modelling 
D. These examples illustrate not only different modelling options offered by the 
proposed new method, but also provide novel answers to interesting substantial 
research questions. The first example presented in study 1 uses data from German 
urban monitoring survey in which German citizens and immigrants were sampled 
from a large number of city districts. These data enable us to study the extent of 
ethnic residential segregation between city districts, holding constant socioeco-
nomic differences among respondents and accounting for district-level character-
istics. The second example presented in study 2 directs its attention to the field of 
cross-national research. Using individual data from the European Labour Force 
Surveys (EU-LFS), we study the degree of ethnic occupational segregation for 15 
EU member states that remains after both individual- as well as occupation-level 
explanatory variables are taken into account. In study 3, the research question of 
interest for the final example is to determine simultaneously the level of gender 
occupational and industrial segregation. To this end, we employ a cross-classified 
multilevel model using a single wave from the German Socio-Economic-Panel 
Study (GSOEP). 
Study 1: Ethnic Residential Segregation
Data and Theory 
We study ethic residential segregation using data from the urban monitoring survey 
program of the city of Duisburg (‘Duisburger Bürgerumfrage’, see GESIS 2017), 
a large multiethnic city situated in the western part of Germany (see Schlueter, 
2011). Focusing on topics such as residents’ satisfaction with the cultural and social 
infrastructure of the city, these surveys were carried out separately for German citi-
zens and foreigners using random samples of individuals aged 18 years and older 
217 Spörlein/Schlueter: Group-based Segregation
selected from the city’s population register. For the present purposes and in order to 
increase sample size, we merged three waves of data spanning the years 2004, 2005 
and 2006 (Stadt Duisburg, Amt für Statistik, Stadtforschung und Europaangelegen-
heiten der Stadt Duisburg, 2007). From the sample of foreigners, we selected only 
Turkish respondents3 as they represented the largest ethnic minority group in Duis-
burg (∼24 percent). Our final sample covers 6,352 individuals (level 1), 21 percent 
of which from Turkish descent, living in one of 46 districts in the city of Duisburg 
(level 2). The dependent variable in this case study is a dichotomous variable indi-
cating whether respondents are of Turkish descent (1) or of German descent (0).
We employ three theoretical perspectives to describe and explain ethnic resi-
dential segregation. Our vantage point is the spatial assimilation model (Massey, 
1985), which posits that ethnic minority members are able to convert their socio-
economic resources for renting or acquiring living space that is equally desired by 
ethnic majority members. According to this approach, the extent of ethic residential 
segregation should diminish once the socioeconomic resources of group members 
are taken into account. To this end, we include three individual-level indicators 
reflecting group compositional differences in socioeconomic resources (highest 
education attainment [1 = no education to 3 = (Fach-) Hochschulreife], respon-
dent receives unemployment benefits and respondent receives social welfare). For 
completeness, we also hold constant respondents’ age (in years), gender (0 = male, 
1 = female), marital status (0 = not married, 1 = married) and household size 
(number of persons per household). Unlike the spatial assimilation model, the place 
stratification model holds that ethnic residential segregation centrally is shaped by 
powerful majority members (e.g. real estate agents, landlords) who seek to con-
strain ethnic minority members’ access to desirable residential spaces (Alba and 
Logan, 1993). Supposing that a substantial degree of ethnic residential segrega-
tion persists even after controlling for differences in the socioeconomic resources 
of group members, this means that more (less) attractive districts should increase 
(decrease) ethnic residential segregation. We seek to approximate these assump-
tions by assessing the desirability of city districts using information on the average 
living space per person (2005 data) and average rent per square meter (no utilities, 
2002 data), presuming that a higher average living space per person respectively 
higher average rent per square meter indicates more attractive city districts. Further, 
we take the number of social welfare recipients per 1,000 inhabitants (2005 data, 
Stadt Duisburg 2007) to indicate less attractive city districts. The third theoreti-
cal account we consider is known as the homophily-principle. Shifting attention to 
group members’ ethnic preferences, this approach presumes at its core that ingroup 
members prefer to dwell among fellow ingroup members (Schelling 1969; McPher-
son, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001; Henry, Pralat and Zhang 2011). We approximate 
3 Extending this example to multigroup comparison is fairly straightforward using mul-
tinomial logistic multilevel models or a series of binomial multilevel models.
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this assumption using data on the local ethnic infrastructure represented by the pro-
portion of ‘ethnic clubs’ per postal code district gathered from the Federal Register 
for Associations (Justizministerium 2016).
Results
Figure 1 depicts the results for the gross level of ethnic residential segregation and 
the subsequent adjustments for compositional differences between Germans and 
Turks as well as contextual differences across city districts. The first two bars of 
the figure show that the gross level of ethnic residential segregation is fairly similar 
when calculated based on the standard cross-tabulation approach and the multi-
level simulation approach. Both methods result in an index of dissimilarity that 
approaches a value of 0.40. In addition, the simulation results provide a 95% con-
fidence interval depicted as error bars which range from 0.31 to 0.47. According 
to the common interpretation of D, in order to for the two population groups to be 
evenly distributed across Duisburg’s city districts, roughly 40 percent of the popu-
lation would need to move between districts. However, adjusting the observed level 
of residential segregation for potential compositional differences between Germans 
and Turks in terms of their socioeconomic resources results in a decline to an aver-
age of 0.28 (CI=[0.22;0.35]). In other words, around one quarter of the observed 
level of ethnic residential segregation in Duisburg is accounted for by the average 
lower socioeconomic positions of Turks relative to Germans – a large effect. 
Table 1 presents the results of the multilevel models which provided the param-
eters for the simulation of the dissimilarity index, specifically, the intercept and the 
district-level random effect. Assessing the direction of change in segregation after 
adjustment for compositional differences is easily glimpsed by the reduction of the 
district-level random effect which decreases from 1.08 to 0.58 (Variance district-
level⨉SCF2=0.97⨉0.60~0.58). Hence, even without carrying out the simulation of 
D the change in the district level variance provides an intuitive measure of the 
change of segregation: the variance on the district level indicates how strongly the 
average proportion of Turkish residents per city district deviates from the median 
neighborhood. Thus, a reduction in this variation implies that some fraction of the 
between-district variation in the proportion of Turkish residents is accounted for 
differences in the socioeconomic composition of the two groups.  
Finally, model 2 incorporates the contextual measures of the local pricing 
structure and ethnic infrastructure which results in a further decrease in the level of 
segregation to an average of 0.17 (CI=[0.13;0.21]). Contrary to our expectation, we 
do not find that the proportion of ethnic clubs is associated with the proportion of 
Turkish inhabitants per neighborhood. The pricing indicators are more in line with 
our expectations: city districts with on average larger rooms have lower proportions 
of Turkish inhabitants whereas the number of social welfare recipients per 1,000 
inhabitants is positively associated with a districts’ proportion of Turks. Although 
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these associations are present net of individual differences in resource endowment, 
the associations point towards a primary underlying mechanism, namely that the 
lower socioeconomic composition of Turks in Duisburg constraints their residential 
choices which in turn is associated with a large part of the observed segregation 
patterns. Overall, the adjustment of segregation for compositional and contextual 
differences reduced the index of dissimilarity by roughly 60 percent4.
Study 2: Ethnic Occupational Segregation
Data and Theory 
In order to study ethnic occupational segregation, we rely on cross-national data 
from the European Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the EU-15 member states. 
For this application, we focus on comparing occupational choices of first genera-
tion immigrants (i.e., those born outside the respective destination country) to the 
national population. Specifically, we use data from the 2009 wave covering (self-)
employed individuals aged 22 to 57. Occupations are classified according to three-
digit ISCO-88 codes which provide a suitable compromise between level of detail 
(i.e., 131 distinct occupational categories) and individuals per occupational cate-
gory. Moreover, the analyses will be carried out separately not only by country, 
4 Notice that and variance on the neighborhood level is reduced by roughly 80 percent. 
This difference is due to the non-linear relation between the random effects and the dis-























Figure 1 Ethnic residential segregation in Duisburg, calculated based on tabu-
lated data and using multilevel binomial response approach
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Table 1 Multilevel modelling of ethnic residential segregation in Duisburg, 
2003-2006 (n=6,532)
M0: gross D
M1: + individual 
characteristics
M2: + contextual 
characteristics
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Intercept -1.59* 0.16 -2.86* 0.18 -2.78* 0.14
Age -0.03* 0.00 -0.04* 0.00
Female -0.43* 0.08 -0.44* 0.08
Married 1.57* 0.11 1.56* 0.11
Household size 0.50* 0.03 0.50* 0.03
Group compositional differences
Education
No education 2.40* 0.14 2.38* 0.14
Hauptschule 0.70* 0.12 0.68* 0.12
Realschule (ref.)
(Fach-)Hochschulreife 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.15
Receives unemployment benefits 0.99* 0.13 0.97* 0.13
Receives social welfare 0.72* 0.19 0.71* 0.19
Contextual differences
Average room size -0.08* 0.03
Average price per qm -0.41 0.23
Social welfare recipients per 
1,000 inhabitants 0.01* 0.00
Proportion of ethnic clubs -0.94 1.29
Variance neighborhood level 1.08 0.97 0.38
SCF2 - 0.60 0.53
R2 neighborhood level - 0.55 0.84
Note. All variables (with the exception of “education”) grand-mean centered. Comparisons 
across models require multiplication of M1 and M2 coefficients with the squared scale 
correction factors. 
but also by gender – an important category in research on labour market segrega-
tion. Our final sample includes 1,082,025 individuals (11.2 percent of which are 
immigrants) living in one of the EU-15 member states. The dependent variable in 
this case study is a dichotomous variable indicating whether respondents were born 
outside their country of residence (1) or born in the country of residence (0).
Labour market outcomes such as occupational sorting typically result from 
matching processes between employers wanting to fill vacancies with suitable can-
didates and employees expecting to receive adequate compensation for the skills 
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they offer (Kalleberg and Sørensen, 1979). Systematic differences in occupational 
sorting between immigrants and the majority population may therefore result from 
(1) between-group differences in the skills they offer or (2) preferences of employers 
for individual characteristics that go beyond skill endowment (i.e., discrimination; 
Granato and Kalter 2001). Since discriminatory explanations are notoriously dif-
ficult to uncover with large-scale survey data, we focus on the first aspect, namely 
compositional differences between immigrants and the majority population in 
terms of relevant skills. Central to group differences regarding skills will be edu-
cational attainment as a first crude approximation where higher levels of education 
are assumed to be associated with higher skill levels. This approximation obviously 
ignores substantial variation in labour market skills within educational categories. 
We try to improve the approximation by including occupational characteristics 
that are correlated with differences in skill level. For example, two occupations 
may be chosen by individuals with similar educational attainment profiles. But 
these occupations differ along other dimensions (e.g., the prevalence of temporary 
employment contracts) that make them more or less attractive to the higher skilled 
employees and thereby help in explaining group differences in occupational sort-
ing beyond mere compositional differences in the absence of adequate data. Hence, 
when trying to account for the observed degree of ethnic occupational segregation, 
we include the following individual characteristics (i.e., compositional differences 
between immigrants and the majority population, level 1) as well as contextual 
characteristics (i.e., differences between occupational categories, level 2). For the 
first set of characteristics, measures of age (in years), marital status (0=not mar-
ried, 1=married), nationality (0=nationalized, 1=non-national), educational attain-
ment (0=ISCED to 6=ISCED 6), weekly work hours and full-time employment 
(0=part-time, 1=full-time). In contrast to the data used in case study 3, the EULFS 
includes few relevant occupational characteristics. We therefore rely on aggregating 
country-specific individual characteristics for each occupational category: the per-
centage of firms employing more than 10 workers, the percentage of workers hold-
ing temporary contracts and the percentage employed in non-shiftwork. Results for 
the simulated index of dissimilarity D are based on gender- and country-specific 
multilevel binomial response models where employees (level 1) are hierarchically 
nested in 131 occupational categories (level 2).
Results
Figure 2 visualizes the results for modelling ethnic occupational segregation sepa-
rately for men (upper panel) and women (lower panel) across 15 European-Union 
countries. To begin with, we note that the figure shows substantial cross-national 
variation in the extent of D. For males, the results for simulating D from the initial 
models without individual- respectively occupational-level explanatory characteris-
tics range from a minimum of 0.18 (Belgium) to a maximum of 0.49 (Greece). For 
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females, the minimum in ethnic occupational segregation equals 0.15 (Belgium), 
while its maximum is 0.52 (Greece). To illustrate, these numbers could be taken 
to imply that in Belgium, 18% of the first generation male immigrants and major-
ity members would need to change between occupational categories in order to 
achieve an equal distribution across all occupations. However, the results from the 
subsequent models demonstrate that the extent of ethnic occupational segregation 
is substantially reduced once the previously discussed explanatory variables are 
taken into account. For all countries and for both males and females, controlling 
for compositional characteristics of the individual employees uniformly results in 
a decrease of D. For example, the largest drops in D are found for Italy (for male 
employees, ΔD = 0.24; for female employees, ΔD = 0.19). To reiterate the logic 
of the underlying modelling approach, we note that parts of the level-2 variance, 
which in this case reflects how strongly the proportion of immigrants varies across 
occupations, are accounted for by differences in, for instance, educational profiles 
or weekly work hours between immigrants and the respective host society popula-
tions. Conversely, the remaining level-2 variance suggest that even after accounting 
for these compositional differences, immigrants are still disproportionately more 
often working in some occupations rather than others. This implies that there are 
either compositional differences we haven’t picked up yet and/or that these differ-
ences can be explained by systematic difference of occupations themselves.  The 
figure also shows that adding the occupation-level characteristics to the model leads 
for many countries to a further, albeit relatively small decrease in the extent of 
ethnic occupational segregation.  Interestingly, between countries the data reveal 
a heterogeneous pattern of results between occupational characteristics and the 
proportion of (male) immigrants in each country-specific occupational category. 
For example, whereas an occupations higher prevalence of shift work is positively 
associated with a higher share of immigrants in Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and 
the UK, no such correlation is present in the remaining EU-15 countries. Similarly, 
in some countries immigrants seem to overrepresented in occupations typically 
present in smaller firms in some countries: in Belgium, Greece, Italy and Spain, 
the results show that the higher an occupation’s proportion of individuals working 
in firms with more than 10 employees, the smaller that occupation’s proportion 
of immigrants. However, in the remaining countries this association is virtually 
absent5. Collectively, these results could be taken to explore potential country-level 
moderators of the divergent relations between the predictors and the proportion of 
(male) immigrants in the occupational categories.
5 Table A1 in the appendix summarizes the pattern of results. Detailed results are avail-
able upon request. 
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Study 3: Occupational and Industrial Gender Segregation
Data and Theory
For the third case study, we rely on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
Study (GSOEP, Wagner et al. 2007), which has been collected annually since 1984 
as a probability-based sample of households. We use the 2011 wave and restrict the 
sample to (self-) employed individuals aged 25 to 54. Information on occupations 
is again based on three-digit ISCO-88 codes. Because we are also interested in 
estimating the level of gender industry segregation that is independent of occu-
pational segregation, we rely on the division categories of the NACE classifica-
tion of industries which comprises a total of 62 categories (e.g., ‘crop and animal 
production’, ‘manufacturing of electrical equipment’ or ‘education’). In total, the 
sample covers 7,802 employees working in 108 occupations and 62 industries. The 
dependent variable in this case study is a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
respondents were female (1) or male (0).
Similar to the mechanisms that generate patterns of ethnic occupational segre-
gation, occupational segregation is a result of women and men systematically sort-
ing into different occupations. The reasons for this differential sorting are broadly 












































Figure 2 Ethnic occupational segregation in EU-15 countries based on multi-
level simulation approach
methods, data, analyses | Vol. 12(2), 2018, pp. 211-232 224 
as differences in (anticipated) life course pressures (Ostner 1990; Hakim 2002; 
Padavic and Reskin 2002). According to socialization theory, occupational prefer-
ences are established in earliest socialization with individuals adopting gendered 
skills to varying degrees. Gendered preferences may lead individuals to opt for 
jobs where these skills are more advantageous such as occupations with a strong 
“social” or “caring” component in the case of women; occupations which are typi-
cally part of the service sector (Busch 2013). In addition, different stages in the life 
course are associated with specific pressure on individuals to reconcile family and 
employment (Filer 1989; Tam 1997). These pressures are especially marked for 
women with (small) children who therefore more often work part-time or in jobs 
with higher flexibility (Glass and Camarigg 1992; Bush 2013; Cha 2013). 
Hence, in order to account for the extent of occupational and industry seg-
regation in Germany, we include measures that aim to capture differences in life-
course stages and occupational characteristics indicative of job higher flexibility. In 
terms of life-course stage, we include individual-level measures for marital status 
(1=married, 0=else), household type (1= single household, 2= single parent house-
hold, 3= two person household, no children present, 4= two parent household, at 
least one children younger than 16 years present, 5= two parent household, children 
16 or older present, 6=other), the number of children present in the household who 
are younger than 16, the total years of full-time work experience and the num-
ber of years individuals worked with their current employer. Flexibility differences 
are captured using the following individual-level characteristics: respondent works 
part-time, respondent holds a managerial position and works in service industry. In 
addition, we include occupation-level characteristics which were computed from 
the SOEP data: the percentage of public employees, percentage working in the 
service industry, percentage of individuals working in the occupation they trained 
for, average status of occupation (based on ISEI scores), average company size and 
average job autonomy. And finally, we also include respondent’s education based 
on the six category ISCED 1997 classification. Notice that occupations and indus-
tries are not necessarily nested within another; for example, a white or blue collar 
workers can certainly work in different industries, and vice versa. Thus, a more 
realistic view is to consider employees to be situated in a cross-classification of 
jobs and industries, and this is why we use a non-hierarchically cross-classified 
multilevel model (Raudenbush and Bryk 2012). Accordingly, in this example, we 
take employees (level 1) to be non-hierarchically nested in both occupations (level 
2a) and industries (level 2b). Our results are based on cross-classified multilevel 
binomial response models where employees are non-hierarchically nested in 108 
occupations and 62 industries.
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Results
The main results for this case study are presented in Figure 3. The index of dissimi-
larity based on cross-tabulated data is calculated as 0.52 for occupational gender 
segregation and 0.39 for industrial gender segregation. The corresponding values 
from the multilevel simulation approach are 0.45 (CI=[0.38;0.52]) for occupational 
and 0.18 (CI=[0.13;0.25]) for industrial gender segregation. Hence, there is consid-
erably less agreement in the extent of segregation compared to the findings pre-
sented for residential segregation above. That is because the calculation based on 
cross-tabulated data is only two-dimensional and thus cannot take into account 
deviations from unevenness due to some other but possibly related grouping factor. 
The same is not true for multilevel simulation approach: here, additional group-
ing factors are taken into account by simply modelling them. The corresponding 
random effect is estimated net of other random effects present in the models. The 
differences between the tabulated and simulated indices of dissimilarity thus indi-
cate that some part of occupational segregation is due to industrial segregation and 
vice versa. Though, apparently it is primarily industrial gender segregation that is 
artificially inflated due to not taking into account occupation-level random effects.
The following bars in Figure 3 depict the simulated dissimilarity index when adding 
employee characteristics to the models (see Table 2, model M1 for detailed results). 

























Figure 3 Occupational and industrial gender segregation in Germany, calculat-
ed based on tabulated data and using cross-classified multilevel bino-
mial response models
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the proportion of women across occupations and industries: levels of segregation 
decrease to 0.38 (CI=[0.31;0.44]) for occupations and to 0.12 (CI=[0.08;0.16]) for 
industries. Thus, on average 16 percent ([0.45-0.38]/0.45) of occupational gender 
segregation are due to employees with specific characteristics differentially sorting 
across occupations: for example, some occupations are more frequently composed 
of individuals working part-time or in service industries. And because these char-
acteristics are more prevalent among women, the inclusion of their attributes in 
the simulation models accounts for some of the observed unevenness in the gen-
der distribution across occupations. Similarly, differences in employee composition 
account for roughly 33 percent of industrial gender segregation. And finally, adding 
characteristics of occupations to the model further decreases the simulated segre-
gation to an average of 0.30 (CI=[0.24; 0.35]) for occupations and to 0.11 (CI=[0.07; 
0.15]) for industries. According to the estimates presented in M2, occupations with 
a higher percentage of employees working in service industries also tend to have 
a higher proportion of women working in them. None of the other occupational 
characteristics covary with the proportion of women per occupation. Occupational 
characteristics account for an additional 15 percentage points in occupational gen-
der segregation and another 5 percentage points in industrial gender segregation 
through differences across industries regarding their occupational make-up. Even 
though we included a broad range of factors associated with differences in life-
course stages and flexibility demands, especially the extent of occupational gender 
segregation remaining is substantial: around one third of female or male employees 
would need to change occupations to arrive at an even distribution.
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Table 2 Multilevel modelling of occupational and industry gender 
segregation, GSOEP 2011 (n=7,802)
M0: gross D M1: + individual 
characteristics
M2: + contextual 
characteristics
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Intercept -0.50* 0.17 -0.10 0.29 0.01 0.28
Educational attainment -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03
Group compositional differences
Married 0.48* 0.08 0.48* 0.08
Household type (ref. other)
Single household -0.10 0.26 -0.09 0.26
Single parent household 1.28* 0.29 1.30* 0.29
Two person household 0.14 0.26 0.15 0.26
Two parent household, at least  one 
child younger than 16 present -0.71* 0.27 -0.70* 0.30
Two parent household, children 16 
or older present -0.24 0.26 -0.23 0.26
Number of children younger than 16 -0.17* 0.07 -0.17* 0.07
Total years of full-time work  
experience -0.07* 0.01 -0.07* 0.01
Number of years worked with  
current employer 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.01
Works part-time 2.20* 0.11 2.19* 0.11
Holds managerial position -0.50* 0.09 -0.51* 0.09
Works in service industry 0.46* 0.14 0.35* 0.14
Contextual differences
Percentage of public employees -0.75 0.63
Percentage working in service 
industry 2.52* 0.48
Percentage working in occupation 
they trained for -0.27 0.64
Average occupational ISEI 0.01 0.01
Average job autonomy -0.12 0.30
Variance occupation level 2.03 1.67 1.07
Variance industry level 0.24 0.13 0.13
SCF2 - 0.74 0.63
R2 occupation level - 0.39 0.67
R2 industry level - 0.60 0.66
Note. All variables grand-mean centered. Comparisons across models require multiplica-
tion of M1 and M2 coefficients with the squared scale correction factors. 
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Discussion
In this article we sought to demonstrate how using a standard multilevel binomial 
response model in an atypical way enables researchers to overcome several limita-
tions that long have hindered research on segregation. In following Leckie et al. 
(2012), we showed how the upper-level variances from a binomial multilevel model 
can be effectively used as accurate measure of ethnic and gender segregation. Fur-
ther, by employing simulation techniques we then converted this measure into the 
popular and well-known index of dissimilarity D. This methodological strategy 
helped not only to avoid the common inflation of D due to small unit bias. In addi-
tion, the novel approach also enabled us to assess segregation simultaneously at 
different scales and to examine the contribution of explanatory variables at multi-
ple, statistically appropriate levels of analysis6. Although our primary focus in this 
paper was methodological, our illustrative case studies yielded several substantial 
findings that deserve enhanced attention in subsequent research. Specifically, to the 
literature on ethnic residential segregation this study adds the insight that control-
ling for individual-level differences in group members’ socioeconomic resources 
drastically reduces the degree of residential segregation (Teltemann, Dabrowski 
and Windzio, 2015). Unlike previous research, our results show that even after an 
array of individual-level differences is taken into account, contextual-level char-
acteristics still make a significant contribution to ethnic residential segregation. 
Relatedly, this study also extends previous knowledge on ethnic occupational seg-
regation. Our findings not only show a substantial decrease in ethnic occupational 
segregation across several countries once various individual-level factor are taken 
into account. In addition, the results also offer new insights of the role occupa-
tion-level characteristics play in shaping differences between ethnic majority- and 
minority at the labour market. With regard to the literature on gender segregation 
at the labour market, this article is the first that assesses segregation simultane-
ously at different levels using a cross-classified multilevel model.  Doing so yielded 
the novel finding that what appears at first sight as different distribution of men 
and women across occupations should be better understood as simultaneous seg-
regation not only at the level of occupations, but also at the level of industries. 
Apart from these substantial contributions, future methodological developments 
might expand our knowledge in several directions. For example, in focusing on 
D, we have explored the issue of using a multilevel inferential framework for a 
single index of segregation only. However, it is well-known that research on seg-
6 We refer readers interested in applying the methods described here for their own needs 
to Spörlein, C. (2016). multi.correct: An R package to calculate and correct the Index of 
Dissimilarity using multilevel/random effects models, available at https://github.com/
chspoerlein/multi.correct.git . Simply type multi_correct after loading the package to 
inspect the code or ?multi_correct for the help file and code examples.
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regation offers a particularly rich array of different segregation measures (Massey 
and Denton, 1985). Indeed, the statistical approach applied in this paper appears 
to be suitable to several alternative measures of segregation, such as the prominent 
isolation- respectively interaction-index (see Leckie et al., 2012) or the index of net 
difference (ND, see Lieberson 1969). It also appears promising to apply the present 
approach for assessing segregation phenomenon between multiple ethnic or demo-
graphic groups. For ease of exposition, in this contribution we restricted our focus 
on modelling segregation for two groups only. Yet by extending the binomial to a 
multinomial response model the present approach is also capable to provide accu-
rate estimates of segregation between multiple groups (Jones et al. 2015, Reardon 
and Firebaugh 2002). Collectively, the insights resulting from such methodological 
developments will help to better inform our theoretical understanding of the extent 
and the sources underlying social segregation.
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Appendix
Table A1:  Ethnic occupational segregation in EU-15 countries based on multi-
level simulation approach. The table shows significantly (p < .05) po-
sitive or negative associations of the predictors with the proportion of 





















AT - + - + - +
BE - + - + - - +
DE - + - + - -
DK - + + +
ES + + + - + -
FI - + +
FR + + +
GR - + + + - - -
IE + + + + - -
IT - + + + - -
LU + + +
NL + - + +
PT - + + + -
SE - + + + +
UK - + + + - - -
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Abstract
This article introduces two advanced analytical strategies for analyzing contextual-level 
outcomes in multilevel models: the multilevel SEM and the two-step approach. Since these 
strategies are seldom used in comparative survey research, we first discuss their method-
ological and statistical advantages over the more commonly applied approach of group 
mean aggregation. We then illustrate these advantages in an empirical analysis of the ef-
fect of citizens' support for democratic values at the individual level on a contextual-level 
outcome – the persistence of democracy – drawing on data from the World Values Survey 
and the Quality of Government project. Whereas we found no significant effect of support 
for democratic values in the model using simple group mean aggregation, citizens' support 
for democratic values was a significant predictor of democracies' estimated survival rate 
when applying latent aggregation in multilevel SEM and the two-step approach. The article 
corroborates previous concerns with simple aggregation and demonstrates how researchers 
can improve the validity of their analyses of contextual-level outcomes by using alternative 
strategies of aggregation.
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Despite significant methodological advancements, comparative social scientists 
continue to face the question of how to adequately test theoretical multilevel models 
empirically. Hierarchical modeling has evolved into a canonical statistical tech-
nique for regressing an individual-level variable on individual- and contextual-level 
predictors. There is no agreement when it comes to multilevel models where the 
dependent variable is analytically located on the contextual level, though. 
Many comparative studies ‘solve’ this problem through measures of central 
tendency – such as the average – or the distribution of the data – such as percent-
ages. They then use these aggregates as predictors for the contextual-level depen-
dent variable (for examples, see Fails & Pierce, 2010; Lim, Bond, & Bond, 2005; 
Muller & Seligson, 1994). This approach has been criticized on both statistical 
and methodological grounds. Croon and van Veldhoven (2007) demonstrated that 
group mean aggregation may lead to biased estimates. Griffin (1997) argued that 
the aggregation procedure needs to take into account the complex theoretical rela-
tionships of independent variables at different levels of analysis. When applying 
simple aggregation, researchers may run the risk of drawing invalid conclusions 
about how individual-level predictors affect contextual-level outcomes (Snijders & 
Bosker, 1999). 
Given these criticisms, researchers have proposed two more advanced strat-
egies for analyzing contextual-level outcomes in multilevel models: the mul-
tilevel SEM and the two-step approach. Since multilevel SEM and the two-step 
approach are seldom used in comparative survey research, the article seeks to 
motivate researchers to improve the validity of their inferences when analyzing 
contextual-level outcomes by going beyond simple aggregation. In the following 
section, we introduce the methodological and statistical advantages of these two 
alternative techniques over the group means approach. In our analysis, we illus-
trate these advantages in an empirical study of the effect of citizens’ support for 
democratic values at the individual level on a contextual outcome – the persistence 
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of democracy. We draw on data from the World Values Survey and the Quality of 
Government project and study 98 countries between 1946 and 2014. We compare 
the regression coefficients and confidence intervals of our individual-level predictor 
– support for democratic values – on democracies’ persistence when applying the 
three methods. Whereas we found no significant effect of support for democratic 
values in the model using simple group mean aggregation, citizens’ support for 
democratic values was a significant predictor of democracies’ estimated survival 
rate when applying multilevel SEM and the two-step approach. In the final section 
we therefore conclude that comparative researchers who use simple group mean 
aggregation when regressing a contextual outcome on individual level predictors 
may run the risk of wrongly rejecting their hypothesis of interest.
Methodological Foundation and Statistical 
Background
Testing theoretical multilevel models with contextual-level outcomes poses two 
challenges. From a methodological point of view, researchers need to establish 
close correspondence between the theoretical multilevel mechanism and its empiri-
cal measurement. From a statistical perspective, they need to choose a method that 
is both valid and reliable for aggregating the individual-level predictors. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss the methodological foundations of multilevel analysis of macro-
level social phenomena. We then proceed to introduce and compare three analyti-
cal strategies for analyzing contextual level outcomes: simple manifest group mean 
aggregation, latent aggregation through multilevel SEM, and the two-step approach. 
The results of the comparison are summarized in Table 1 at the end of this chapter.
Methodological Foundation
According to the paradigm of structural individualism (Udehn, 2002), the ultimate 
goal of the social sciences is to explain social phenomena on the contextual – or 
macro – level as a consequence of individuals’ social actions on the individual – 
or micro – level. Structural individualism distinguishes three explanatory mecha-
nisms (see Figure 1) (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; Tranow, Beckers, & Becker, 
2016). Situational mechanisms (1) link the objective characteristics of the social 
situation to the subjective expectations and evaluations of individuals. Action-for-
mation mechanisms (2) explain individuals’ actions given their subjective defini-
tion of the situation. This is a pure micro-level explanatory step. Transformational 
mechanisms (3) reconstruct how individuals’ actions aggregate to create a new 
social situation. They thereby re-link the micro level to the macro level. 
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Studying these theoretical mechanisms empirically is not straightforward. 
Multilevel modeling (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Hox, 2010) is a well-established 
statistical tool for testing situational and action formation mechanisms, that is, 
explanations that link social situations to individuals’ expectations, evaluations, 
and actual decisions (Becker, Beckers, Franzmann, & Hagenah, 2016). By contrast, 
micro-to-macro (or, more technically, level-one to level-two) explanations consti-
tute a blind spot of conventional multilevel analysis (henceforth MLA)1 as transfor-
mational mechanisms are more difficult to analyze empirically (Opp, 2011; Raub, 
Buskens, & van Assen, 2011). 
Three Analytical Strategies
The simple group means approach
When studying multilevel models with contextual-level outcomes, a common 
approach (Lim et al., 2005) is to aggregate all level-one variables (hereafter L1) 
to level-two variables (hereafter L2) by computing their group-specific arithmetic 
means. This manifest aggregation is followed by an L2-only regression (see Figure 2). 
Methodologically, this method models neither situational nor action-formation 
mechanisms and accounts for transformational mechanisms via (manifest) aggre-
gation (see Figure 2). Statistically, Croon and van Veldhoven (2007) have shown 
that this procedure only yields valid estimates if the L1 variance of the aggregated 
variables is zero. If the L1 variance is larger than zero, simple group mean aggre-
gation yields biased estimates. In cross-national comparative survey research, this 
1 In accordance with previous research, we use the terms ‘conventional’ or ‘standard’ 
multilevel analysis to describe hierarchical modeling techniques that are restricted to 
the analysis of level-one outcomes (Bennink, Croon, & Vermunt, 2013, 2015; Lüdtke et 









 Figure 1 The social mechanisms of  social science explanations. Source: Hedström & Ylikoski (2010, p. 
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Figure 1  The social mechanisms of social science explanations.  
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is often the case because individuals are sampled from a finite population and a 
specific constellation of individuals is selected to measure the L2 construct (Lüdtke 
et al., 2008). Since manifest aggregation does not control for these sampling errors, 
the observed group average (measured, for instance, in terms of group-specific 
arithmetic means) may be an unreliable measure of the unobserved true group aver-
age. In addition, the observed group average completely obscures the heterogeneity 
within groups. Therefore, if effects of observed group averages on L2 outcomes are 
of interest, estimates of both these effects and of other L2 predictors are likely to 
be biased when applying the simple group means approach (Bennink et al., 2013, 
2015; Shin & Raudenbush, 2010). 
The multilevel SEM approach
Multilevel SEM avoids these statistical problems by replacing manifest with latent 
aggregation (see Figure 3). Assume that we observe a manifest L1 variable Xij for 
individuals i in countries j. Xij is used to predict a manifest L2 outcome Yj along 
with other L2 predictors Pj. Following the simple group means approach, Xij is 
aggregated from L1 to L2 by computing group-specific arithmetic means jX• , 
which are not corrected for sampling error. In a second step, jX•  are used to pre-
dict Yj controlled for Pj (adapted from Marsh et al., 2009):
2
 
0 1 • 2 0j j j jY X P uβ β β= + + +  
(1)
2 The notation by Marsh et al. (2009) implies group mean centering of all L1 predic-
tors to account for a reference-group effect (in their example, this is the dependence 
of student academic self-concept on class-average achievement). Since our substantive 
application does not include a reference-group effect, we present the general notation 
















Figure 2  The simple group means approach
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By contrast, multilevel SEM regards the actual group mean on L2 as an unobserved 
latent variable Uxj (which must not be confused with L2 residual error uoj) that can 
only be estimated with error by the L1 indicators (Marsh et al., 2009). Following 
the conventions of SEM, the L2 latent means of the L1 observations are therefore 
depicted by ovals in Figure 3. While the simple group means approach treats the L2 
group mean as a simple composite or index score of the L1 observations, multilevel 
SEM assumes the unobserved latent group means to cause the observed L1 values 
(Lüdtke et al., 2008).3 
Multilevel SEM proceeds in two steps: First, an L2 latent variable Uxj is esti-
mated. It is assumed to be the cause of Xij at L1. In a second step, Uxj is used to 
predict the L2 outcome Yj along with the other L2 predictors Pj:
4
0 1 2 0j xj j jY U P uβ β β= + + +  (2)
The aggregated L2 construct is a measure of the unobserved true group mean. Its 
reliability is a function of the relative share of the L2 variance weighted by the 







τ σ+  (3)
3 This points to the difference between formative and reflective models in measurement 
theory. Whereas formative latent variable models are already established in single-lev-
el measurement models (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001), it remains unresolved 
whether formative latent aggregation is equally possible.
4 Additional controls for measurement error can be integrated easily (Marsh et al., 2009). 
For the sake of simplicity, our analysis of democratic persistence is limited to latent 
aggregation without controlling for measurement error.
  
















Figure 3  Latent aggregation in multilevel structural equation modeling 
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As in conventional hierarchical modeling, σ²x denotes the L1 part and τ²x the L2 
part of the variation of the respective indicator(s), whereas nj refers to the group-
specific number of observations. 
By estimating a latent L2 variable Uxj as in (2), the variance of the L1 indicator 
is partitioned into an L1 and an L2 component. Unlike simple group mean aggre-
gation, latent aggregation takes account of the heterogeneity within each group by 
partitioning the L1 variance σ²x from the L2 variance τ²x. In addition, by estimating 
latent group means at L2, which are assumed to cause the L1 observations in each 
group, the multilevel SEM approach acknowledges that the L1 scores do not per-
fectly map the construct at the L2 level, because of measurement error (Bennink et 
al., 2013, 2015; Preacher et al., 2010).
In sum, multilevel SEM replaces manifest with latent aggregation to aggre-
gate individual-level predictors of macro-level outcomes. Like manifest aggrega-
tion, latent aggregation per se models only the transformational but not the situ-
ational and action formation mechanism. Statistically, however, latent aggregration 
is superior to manifest aggregation since it corrects for sampling error (see Table 1). 
As a result, its estimates are less biased, thereby permitting more valid inferences 
regarding the effect of multilevel predictors on contextual-level outcomes.
The two-step approach
The two-step approach also deals with the methodological and statistical issues that 
arise when studying multilevel models with contextual-level outcomes, albeit in a 
different manner. Figure 4 summarizes its basic idea.
The two-step approach builds on standard MLA. For an L1 outcome Yij and 
L1 units i nested in L2 contexts j, the standard model is given by:
0 1ij j j ij ijY X eβ β= + +  (4)
In equation (4), β0j is the regression intercept of the outcome variable, ß1j is the 
regression slope of an L1 predictor, and eij is the residual error term. In contrast to 
non-nested regression analysis, both random intercepts β0j and random slopes ß1j 
can be estimated for each L2 unit j by modeling them as a function of an additional 
L2 predictor Zj with distinct intercepts (γ00 and γ10) and regression slopes (γ01 and 
γ11):
0 00 01 0j j jZ uβ γ γ= + +  (5)
1 10 11 1j j jZ uβ γ γ= + +  
(6)
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Equations (5) and (6) introduce two additional residual error components: u0j 
denotes the residual error of the outcome’s L2 intercept ß0j, and u1j denotes the 
residual error of the slope ß1j between L2 units.
Standard MLA only considers the case of an L1 outcome Yij that is predicted 
by L1 and L2 variables Xij and Zj, respectively. Griffin (1997) proposes an exten-
sion of the standard MLA approach to study an L2 outcome Yj: Let X1ij be the L1 
explanatory variable of primary interest. In a first step, X1ij is regressed on all other 
L1 and L2 predictors X2ij, …, Xnij and Zj:
1 00 01 0 1 2 ...ij j j j ij nj nij ijX Z X X eγ γ τ β β= + + + + + +  
(7)
In a second step, the L2 residuals u0j of this model are used as a predictor variable 
in an L2 regression of the L2 outcome of interest:
0 1 0j j jY u eβ β= + +  
(8)
The effect of u0j on the L2 outcome Y can be interpreted as the aggregated effect of 
the L1 variable X1, net of both L1 and L2 covariates X2, …, Xn and Z. 
The two-step approach has both statistical and methodological advantages 
when studying multilevel models with contextual-level outcomes (see Table 1). 
Statistically, it provides a better estimate than the group mean aggregate: u0j is 
a model-based estimate of the L2 variance that is already net of the L1 variance. 
In addition, u0j can be adjusted for other covariates at L1 and L2. This may save 
degrees of freedom and circumvent collinearity issues when using u0j as a predic-
tor in a subsequent L2 regression. Compared to the group means approach and 
the multilevel SEM approach, the crucial methodological advantage of the two-

















Figure 4  The two-step approach
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explanations in their entirety. The MLA of step 1 maps both the situational and 
action formation mechanism through the regression of an L1 outcome on L1 and L2 
predictors. Storing the L2 residuals of this MLA then maps an underlying transfor-
mational mechanism in terms of an L1-L2 aggregation.
The relative statistical performance of each method can also be compared 
empirically. Based on previous research, we deduce two hypotheses. First, we 
expect that unless the L1 variance equals zero, simple group mean aggregation 
yields unreliable measures of the unobserved true group means. By contrast, mul-
tilevel SEM results in reliable estimates of true group means. Consequently, when 
group means based on simple aggregation are used as predictors of an L2 outcome, 
estimates of their regression coefficients may be biased (Bennink et al., 2013, 2015):
H1: Regression coefficients of L2 predictors that are simple group means 
deviate in terms of a) point estimates, b) standard errors, and c) resulting 
significance levels from regression coefficients of L2 predictors that have 
been aggregated through multilevel SEM.
Second, while the statistical performance of the two-step approach (Griffin, 1997) 
is less well researched, Lüdtke et al. (2008) compared multilevel SEM to another 
two-step approach proposed by Croon and van Veldhoven (2007). This approach 
adjusts the observed group means with weights from ANOVA formulas. This 
is quite similar to the decomposition of variance in an empty multilevel model. 
Lüdtke et al. (2008) observed that Croon and van Veldhoven’s (2007) approach per-
formed slightly less well than multilevel SEM. Consequently, we expect Griffin’s 
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two-step approach to yield estimates closer to multilevel SEM than to the simple 
group means approach:
H2: Regression coefficients of L2 predictors that have been aggregated by 
the two-step approach deviate less from multilevel SEM in terms of a) point 
estimates, b) standard errors, and c) resulting significance levels than regres-
sion coefficients of L2 predictors that are simple group means.
Substantive Application: A Multilevel Explanation 
of the Persistence of Democracy
Theoretical Background
To illustrate the methodological and statistical issues described in the previous sec-
tion, we use the persistence of democracy as a substantive example. Explanations of 
democratic persistence pertain either to a macro-to-micro mechanism leading from 
the macro level to the level of individual citizens or to a micro-to-macro mechanism 
leading from individual citizens to the persistence of democracy at the macro level. 
Przeworski (1991) introduces a classic model linking macro-level causes to 
individuals’ micro-level incentives for subverting a democratic regime. Acknowl-
edging that democratic competition produces winners and losers, he argues that 
“political forces comply with present defeats because they believe that the insti-
tutional framework that organizes the democratic competition will permit them 
to advance their interests in the future” (Przeworski, 1991, p. 19). Institutions are 
not only crucial for inspiring the belief that there will be future possibilities to 
advance one’s interests. The given set of political and economic institutions also 
has distributional consequences affecting the capacities individuals have at their 
disposal to advance their interests (Przeworski, 1991). A model of democratic per-
sistence therefore has to take into account that – under the same set of democratic 
rules – members of some societal groups might deem their chances of affecting 
future democratic outcomes to be lower than members of other societal groups. 
Correspondingly, classic studies have analyzed the decisive impact of economic 
development on both the process of successful democratization (Bollen, 1979; Bol-
len & Jackman, 1985; Lipset, 1959) as well as democratic persistence (Przeworski, 
Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). 
A second example for the macro-to-micro mechanism underlying the persis-
tence of democracy is the idea that an ethnically divided society poses a particular 
challenge to democratic persistence (Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972; 
Reilly, 2001). In countries where several ethnic groups are politically mobilized, 
the question of who is to legitimately take part in the democratic game is continu-
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ously contested. Members of ethnic minorities often see little incentive to support 
ruling elites, who are – in virtue of the majority principle – likely to be members of 
the majority group. As a result, those out of power may choose to subvert democ-
racy because they feel permanently excluded from democratic decisions likely to 
reflect only the interests of the majority. 
A classic example of the micro-to-macro mechanism underlying the persis-
tence of democracy is the political culture model. Almond and Verba (1963) semi-
nally argued that the persistence of a political regime does not rest on its formal 
democratic institutions alone, but also on its political culture. Succeeding studies 
further specified the content of political culture and its effect on democratic persis-
tence based on Easton’s (1965, 1975) systems theory (Dalton, 2004; Fuchs, 2007; 
Norris, 1999). According to Easton, citizens’ political support refers to their sup-
portive values and attitudes toward the political community, the political regime, 
and political authorities (Easton, 1965). A critical amount of political support is 
necessary for any kind of political system to persist. Citizens’ political support 
increases the functionality of political systems as it allows political authorities to 
convert demands into outputs and permits them to implement collectively binding 
decisions without having to resort to force (Easton, 1965). 
Building on Easton (1965, 1975), Fuchs (2007) clarifies the implications of 
the different dimensions of political support for democratic political regimes. Sup-
port for the political authorities is crucial for their re- or de-election; support for 
the political system is essential for the persistence of a given type of democracy; 
support for democratic values is critical for the persistence of democracy in general 
(Fuchs, 2007). Thus, citizens’ support for democratic values is the key factor when 
studying the effect of individual-level political orientations on the persistence of 
democracy at the macro level. 
Fails and Pierce (2010) tested the systems approach of the political culture 
model empirically. Their analysis yielded no significant relationship between citi-
zens’ support for democratic values and their rejection of authoritarian values on 
the one hand and the probability of a decline of democracy on the other hand.
These mechanisms can be combined into a full multilevel explanation of dem-
ocratic persistence (see Figure 5). From the macro to micro explanations, we take 
the insight that citizens’ support for democratic values is likely to be affected by 
context-specific economic conditions and ethnic heterogeneity. From the micro to 
macro explanations, we take the insight that micro-level support for democratic 
values crucially accounts for the persistence of democracy at the macro level.
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Research Design
Period of analysis and data
Based on the data available, we analyzed the persistence of democracy from 1946 
to 2014. We derived all L2 indicators from the Quality of Government standard 
time series data set (QoG) (Teorell et al., 2016), which includes data on a broad 
range of country-level indicators over time that we could easily merge with our L1 
data. 
To measure our L2 outcome variable – democratic persistence – we used the 
democracy index developed by the Polity IV project as included in the QoG (Mar-
shall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2015). Polity IV’s democracy index – POLITY – reports 
countries’ level of democracy on a scale ranging from -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 
(fully democratic).5 In line with the threshold provided on the Polity IV website 
(Marshall & Gurr, 2014), we considered countries as democracies if their POLITY 
score ≥ 6.6 
As for our L2 predictors, we used the following indicators: Economic devel-
opment was measured using countries’ annual gross domestic product (GDP). We 
used the log of the OECD measure of GDP per capita. Ethnic heterogeneity was 
5 POLITY is a composite score that quantifies the extent to which a country exhibits 
democratic and authoritarian characteristics. Polity IV coders assess countries’ formal 
political institutions in terms of five component variables – the competitiveness of po-
litical participation (1), the openness of executive recruitment (2), the competitiveness 
of executive recruitment (3), the constraints on the executive (4), and the regulation of 
political participation (5) for each country on an annual basis. Countries are assigned 
weighted scores for each component. These are then added up to arrive at a democ-
racy (DEMOC) and an autocracy score (AUTOC), both of which range from 0 to 10. 
The autocracy score is then subtracted from the democracy score to construct POLITY 
(Marshall et al., 2015).
6 We noted an inconsistency in the definition of the thresholds. In their codebook, Mar-


















Figure 5  A two-level explanation of the persistence of democracy
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measured using Fearon’s (2003) ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (ELF), a 
measure of the probability that two randomly chosen individuals from a particular 
country are members of different ethnic groups. It ranges from 0 (perfect homoge-
neity) to 1 (very high fractionalization).7
Citizens’ support for democratic values and all other L1 covariates were 
derived from the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS is a cross-national 
survey based on representative national samples investigating worldwide socio-
cultural and political change. For our analyses, we used the wave 6 aggregated 
longitudinal file, which includes more than 340,000 observations sampled in 101 
countries across all available waves from 1981 to 2014. In line with previous 
research, support for democratic values was operationalized in terms of respon-
dents’ reply to the following question: “I’m going to describe various types of polit-
ical systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. 
For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad 
way of governing this country?”. For reasons of data availability, we used respon-
dents’ rejection of an authoritarian system rather than their support for a demo-
cratic system. The answer category reads: “Having a strong leader who does not 
have to bother with parliament and elections” (1 = ‘very good’; 2 = ‘fairly good’; 
3 = ‘bad’; 4 = ‘very bad’). For our analyses, we dichotomized this variable (0 = 
‘good / very good’ vs. 1 = ‘bad / very bad’). In accordance with previous research 
(Schneider, 2009), we controlled for individuals’ age (six categories ranging from 
1 = ‘15-24 years’ to 6 = ‘65 and more years’), subjective assessment of social class 
(five categories ranging from 1 = ‘lower class’ to 5 = ‘upper class’), and education 
(eight categories ranging from 1 ‘inadequately completed elementary education’ to 
8 ‘university with degree/higher education’).8
Methods of analysis
Studying the effect of L1 and L2 predictors on an L2 outcome such as the persis-
tence of democracy poses two methodological challenges. First, choosing a method 
to address the L1-L2 aggregation problem; second, analyzing persistence of democ-
racy, which is a duration variable. 
We compared three different strategies for solving the L1-L2 aggregation prob-
lem. First, we aggregated support for democratic values and all other L1 covariates 
by computing the arithmetic means for each country year (model 1). Second, we 
corrected for sampling error by estimating a latent aggregation of all L1 variables 
on L2 using multilevel SEM (model 2).9 Third, we applied the two-step procedure 








∑ where si is the share of group i (i = 1, …, n).
8 See Table A1 (appendix) for a summary of all variables.
9 The latent aggregation was performed in Mplus, Version 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012).
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proposed by Griffin (1997) by regressing support for democratic values on all other 
L1 and L2 predictors and then using the L2 residuals of this multilevel model as a 
new predictor variable. 
We estimated not one, but several multilevel levels that were built up step-
wise: The first empty model separated the L2 residuals of support for democratic 
values from the L1 residuals (model A1). We then added the macro level predictors 
GDP and ELF (models A2-A4). Finally, we added all L1 controls (model A5).10 
Researchers typically use stepwise model building (which we also carried out in the 
L2-only regressions below) to make causal claims about mediator variables partial-
ing out significant effects of previous regressors. Apart from comparing point esti-
mates and confidence intervals between aggregation methods for the final model, 
we also considered it instructive to analyze a series of stepwise models in order to 
assess whether different aggregation methods lead to different claims about causal 
mediation.
In addition, we chose an adequate model for predicting democratic persis-
tence, a duration variable. The time span of interest is the persistence of a given 
democracy until its breakdown. Whereas some democracies may have persisted 
before entering the observation window (left censoring), others may have continued 
to persist after the observation ended (right censoring). Within the time period of 
analysis, the same country may have experienced multiple democratic sequences, 
followed by breakdowns. In order to address these issues, we used event history 
modeling. We considered democratic breakdown to occur if the score of demo-
cratic regimes (nested within countries) fell below the threshold of POLITY = 6. 
The duration until this event was measured by the total number of years a demo-
cratic system persisted from 1946 onwards. Multiple breakdowns within the same 
country were coded as distinct events. To keep the models parsimonious, we used 
a simple exponential event history model, which assumes constant transition rates 
across years.
In formal terms, our event history model is defined as follows: Let h denote 
the hazard rate of democracies’ estimated risk of falling below POLITY = 6 and t 
the time of democracies’ survival. The basic exponential survival model can then 
be described as:
( ) ; 0, 0h t tλ λ= > >  (9)
λ is a positive constant constraining transition rate (in terms of democratic break-
downs) that is equal across years. Our aim was to predict the expected survival time 
E(t) with an aggregate measure of citizens' support for democratic values (DVAL), 
10 See Table A2 (appendix).
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countries’ GDP and ELF, as well as aggregate measures of citizens’ age (AGE), 
subjective social class (SCLASS), and education (EDUC).
When applying simple aggregation, democracies’ expected time of survival 
was estimated by:
( ) 0 1 2 3 4
5 6
exp
j j j j
j
j j
DVAL GDP ELF AGE
E t
SCLASS EDUC




 + + + +
=  
 + + 
 (10)
where jX•  from equation (1) was replaced by the aforementioned predictor vari-
ables. When using latent aggregation, we estimated:
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(11) 
Here, U refers to the unobserved latent L2 group mean which is assumed to cause 
the observed L1 values of each variable.
Finally, when employing the two-step approach, the estimates were derived as 
follows:
( ) ( )0 1 0expj jmE t uβ β= +  (12)
In equation (12), u0jm denotes the L2 residuals from a hierarchical regression of 
citizens’ support for democratic values on both the L2 predictors and the L1 covari-
ates. The subscript m indicates that the hierarchical models were built up in a step-
wise manner, which is why we estimated several terms for u0.
These formal specifications require a methodological addendum: While we 
estimated three L2 event history analyses after having applied each of the three 
aggregation methods, our theoretical explanation emphasizes the importance of 
citizens’ support for democratic values on L1. Hence, though the event history mod-
els applied L2-only regressions, in line with the paradigm of structural individual-
ism, we assume that the theoretical mechanisms operate via citizens’ preferences 
and beliefs on the micro level. In line with the aim of our article, we sought to 
determine how the three different aggregation methods map these L1 processes 
when predicting an L2 outcome.
In order to increase our statistical power, we used both inter- and extrapolation 
techniques for our independent variables. We interpolated missing values between 
observation points, using the -ipolate- command in Stata. In addition, we extrapo-
lated missing values between the last valid observation and 2015, using a ‘non-lin-
ear trend’ scenario. We first estimated a polynomial regression of the interpolated 
values of each predictor on years of observations using the -lpoly- command in 
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Stata. We then used out-of-sample predicted values to replace missing observation 
for subsequent years over countries.11
Results
Prior to computing the comprehensive multivariate models, we compared the sur-
vival functions of democracies with high vs. low average support for democratic 
values. We dichotomized the support variable and compared countries with one 
standard deviation above vs. below the grand mean of the aggregated variable. We 
then compared the survival functions of these two groups of countries using group 
mean aggregation, the two-step model, and latent aggregation. Independent of the 
method of aggregation, in the long run, the estimated survival rate for democracies 
scoring one standard deviation above the grand mean of support for democratic val-
ues was higher than for their lower-scoring counterparts (see Figure A3, appendix). 
Apart from a lower estimate of the survival rate of countries whose citizens had less 
support for democratic values in the two-step model, the differences between the 
aggregation methods appeared to be negligible. 
Figure 6 presents the results of the analyses using the simple group means 
approach (model 1), multilevel SEM (model 2), and the two-step approach (model 
3). It shows both point estimates and confidence intervals for the L1 and L2 pre-
dictors. Our survival models were built up stepwise: In model 1a and 2a, the sur-
vival rate of democracies was first predicted by support for democratic values only; 
in model 3a, it was predicted by the L2 residuals from the multilevel null model, 
which separated the variance of the L1 support variable without having included 
any other L1 or L2 predictor. In models 1b and models 2b, we simultaneously added 
GDP and ELF. Correspondingly, in model 3b we included the residuals corrected 
for these L2 predictors. Finally, in model 1c and 2c, we added the L1 covariates; in 
model 3c we included the residuals corrected for the L1 covariates. Because of the 
low number of events, we displayed confidence intervals both on the 10% (|t| > 1.64; 
see ticks of confidence bands) and the 5% significance level (|t| > 1.96; see ends of 
confidence bands).
When applying the simple group means approach, support for democratic 
values did not turn out to be a significant predictor of democratic survival. Point 
estimates varied between -3.734 in model 1a and -3.367 in model 1c, but neither 
11 The overlap of valid observations for both democratic persistence and support for dem-
ocratic values before and after interpolation is displayed in Figure A1 (appendix). The 
basic survivor function of democratic persistence for our reduced sample of analysis 
is sufficiently similar to the survivor function of the total country sample (see Figure 
A2, appendix). As a sensitivity check, we also extrapolated our interpolated values by 
repeating the last valid observation of each predictor for subsequent years with miss-
ing values. Results based on this extrapolation technique are very similar to the results 
reported in the results section (see Figure A4, appendix).
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Figure 6  Point estimates and confidence intervals of countries’ democratic 
survival across aggregation methods. N= 917 observations, N= 122 
subjects, N= 5 failures in all models
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estimate was larger than 1.65 times its standard error (also see Table A3, appen-
dix). The latter also applies to all other L2 predictors and to the L1 covariates. 
We observed significant intercept variation in model 1a, which only included sup-
port for democratic values as a predictor variable, but not in models 1b and 1c, 
which controlled for the remaining variables. Values of AIC and BIC as indicators 
of model fit show that not much was gained by adding predictors of democratic sur-
vival apart from citizens’ support for democratic values (see Table A3, appendix). 
When using the latent aggregation approach, the estimated confidence inter-
vals of support for democratic values became more precise and we observed two 
effects of support for democratic values on democratic survival that were greater 
than 1.65 times their standard error (models 2a and 2b). Once the aggregated L1 
covariates were controlled for, our predictor was no longer significantly associated 
with the outcome. Point estimates were remarkably lower after latent aggregation, 
ranging from -.911 in model 2a to -1.009 in model 2b (see Table A4, appendix). 
Having controlled for L2 structural conditions (in terms of GDP and ELF), the 
effect of support for democratic values became more negative from model 2a to 
model 2b – which points to a suppressor effect. Yet, similar to the simple group 
means analysis, none of the remaining variables turned out to be significant predic-
tors of democratic survival. Model fit indices again supported the most parsimoni-
ous model 2a and intercept variation was significant in the first two submodels only.
When applying the two-step approach, point estimates of support for demo-
cratic values on democratic stability were predicted with similar precision as in 
latent aggregation when looking at the confidence intervals. Yet, in the two-step 
model, we observed three significant effects at the 10% level. The L2 (uoj) residu-
als of support for democratic values predicted democratic survival independent of 
whether they were adjusted for other L1 or L2 variables. Effect sizes ranged from 
-.754 in model 3a to -.651 in model 3c (see Table A5, appendix). In contrast to 
simple group mean and latent aggregation, the intercept remained significant in 
all three sub-models. Though model fit indices supported the most parsimonious 
model 3a, the differences between model fit indices across models were less strik-
ing than in the event history regressions following manifest and latent aggregation. 
Our results can be summarized as follows: In each estimation, support for 
democratic values was negatively associated with the event of democratic break-
down, as expected by theory. This replicated our bivariate analysis where democra-
cies with higher support for democratic values showed a longer estimated survival 
rate on average. Apart from this similarity, there are notable differences between 
the aggregation methods: While support for democratic values was not significantly 
associated with democratic stability after manifest aggregation, significant effects 
could be observed after both latent aggregation and the two-step approach. Apply-
ing more advanced aggregation methods led to smaller point estimates and stan-
dard errors compared to the simple group means approach. All this is in line with 
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the two hypotheses postulating notable differences between simple group means 
aggregation and latent aggregation, and closer similarity between the two-step 
approach and latent aggregation than between the two-step approach and manifest 
aggregation.
Yet, compared to latent aggregation, which has already been observed to yield 
unbiased point estimates in simulation models (Bennink et al., 2013, 2015; Lüdtke 
et al., 2008), researchers who apply the two-step approach may run the risk of com-
mitting type one errors: In the most comprehensive model of the two-step approach 
(model 3c) and unlike in the corresponding regressions following latent aggregation 
(model 2c), the effect of support for democratic values was significant at the 10% 
level.12
Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed a methodological challenge well known to compara-
tive survey researchers: how to study the effect of level two (L2) and level one 
(L1) predictors of a level two (L2) outcome so as to yield both reliable and valid 
results. Researchers have criticized simple aggregation for methodological and sta-
tistical reasons. Building on these insights and using the persistence of democracy 
as a substantive example, we compared the simple group means approach with two 
more advanced analytical strategies: the multilevel SEM approach, which estimates 
a latent L2 variable assumed to cause its L1 indicators, and a two-step approach, 
which relies on the L2 residuals of a multilevel model estimated prior to the analy-
sis of interest (Griffin, 1997).
Our study corroborates previous critiques of the simple group-means 
approach. In both bivariate comparisons of countries’ survival curves and more 
comprehensive multivariate event history analyses, we observed that support for 
democratic values was negatively associated with democratic breakdown. Unlike 
in the bivariate models, however, the multivariate models revealed that the associ-
ated significance levels of the estimates of support for democratic values differed 
remarkably depending on the aggregation method. Whereas support for democratic 
values was not significant in the regressions following simple group mean aggrega-
tion, confidence intervals suggested point estimates of higher precision when using 
either the multilevel SEM or the two-step approach, and the latter two approaches 
showed several significant effects at the 10% level. 
These empirical results show that researchers can improve the validity of their 
inferences by choosing more advanced analytical strategies. First, the results match 
previous findings from simulation analyses (Lüdtke et al., 2008), which show that 
12 The event-history models underlying Figure 6 are listed in Tables A3 to A5 (appendix).
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the simplest form of aggregation – manifest group means – is prone to beta or type-
two errors in terms of false negative findings. Second, our results challenge Fails 
and Pierce’s (2010) finding (based on simple aggregation) that support for demo-
cratic values has no effect on democracies’ probability of decline. Our results sug-
gest that comparative survey researchers interested in the effect of one or more L1 
predictors on an L2 outcome may overestimate the standard errors of their regres-
sion coefficients when using manifest group mean aggregation. 
The two more advanced analytical strategies have distinct methodological and 
statistical advantages. From a statistical perspective, the two-step approach per-
forms somewhat poorer than the multilevel SEM approach: Given that simulation 
revealed regression coefficients after latent aggregation to be unbiased (Bennink et 
al., 2013, 2015; Lüdtke et al., 2008), researchers who apply the two-step approach 
may run the risk of committing type-one errors in terms of false positive findings. 
An evident methodological advantage of the two-step approach is, however, that 
it is particularly suited to simultaneously model situational, action formation, and 
transformational mechanisms in their entirety. 
We conclude with several suggestions for future research. As of yet, no simu-
lation analyses (similar to the ones comparing the simple group mean and the mul-
tilevel SEM approach) have been carried out for the two-step approach. It is there-
fore not possible to determine whether the estimated confidence intervals of the 
two-step approach are more or less reliable than the results of the latent aggregation 
approach. Hence, our first suggestion for future research is to perform a simulation 
analyses for all three aggregation methods. Controlling the data-generating mecha-
nism would permit valid conclusions about the actual precision of each aggregation 
method compared to the ‘real’ effect size at L2. 
Second, the latent aggregation model can be extended towards a doubly-latent 
model with controls for measurement error. Thus, our second suggestion for future 
research is to use multiple indicators of political support to arrive at a doubly-latent 
model of political support at L2. Depending on the results of the aforementioned 
simulation study, latent variable models and the two-step approach could eventu-
ally also be combined in order to estimate both situational and transformational 
mechanisms without falling prey to either measurement or sampling error. More-
over, if individuals’ actual decisions such as turning out to vote or participating in 
demonstrations or public protests are considered, a combined framework of struc-
tural equation modeling and the two-step approach would allow researchers to map 
action-formation mechanisms as well.13 Third, while we used a simple exponential 
event-history model to simplify the analysis, future research might make use of 
13 Structural equation modeling can map action formation mechanisms in simple L1 re-
gressions as well. In addition, for group-mean centered L1 variables, multilevel SEM 
can estimate situational mechanisms by computing the difference between L2 and L1 
regression coefficients (Marsh et al., 2009).
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more flexible links for the survival function such as piecewise constant or frailty 
models. 
In sum, we encourage comparative survey researchers to surpass the simple 
group means aggregation approach in favor of more advanced methods of analyz-
ing contextual-level outcomes. We have shown that this helps researchers to cir-
cumvent beta or type-two errors in terms of false negative findings when using one 
or more L1 indicator to predict an L2 outcome. In addition, unlike the simple group 
means approach, these more advanced methods can be extended further, thereby 
facilitating the test of more theoretically valid models. 
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Appendix
Table A1  Distribution of all indicators







Support for democratic values 269869 2.75 1.03 1 4
Support for democratic values  
(dichotomized) 269869 0.59 0.49 0 1
Age recoded 337018 3.1 1.57 1 6
Highest educational level attained 296142 4.72 2.23 1 8







GDP 7998 7.62 1.64 3.51 12.11
ELF 8573 0.47 0.27 0.00 1.00
Support for democratic values 1007 0.60 0.18 0.01 0.97
Age 1190 3.19 0.46 1.91 4.30
Education 1076 4.74 0.80 2.53 6.79
Subjective class 1022 2.69 0.28 1.70 3.69
Residuals (null model) 921 -0.02 0.86 -4.84 3.06
Residuals (model A1) 921 0.00 0.93 -5.34 2.89
Residuals (model A2) 921 -0.01 0.95 -5.30 2.94
Support for democratic values 1007 -0.02 0.82 -3.89 2.22
Age 1058 0.07 0.53 -1.47 1.32
Education 1034 0.09 0.65 -1.67 1.71
Subjective class 1013 0.04 0.51 -1.67 1.35
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Table A2  Multilevel logistic regression of support for democratic values 
(dichotomized) on level-two predictors and level-one covariates
  Null model Model 1a Model 1b
b se b se b se
Intercept 1.812** (0.585) 2.042***(0.580) 0.457*** (0.071)
log(GDP) -0.174** (0.061) -0.166** (0.061)
ELF -0.392 (0.345) -0.427 (0.341)
Age: 15-24 years REFERENCE CATEGORY
25-34 years 0.015 (0.015)
35-44 years 0.067*** (0.015)
45-54 years 0.103*** (0.017)
55-64 0.092***(0.019)
65 and more years -0.039 (0.020)
Education: Inadequately completed 
elementary REFERENCE CATEGORY
Completed elementary 0.042 (0.022)
Incomplete secondary: tech./voc. 0.051* (0.025)
Completed secondary: tech./voc. 0.178*** (0.022)
Incomplete secondary: univ. prep. 0.171*** (0.024)
Complete secondary: univ. prep. 0.274*** (0.022)
Some university without degree 0.428*** (0.026)
University with degree 0.581*** (0.023)
Subjective class: lower REFERENCE CATEGORY
working 0.016 (0.017)
lower middle 0.042* (0.017)
upper middle -0.034 (0.019)
upper         -0.275***(0.038)
τ0j 0.025 (0.063) 0.012 (0.063) -0.045 (0.054)
N 219740 219740 219740
AIC 261954   263445   263440  
Notes. Random intercept model (QR decomposition) across country-years (level 2). Signif-
icance levels: * < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001 (two-sided). Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A3  Exponential event-history regression of democratic breakdown 
on aggregated support for democratic values, L2 predictors, and 
aggregated L1 controls (simple group-means approach)
  Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c
b/se b/se b/se
Intercept -3.220* -3.662 -2.073
(1.252) (3.492) (6.503)











      (1.887)
AIC 43.318 47.201 52.375
BIC 52.96 66.486 86.123
N (failures) 5 5 5
N (subjects) 122 122 122
N (observations) 917 917 917
Notes. Significance levels: + < .10: * < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001 (two-sided). Standard 
errors in parentheses.
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Table A4  Exponential event-history regression of democratic breakdown 
on aggregated support for democratic values, L2 predictors, and 
aggregated L1 controls (multilevel SEM approach)
  Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c
b/se b/se b/se
Intercept -5.547*** -7.151+ -6.851
(0.563) (4.195) (4.332)












AIC 42.444 46.179 51.203
BIC 52.086 65.463 84.951
N (failures) 5 5 5
N (subjects) 122 122 122
N (observations) 917 917 917
Notes. Significance levels: + < .10: * < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001 (two-sided).  Standard 
errors in parentheses.
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Table A5  Exponential event-history regression of democratic breakdown on 
residualised support for democratic values (two-step approach)
  Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c
b/se b/se b/se
Intercept -5.460*** -5.427*** -5.433***
(0.525) (0.517) (0.520)
Residuals (Null model) -0.754+
(0.389)
Residuals (model 1a) -0.658+
(0.357)
Residuals (model 1b) -0.651+
(0.361)
AIC 42.813 43.047 43.089
BIC 52.455 52.689 52.731
N (failures) 5 5 5
N (subjects) 122 122 122
N (observations) 917 917 917
Notes. Significance levels: + < .10: * < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001 (two-sided).  Standard 
errors in parentheses.
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Figure A2  A comparison of democracies’ estimated survival rates across differ-
ent samples of analysis
Figure A3  Survival of democracies by support for democratic values across ag-
gregation methods
263 Becker et al.: Surpassing Simple Aggregation
Figure A4  Point estimates and confidence intervals of countries’ democratic 
survival across aggregation methods (constant interpolation)
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Abstract
Social scientists often work with theories of reciprocal causality. Sometimes theories sug-
gest that reciprocal causes work simultaneously, or work on a time-scale small enough to 
make them appear simultaneous. Researchers may employ simultaneous feedback mod-
els to investigate such theories, although the practice is rare in cross-sectional survey re-
search. This paper discusses the certain conditions that make these models possible if not 
desirable using such data. This methodological excursus covers the construction of simul-
taneous feedback models using a structural equation modeling perspective. This allows 
the researcher to test if a simultaneous feedback theory fits survey data, test competing 
hypotheses and engage in macro-comparisons. This paper presents methods in a manner 
and language amenable to the practicing social scientist who is not a statistician or matrix 
mathematician. It demonstrates how to run models using three popular software programs 
(MPlus, Stata and R), and an empirical example using International Social Survey Pro-
gram data.
Keywords: simultaneous feedback model, cross-sectional data, macro-comparative research, 
structural equation modeling, reciprocal causality, Mplus, Stata, R (lavaan)
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Social scientists often study reciprocally causal phenomena. For example, sup-
ply and demand in economics; candidate evaluations and party identification in 
political science; road investment and travel demand in geography; and educational 
attainment and parenthood entry in sociology and demography (Marini, 1984; 
Page & Jones, 1979; Xie & Levinson, 2010). When timings of reciprocal causes are 
unobservable or occur contemporaneously, a state of simultaneous feedback exists. 
Rather than in cycles, events happen at the same time. Philosophers of causality 
question the existence of simultaneous feedback (Mulaik, 2009: Chapter 3); how-
ever, researchers regularly face theoretical and data conditions that force them to 
accept simultaneous feedback in practice. This is particularly acute in macro-com-
parative survey research where observations take place over a year, but theoretical 
causes may take place at less-than-yearly intervals. All sub-yearly causal effects 
appear simultaneous within a year interval. Under certain conditions, macro-com-
parative researchers can employ simultaneous feedback models (SFMs) to capture 
these effects, allowing them to overcome some limitations of comparative cross-
sectional survey research. 
Herein, I elaborate when and how to use SFMs. This requires structural equa-
tion modeling (SEM) strategies to explicate theoretical relationships before extract-
ing meaningful statistical results. I use minimal statistical and mathematical jar-
gon without matrix algebra1, and a practical example of public opinion and social 
policy. I show that SFMs provide a powerful method for macro-comparative survey 
researchers to explain, predict and compare reciprocally causal phenomena.
Simultaneous Feedback
Instances where two phenomena are co-causes of each other are ubiquitous in social 
research2; however, modeling reciprocal causality is challenging. Time is usually 
1 Matrix algebra is the basis of nearly all social science statistics including SFMs; how-
ever, this excursus is for the practicing social scientist who is unlikely a matrix alge-
braician.
2 More non-exhaustive examples: (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Chong & Gradstein, 2007; 
Claibourn & Martin, 2000; Liska & Reed, 1985; Mulatu & Schooler, 2002; Owens, 
1994; Thornton, Axinn, & Hill, 1992)
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the basis for explaining or predicting things (Elwert, 2013; Pedhazur, 1997). To be 
a cause or a useful predictor, X must take place prior to Y. If X happened after Y it 
is not a cause3. Sometimes researchers cannot effectively observe or operational-
ize time. For example, the moods of roommates are theoretically timed causes of 
each other but may unfold so quickly that they appear simultaneously causal (Sie-
gel & Alloy, 1990). It is possible that there are nanoseconds in between, but these 
are unobservable. Furthermore, excessive complexity of timings and multitudinous 
mood causes running in both directions leave the researcher viewing mood effects 
as simultaneous.
Macro-comparative research is similar on a larger time scale. Contextual data 
tend to measure time points spanning an entire year. Reciprocally causal effects 
that take place in just days, weeks or even months subsume into these yearly obser-
vations. For example, public opinion likely causes changes in policymaking on a 
weekly or monthly basis as policymakers constantly try to meet public preferences. 
Simultaneously, public opinion changes within minutes or hours in response to 
policy changes. When capturing these opinion-policy effects with survey data, the 
two appear to have simultaneous causality within each year unit. Moreover, survey 
researchers lack yearly comparative opinion data across countries, e.g., cross-sec-
tional yearly time-series4, rendering longitudinal methods sometimes inappropri-
ate. Having sporadic macro-comparative survey data means SFMs might be appro-
priate, but this is not a sufficient condition to use them. Theory must drive this 
decision (Hayduk et al., 2007; Kaplan, Harik, & Hotchkiss, 2001).
Given a theory of simultaneous feedback between two phenomena, I label 
them Y1 and Y2
5, where at least two different linkages exist between them if not 
more. One for the effect of Y1 on Y2 and one vice-versa. However, when I observe 
and quantify Y1 and Y2 as variables, they have only one empirical linkage: their 
covariance (or correlation). Identifying two effects statistically, when there is only 
one covariance, is not possible. Y1 and Y2 are nonrecursive meaning that their 
respective effects on each other cannot be identified using only their joint informa-
tion. Their reciprocal relationship makes them endogenous meaning caused from 
3 The method herein applies to causal or explanatory research subsuming causes or sev-
eral causes into a package of predictive power without considering the mechanisms in 
detail. Although causality is at the heart of the theoretical side of SFMs, the vast realm 
of mathematics and philosophy of causality is beyond the scope of this paper (Pearl, 
2010; Sobel, 1996).
4 Although impressive, many macro-comparative sources of survey data barely qualify 
as longitudinal, cross-sectional time-series when fielded only every 2 to 10 years (e.g., 
European Social Survey, World Values Survey and International Social Survey Pro-
gram).
5 I use Y1 and Y2 rather than X and Y, because Y denotes dependent variables. Recipro-
cally causal variables are dependent on each other.
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within; however, identifying these nonrecursive endogenous effects requires some 
exogenous causes from without. 
I describe this problem using Equations 1 and 2, and Figure 1. Both cases 
present a system logically underidentified – there are more parameters to be esti-
mated than pieces of observed information (two coefficients b1 and b2 yet only one 
covariance of Y1 and Y2).
1 1 2 1Y b Y e= +  (1)
2 2 1 2Y b Y e= +  (2)
Regression analysis could estimate Equations 1 and 2, but results are probably 
inaccurate given a theory of reciprocal causality. In Figure 1 the arrows represent 
theoretical effects, and b1 and b2 represent regression coefficients. Y1 is not known 
without knowing Y2 and Y2 is not known without knowing Y1: An endless circle!
Identifying b1 and b2 is an exercise in finding more variables or parameters. 
Figure 2 gives four common formal models containing reciprocal causality, some 
identified, others not. Adding instrumental variables (IVs) enables identification of 
unique b1 and b2 effects. An IV is exogenous: not caused by the system described 
in the model, not caused by Y1 or Y2 and not moderating or somehow causing the 
causal paths linking Y1 and Y2. Figure 2A describes some phenomenon labeled Y1 
occurring at time “t” that is both a cause (arrow pointing away) and outcome (arrow 
pointing towards) of another phenomenon Y2 measured at the same time. In this, 
IV1 must be a cause of Y1 but not of Y2; and IV2 must cause Y2 but not Y1 (see section 
“Instrumental variables”). 
Figure 2A is the basic SFM form. 
Other common reciprocal effects models appear in Figure 2B-2D. Cross-
lagged reciprocal effects (2B) are a common form of reciprocal causal modeling 
(for discussions: Billings & Wroten, 1978; Schaubroeck, 1990). Looking at Y1 and 
Y2 longitudinally over time generates separate, unique covariances between Y1 
and Y2; one for Y2,t-1 with Y1,t and another for Y1,t-1 with Y2,t. Cross-lagged models 
require the assumption that Y1 and Y2 do not cause each other simultaneously for 
identification (omitted arrows between them at time t). Macro-comparative survey 
researchers rarely have sequential time series of survey data in several countries 
making these models untenable, often because of missing time points or the exact 
𝑌𝑌1                𝑌𝑌2 




Figure 1 Path Model of Equations 1 and 2
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timing of cause and effect do not match the starting and ending points of the survey 
(Finkel, 1995). If causes occur at a less-than-yearly interval, in addition to across 
time-units, then Figure 2C is accurate visually but underidentified statistically. A 
similar story occurs when adding instrumental variables to 2C as shown in 2D. The 
instruments do not add enough power to overcome the cyclically recursive problem 
of observing Y1 and Y2 over time because they are causes of their later selves in 
addition to causing each other leading again to too many parameters.
















A. Simultaneous feedback w/ instruments, 
identified
Legend:
Y = endogenous dependent variable
IV = instrumental variable
e     = error term
= causal effect 
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Figure 2 Various Models of Reciprocal Causality
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Conditions Necessary for Simultaneous Feedback 
Models
A strong theory, equilibrium, model identification and appropriate instrumental 
variables are the necessary features to employ Figure 2A. 
Theory
The first and most important requirements of SFMs are theoretical. Without the-
ory, the two arrows connecting Y1 and Y2 do not exist. There must be an a priori 
logic to the data-generating model, defensible against confounding effects (Heck-
man, 2000; Rigdon, 1995). Thus, a theory of simultaneous causality is the baseline 
condition. This theory must specify that during the observational window causal 
effects materialized between Y1 and Y2; regardless of whether these are direct or 
operating through intermediary mechanisms. A researcher must provide sufficient 
argument for simultaneity. That of, (1) co-determinacy with effects that happen 
‘instantaneously’ in less time than can be observed, or (2) complexity with effects 
that are constantly taking place going in many directions having various lengths 
of time to complete; so as to appear simultaneous. Without this theoretical basis 
to the Y1 and Y2 relationship, researchers have no ground to stand on in defense of 
simultaneous feedback (Hayduk et al., 2007; Markus, 2010). Theory determines 
the design of a formal path model, instrumental variables, equilibrium, size and 
direction of effects, the set of independent variables, and the nature of errors and 
estimation techniques. Suffice to say, theory is paramount. 
Equilibrium
Two forms of equilibrium need be present in SFMs. The first is that causal effects 
are theoretically stable or behave in a stable manner. There should be logical argu-
ment that the impact of Y1 on Y2 and vice-versa, do not change over time (Kaplan 
et al., 2001). In other words, the effects should not depend on when in time the 
researcher observes Y1 and Y2 (Sobel, 1990). This is a grey area as inevitably all 
social things change over time; so a better stance to defend might be they do not 
change much in a given period. For example, if the area of farmed land reduces 
the hunger in a society while the rate of hunger increases the area of farmed land, 
a researcher might argue for equilibrium, as a change in one produces a predict-
able change in the other. Statistically speaking the regression coefficients should be 
stable. However, technology increases food produced per acre, disrupting the equi-
librium because each acre has a larger impact on hunger reduction. This implies 
that the regression coefficients change if technology changes, but might be stable 
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before and after. If the model includes events before and after this change, it is mis-
specified as a SFM. 
The second part is that the causal effects are part of a context at equilibrium, 
e.g., a political or judicial system. If a system experiences shocks then equilibrium 
is unlikely, e.g., disruptive wars or economic recessions. Therefore, the researcher 
must rule out changes to the larger systems within which Y1 and Y2 operate (see sec-
tion “Disequilibrium”).
Identification
Any formal model, including one with simultaneous feedback must be identified to 
produce meaningful results or results at all6. To identify two statistical coefficients 
that capture two theoretical effects between Y1 and Y2 there must be more than one 
covariance in the model. Only one covariance in the feedback model is underi-
dentified, meaning more parameters to estimate than pieces of observed informa-
tion leading to a negative value for model degrees of freedom. Pieces of observed 
information are all parameters the researcher observes in the data including the 
means, variances and covariances of the variables in the model, also known as 
model “elements” (Rigdon, 1994). In SFMs, the observed means are often not esti-
mated because researchers’ main interests are in the coefficients between Y1 and Y2 
that derive entirely from covariances, irrespective of means. Adding means to the 
analysis generally complicates things with few cases. 
Without means, the formula to calculate pieces of observed model informa-
tion is ( )1 / 2v v + , where v is the number of observed variables (Kline, 2011). The 
model needs a minimum of the same number of model elements as freely estimated 
parameters for identification, i.e., model degrees of freedom needs to be larger than 
or equal to zero. To illustrate, I add one predictor variable X, as shown in Figure 
3. Figure 3A is not identified because it requires estimation of four coefficients (a 
through d) and three variances (g through i), with residual covariance m optional. 
Fixing m to zero for now, and knowing nothing about a through i, there are seven 
freely estimated parameters (a through i). That means I need seven pieces of infor-
mation for a just-identified model. There are only six pieces in Figure 3A: three 
covariances ( 2 1 21 | , | ,, X Y YX YY ) and three variances (for 21 &,X Y Y ), or 3(4)/2=6. 
Thus, model degrees of freedom is smaller than zero (six minus seven). Figure 3A 
is underidentified.
Figure 3B includes IV1 and IV2, creating 5(6)/2 = 15 pieces of information. 
Assuming that the IVs and the error terms are correlated (parameters n and m 
respectively), the model has 15 freely estimated parameters (all letters in 3B), 
6 Any introductory text on structural equation modeling covers identification. I find 
Kline (2011) a useful source.
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meaning model degrees of freedom is zero and the model is just-identified. An 
ideal model has more than zero, for example three IVs leads to 6(7)/2=21 pieces of 
observed information and 20 freely estimated parameters; degrees of model free-
dom equals one. However, IVs are difficult to find. An identification rule requires 
at least one IV for each Y variable. If both instruments are attached to Y2, and none 
to Y1, the model might have degrees of freedom greater than zero, but the model is 
still not identified without an IV for Y1. This is known as the rank condition. This 
condition is satisfied when, “each variable in a feedback loop has a unique pattern 
of direct effects on it from variables outside the loop” (Kline, 2011, p. 135). Adding 
A. Without instruments (not identified)  
 
 
B. With instruments (identified) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼2𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼



































Figure 3 Identifying Simultaneous Feedback Models
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more X variables to 3B does not help with identification as it does not change the 
degrees of model freedom nor add unique direct effects. 
Instrumental Variables
Identification depends on instrumental variables (IV1 and IV2). Necessary condi-
tions for selecting IVs are theoretical and statistical. “Instrumental variables” is 
both an estimation technique and a label for specific exogenous variables (Sargan, 
1958). This section is devoted to exogenous variables, saying nothing of estimation 
techniques7. An IV must be exogenous to the dependent variable. In experimental 
language, IV causes the distribution of a treatment but not the outcome. In non-
experimental language, the endogenous variable depends on the values of the IV 
independently from the dependent variable, or the dependent variable only shows 
covariance with the IV after conditioning on the endogenous variable.
In Figure 3B, the IV for Y1 must not cause Y2. If IV1 is a cause of Y2 then IV1 
is an independent variable, not an IV. All independent variables explain or predict 
all endogenous variables, thus are part of the data-generating model of Y2 (and Y1). 
For IV1 to pass it must not be part of the data-generating model of Y2. This is the 
exclusion restriction. The problem is not correlation of IV1 with Y2, but correlation 
of IV1 with e2; i.e., correlation with the unexplained disturbance or error in the 
dependent variable after adjusting for the impact of all independent variables. If IV1 
causes Y2, or omitted variables cause both IV1 and Y2 then a correlation of IV1 with 
e2 exists; and the larger this correlation, the larger the problems with the IV. If IV1 
has a small correlation with e2 because of measurement or random error, then as 
the sample size approaches infinity the correlation approaches its true value of zero 
(i.e., asymptotic correlation = 0). If so, small IV1 with Y2 correlations after adjusting 
for covariates are acceptable. 
When meeting these conditions, IV1 and IV2 decompose the single correla-
tion between Y1 and Y2 in Figure 3B into 3 parts: (1) the part that could result from 
a causal effect or a shared omitted causal effect of Y1 on Y2 (covariance left after 
removing that predicted by IV2), (2) the same for Y2 on Y1, and (3) the unexplained 
remaining covariance of error terms e1 and e2. Although technically optional, Part 
(3) is usually modeled, because finding instruments that explain everything about 
Y1 and Y2 with no remainder is unlikely. Moreover, the error term e1 is produced 
by a causal effect of Y2 (path b). Yet e2 is a part of Y2 and is therefore by definition 
a part of the error term e1, i.e., correlated with its own partial correlation produced 
from Y2 being regressed on Y1 (Wong & Law, 1999, p. 73). The same is true for 
e2, and therefore specifying no residual correlation may deny the causally defined 
7 Other literature covers this in-depth (Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996; Angrist & 
Krueger, 2001; Bascle, 2008; Bollen, 2012).
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model its own properties. Thus, sometimes a cross-sectional nonrecursive model 
with correlated errors is the ʻbest availableʼ approximation of cross-lagged recipro-
cal effects when they are otherwise underidentified.
Even if theoretically not causal, a large correlation between IV1 and Y2 is a 
problem statistically. The larger the correlation the more variance that all indepen-
dent variables must explain in Y2 before IV1 is left uncorrelated with e2. In other 
words, the partial correlation of IV1 and Y2 takes away variance in IV1 that is neces-
sary to explain Y1. Thus, the larger this correlation, the greater the disruption of the 
researcher’s goal to explain variance in Y1 independent of Y2 and all independent 
variables. An inverse of this problem occurs when IV1 has an increasingly closer-to-
zero correlation with Y1 (Bartels, 1991). The smaller the correlation, the less unique 
variance of Y1 that can be explained by IV1. These two conditions describe a weak 
instrument problem. Theoretical arguments establish exclusion restrictions neces-
sary to use instrumental variables; however, statistics help identify potential weak 
instrument problems.
In SEM, model diagnostics, in particular modification indices provide a simple 
first line of defense to identify weak instruments (see “Fit testing and diagnostics”). 
This applies because the structural model (what the researcher draws in a path dia-
gram and then programs into the statistical software) fixes the correlation of each 
IV with each corresponding e to be zero. The fit and modification indices tell the 
researcher if these fixed zero correlations are realistic given the data. Alternatively, 
traditional weak instrument tests come from estimating whether results from the 
instrumental variable estimator and the OLS estimator are consistent, defined in 
a number of ways depending on the test (Bollen, 2012; Hahn & Hausman, 2002).
There are a variety of statisticians arguing for statistical methods to identify 
instrumental variables without theoretical arguments that an IV meets the exclu-
sion restriction (see “Other concerns”). Although these methods may asymptoti-
cally recover a known causal effect (as shown in simulations), the SFM researcher 
is searching for causal effects whose existence or size is empirically unknown. If 
already known, research becomes unnecessary. Moreover, even when the corre-
lation of IV1 and Y2 is exactly zero, there is no statistical way to know for sure 
that IV1 and e2 do not correlate due to causal or omitted variable linkages. Sup-
pression or omitted variables can easily produce a statistical relationship of zero, 
when the actual causal relationship is non-zero (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 
2000)8. Thus, theoretical arguments are necessary to rule out ‘backdoor’ or con-
founding relationships among variables. Finally, arguments must establish that the 
8 The drawing of a causal structure with a path diagram or graph notation introduced by 
Wright (1920) allows researchers to follow rules determining d-separation, exogeneity, 
collision, and confounding. However, the drawing of the model depends entirely on 
qualitative use of reason and logic (not statistics or data) (Chen & Pearl, 2015; Elwert, 
2013).
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instrument is applicable to all cases in the data. If there are cases where the instru-
ment might have a unique causal relationship with the independent variable, so 
that effects are not monotonic, then this is another form of confounding calling for 
model re-specification.
Although focused on experimental research, a meta-analysis of instrumen-
tal variable estimates in political science suggests that researchers routinely fail 
to offer theoretical arguments that the IV is: (1) unrelated to unobserved/omitted 
causes of Y, (2) has no direct (causal) effect on Y, and (3) that the instrument could 
plausibly affect all cases (Sovey & Green, 2011)9. This neglect has grave implica-
tions for the trustworthiness of results.
An Application – Opinion and Policy
I use the example of Breznau (2017) modeling simultaneous feedback between pub-
lic opinion and social spending to provide a didactical picture of SFMs. I only 
briefly summarize the theory from the original research, to keep the focus on 
execution of the SFM. Public opinion and social policy are an example of theo-
retical simultaneous feedback, because: (1) Opinion and policy are co-determinant 
occurring at the same moments or overlapping moments in time. Observing public 
opinion in a one-year unit prevents observation of anything other than simultane-
ous effects, even if multiple effects take place within a year. (2) The relationship is 
so complex that a simultaneous model may come closer to reality than something 
with arbitrary lags (as taken from years of a survey). Policymakers imagine opinion 
or act on expected future changes in opinion before opinion changes occur, while 
public opinion responds to policymakers’ intentions and discussions before they 
actually change policy. Moreover, opinion responds to many things at once over 
many points in time and the responses take different lengths to materialize. The 
same applies to policymaking. Given all these effects starting, maturing, declining 
and then stopping over time, I expect that there is a simultaneous effect, or average 
simultaneous effect underlying all effects. 
The instruments I employ are female labor force participation (IV1) for public 
opinion (Y1) and veto points (IV2) for policy (Y2). Labor force participation influ-
ences policy attitudes. Holding male participation roughly equal (as seen across 
OECD countries), variation in the distribution of female participation links to 
changes in aggregate opinion. Women, who are significantly more supportive of 
social policy than men are, become less supportive when in the labor force, on 
average. Moreover, the policy ‘styles’ of different countries show no patterning by 
female labor force participation suggesting that at least in recent decades it has no 
effect on social policy in the aggregate (i.e., exogenous from Y2). Veto points deter-
9 An argument I am guilty of not making in Breznau (2017)!
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mines how easy it is to block legislation in the design of the political system (e.g., 
executive or minority veto, bicameralism or federalism), thus where veto points are 
higher, policy provisions should be lower. Veto points are part of a larger institu-
tional framework of societies that might influence public opinion; however, previ-
ous research suggests that they are independent (i.e., exogenous from Y1). Moreover, 
veto points predate the measurement of public opinion by decades if not centuries, 
further meeting the exclusion restriction (see Breznau, 2017).
The data I use are publically available; public opinion in the International 
Social Survey Program ‘Role of Government’ and ‘Religion’ modules and social 
policy spending from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment ‘Social Expenditures Database’ covering 70 country-time points (across 1985-
2006). I provide the variances and covariances necessary to estimate the main 
models. I include means only for didactic purposes (see Appendix 1-Table A1). 
All variable measurements and countries are in Appendix 1-Table A2, reproduc-
ing Breznau (2017, p. 597). Almost all SEM software reads raw data or covariance 
matrix data (including correlation/variance matrices). Appendix 1-Table A3 pro-
vides programming code (some call this “syntax”) for Mplus, Stata and R (RStudio 
running lavaan). Stata and R allow programming the matrix by hand, and Mplus 
reads a .dat file, which is a product of copying the matrix into a text editor and sav-
ing it with the file extension .dat10. 
I analyze models of opinion and policy reflecting Figure 3B with four inde-
pendent X variables (aged population, right-party power, unemployment and GDP) 
predicting both Y outcomes. Table 1 presents results for M1, a model of free estima-
tion with little theory and no additional model constraints. Column “b” are unstan-
dardized (‘metric’) coefficients, and “β” standardized coefficients. The results from 
Mplus here are identical to the other software except rounding error. 
The results reveal how much Y1 and Y2 cause or explain each other’s vari-
ance. The standardized coefficient for Y2 predicting Y1 suggests that social policy 
has a very large impact on public opinion (0.715), larger than public opinion has 
on social policy (0.084). However, according to standard testing the effects are 
insignificant. The insignificance of the smaller effect is perhaps not surprising but 
insignificance of the very large effect demonstrates the difficulty in disentangling 
reciprocal effects statistically. Moreover, the countries are not exactly a sample of a 
larger population, like with human populations. Cut-offs (e.g., p<0.05) are perhaps 
arbitrary without a sample population to generalize into. The t-statistic is still use-
ful for gauging the coefficients. Thus, Y2 impacting Y1 is more reliable and precise 
(t=0.148/0.088=1.682) than vice-versa (at 0.357).
10 A1-Appendix One is at the end of this document. The long-form of all code, data, 
and supplementary analyses are available in Appendix Two and Three, A2 and A3 at 
https://osf.io/gyz6p/, and .dat files at https://osf.io/cxzj6/.
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Scholars should exercise caution when interpreting effects independently. 
The relationship is a loop, not a single causal arrow. Here this loop accounts for 
(0.715*0.084=0.06) 6% of the joint distribution of the two Y variables (although 
this percentage also depends on the signs and scaling of the coefficients, see section 
“Explaining variance”). If correctly specified, social policy is a stronger compo-
nent of this loop. In fact, the term field better describes this relationship because the 
forces are simultaneous and constant like magnets. The coefficients represent con-
stant forces in this stable field. This contrasts with a cyclical loop where a change in 
one variable sends effects looping through Y1 and Y2 in a cyclical process. A steady-
state force of the loop and a cyclical force running through the loop are different. To 
say that the levels of Y1 on Y2 are at equilibrium because of their perpetual effects 
Table 1 Results from M1. Freely Estimated Simultaneous Feedback between 
Opinion and Policy
Y1 (public opinion) ON
b s.e. β Fig 3B label
Y2 (social policy) 0.148 0.088 0.715 b
X1 (aged) 0.024 0.116 0.052 c1
X2 (right) -0.659 0.656 -0.133 c2
X3 (unemp) -0.070 0.039 -0.264 c3
X4 (GDP) -0.055 0.024 -0.287 c4
IV1 (FLP) -0.073 0.018 -0.540 e
Y2 (social policy) ON
Y1 (public opinion) 0.403 1.129 0.084 a
X1 (aged) 1.134 0.318 0.507 d1
X2 (right) -4.615 2.560 -0.194 d2
X3 (unemp) 0.187 0.140 0.145 d3
X4 (GDP) 0.113 0.140 0.124 d4
IV2 (veto) -7.509 2.988 -0.235 f
variance std.variance
e.Y1 0.630 0.323 0.654 g
e.Y2 13.211 2.242 0.592 h
covariance correlation
(e.Y1,e.Y2) -1.878 1.213 -0.651 m
Note. b are metric and β are standardized coefficients; 70 country-time point cases from 
ISSP, OECD and other data sources (see A1-Table A2 or Breznau 2017, M10B); Figure 
3B contains only one X variable so labels include a subscript to differentiate the four X 
variables in this model.
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on each other is different than stating that causal effects between Y1 on Y2 unfold in 
specific, precise periods. 
I do not rule out the cyclical version of feedback, but have specific theoretical 
arguments for a non-cyclical version, one that takes place without yearly-time con-
sideration and is sufficiently complex to warrant SFMs. I might take interest in the 
cyclical relationship when investigating a specific social policy with specific time 
periods of voting or policymaking. But this macro-comparative exercise presumes 
that the sum of all specific instances contains common simultaneous feedback; i.e., 
not particular to one country-year. The comparative advantage here is the ability 
to test if the general process formulated in a theory of simultaneous feedback and 
positive returns can be explained by these data (Breznau, 2017; Pierson, 2000).
Without acknowledging reciprocal causality in some form, scholars might 
measure a unidirectional effect of Y1 on Y2 and then separately estimate unidirec-
tional Y2 on Y1 rather than a SFM. Appendix 1-Table A4 reveals results from sepa-
rate regressions. The striking difference is that in both unidirectional regressions 
the β-coefficients for Y1 and Y2 are close to 0.1. This approach leads researchers to 
conclude that either public opinion explains or causes social policy (Y1 causes Y2) 
or vice-versa (Y2 causes Y1), and in either case that the effect is around magnitude 
of 0.1 standard deviations. Given a theory of simultaneous or reciprocal causality, 
both conclusions are false and these models are misspecified11. The theory used 
in constructing M1, and the non-zero loop effect of 6% are evidence of this mis-
specification.
Hypothesis Testing – The SEM Perspective
All parameters in M1 are free, showing how causal effects might look if I know 
nothing theoretically about Y1 and Y2 feedback. Given a sufficiently detailed theory 
of simultaneous feedback, a scholar knows something about the feedback. Thus, I 
test hypotheses derived from this knowledge. This is the structural equation mod-
eler perspective focusing on overidentified models (Bollen, 1989). This perspective 
aims to test if a hypothetically derived model leads to something not far off from 
observational data. If the implied covariances of an overidentified model are not 
significantly different from observed covariances, then the hypothetical model may 
reflect the real-world data-generating processes. Testing hypotheses means compar-
ing models with different exclusions or constraints to determine which fits the data 
better. Both model testing and model comparison require overidentified models.
11 For example, Zhu and Lipsmeyer (2015) use ISSP data to show an impact of policy on 
opinion while Brooks and Manza (2006) use ISSP data to show an impact of opinion on 
policy without acknowledging reciprocal causality in their models.
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Adding more instrumental variables achieves overidentification, as each adds 
one degree of model freedom. However, instrumental variables are rare and hav-
ing two here represents the current limits of this research, beyond speculation 
(Breznau, 2013, p. 132; 136). 
Fixing Parameters
Arguments for a reciprocal relationship of Y1 and Y2, are likely to include theory of 
what this relationship looks like. This is true for opinion and policy feedback (Pier-
son, 2000; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010). Thus, I specify hypotheses about the nature of 
the feedback and fix parameters to reflect this. The methodological advantage is an 
overidentified model. The theoretical advantages are testing competing hypotheses 
to construct improved theory. 
After reviewing the literature I determine that a thermostatic feedback theory 
suggests that the standardized coefficient a (from Figure 3B) is negative 0.05 and b 
is positive 0.30 (see Breznau, 2017). I fix the parameters to these values in M2. The 
SEM software analyzes only unstandardized effects, thus it is necessary to derive 
them by scaling the standard deviation of the standardized variable from one to 
its observed value12. Meanwhile an increasing returns theory suggests that both 
coefficients are positive, possibly around 0.15 as specified in M3. The code is in 
Appendix 1-Table A5, and Table 2 presents the results. 
The other variables’ coefficients do not carry much in the way of hypothesis 
testing (that comes in “Fit testing and diagnostics”); however, they should match 
theoretical expectations. For example, if the coefficient for aged (X1) was large and 
negative, I would become very suspicious that my model is misspecified because 
it is well-established that more older persons in a society requires far more social 
spending and usually means greater support of social spending. 
A researcher might wish to fix an error term, covariance or mean instead of an 
effect. M4 has a fixed Y2 error variance of 0.3, fixed covariance of Y1 and Y2 error 
terms at zero and means of Y1 and Y2 at zero. I do not have theoretical arguments for 
these constraints, they are didactic. Survey data provide the possibility to calculate 
measurement error for public opinion and I invent the number 0.3 here to represent 
this possibility. A fixed covariance of zero would be that the model represents a 
closed system accounting for all possible causal pathways between the variables. 
This would meet an experimental ideal, where the model explains all things that 
cause Y1, Y2 and the causal loop between them. But this is highly unlikely in the 
complex realm of cross-national survey research (see section “Instrumental vari-











=  ; where 
β  = standardized coefficient, b = metric coefficient, 
Xσ  = standard deviation of the 
independent variable, and 
Yσ  = standard deviation of the dependent variable.
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ables”). Nonetheless, I constrain it here for exercise. Means at zero is not important 
theoretically, it just centers the expected values of Y1 and Y2
13.
Fit Testing and Diagnostics
Tests of fit determine how well a theoretically derived model explains real-world 
observations or compares with alternative models. There is a small universe of 
these tests. The art of ruling out alternative theoretical models is crucial to scien-
tific utility (Hayduk et al., 2007; and discussed on the structural equation model-
ing listserv SEMNET), and primarily comes from investigation of how close the 
13 Researchers may have a theory that effects a and b are equal, but not have any predic-
tion about their size. It is possible to constrain a and b to equality and let computer 
estimation decide what size is ideal in all three softwares (see A3-Appendix Three).
Table 2 Models of Competing Theories of Opinion-Policy Simultaneous 
Feedback
M2 M3 M4
variable b s.e β   b s.e β   b s.e β
Y1 (public opinion) ON
Y2  (social policy) -0.010 - - -0.048 0.030 - - 0.146 0.030 - - 0.165
X1 (aged) 0.216 0.038 0.466 0.167 0.037 0.362 0.209 0.027 0.484
X2 (right) -1.434 0.413 -0.291 -1.240 0.402 -0.252 -1.055 0.331 -0.229
X3 (unemp) -0.034 0.028 -0.129 -0.044 0.027 -0.165 -0.006 0.018 -0.023
X4 (GDP) -0.053 0.020 -0.281 -0.053 0.019 -0.282 -0.044 0.016 -0.249
IV1 (FLP) -0.063 0.015 -0.471 -0.066 0.014 -0.494 -0.045 0.009 -0.358
Y2 (social policy) ON
Y1 (public opinion) 1.500 - - 0.311 0.750 - - 0.154 0.750 - - 0.137
X1 (aged) 0.901 0.211 0.403 1.062 0.207 0.474 1.175 0.164 0.495
X2 (right) -3.376 2.264 -0.142 -4.217 2.225 -0.177 -3.929 2.211 -0.156
X3 (unemp) 0.172 0.142 0.134 0.183 0.140 0.142 0.245 0.121 0.180
X4 (GDP) 0.210 0.104 0.229 0.148 0.103 0.160 0.201 0.080 0.206
IV2 (veto) -8.070 3.107 -0.252 -8.369 2.986 -0.261 -7.183 2.987 -0.212
e.Y1 0.446 0.075 0.466 0.424 0.072 0.445 0.300 - - 0.360
e.Y2 13.702 2.318 0.613 13.234 2.240 0.589 13.370 2.260 0.532
(e.Y1,e.Y2) -0.279 0.307 -0.113  -0.472 0.293 -0.199  0.000 - - 0.000
Note. Stata results shown; R (lavaan) and Mplus identical except rounding error. M4 is 
not theoretical, has didactic purpose only.
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model-implied covariances come to the freely observed covariances in the data. 
The proportion of explained variance (r2) is often a secondary concern. The term 
residual denotes the differences between model-implied covariances and observed 
covariances. Residual also describes OLS error (in Ŷ ), thus structural modelers 
sometimes use fitted residuals or covariance residuals to adjudicate these concepts 
(Kline, 2011). 
For just-identified models (like M1) the covariance residuals are zero as 
implied and observed are identical. In overidentified models, larger residuals sug-
gest worse local fit. Scholars rely on standardized residuals and normalized resid-
uals given that residuals on their own do not have a common metric. Appendix 
1-Table A6 provides residuals for M2 and M3. Smaller residuals support M3. 
I might worry about the -1.28 normalized residual of IV2 and Y1 in M2 (Appen-
dix 1-Table A6). This suggests unexplained covariance remaining between these 
variables, where none should be present. This might evidence a weak instrument. 
However, M3 is the preferred model where this residual is slightly lower at -0.964. 
Given that M3 fits well overall (as shown in Table 3), and that the theory sup-
ports the instrument of veto points being exogenous to public opinion, I tentatively 
defend IV2. Yet future research should search for other IVs. What causes policy 
changes that does not cause opinion changes is a puzzle. Finding strong and valid 
instruments is a perpetual concern (Antonakis et al., 2010). 
The model chi-square ( 2χ ) provides the primary statistic for evaluating 
global model fit. The 2χ  comes from maximum-likelihood estimation (for a good 
introduction see Kline, 2011, p. 199). The exact fit hypothesis is that implied and 
observed covariance matrices are identical except for random error. Put into test 
terms, 2χ difference should not be significant at p<0.05, otherwise the matrices in 
comparison are significantly different offering evidence to reject this model. Thus, 
p>0.05 is a reasonable level to not reject the exact fit hypothesis. If this test passes, 
it does not guarantee the strength of the IV, but asserts that nothing about the model 
radically departs from the observed data; i.e., displays reasonable global fit. The 
exact fit test becomes increasingly likely to fail the larger the sample because it is 
more likely to pick up very small confounding parameters in the empirical realm. 
In macro-comparative survey research, having too large of a country sample is 
unlikely a problem. The equal fit hypothesis is that two implied covariance matri-
ces do not differ from one another. If p<0.05 they are significantly different sup-
porting the larger model (with less degrees of freedom). Note that models are only 
comparable with an equal fit test when they are nested; i.e., have all the same basic 
parameters and observational data. 
There are several other global fit diagnostics. Considering all of them is help-
ful in selecting models, especially when they are not nested (Kline, 2011)14. Table 
14 David Kenny’s website provides discussions of model fit http://davidakenny.net/cm/fit.
htm. 
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3 contains fit and diagnostics for models M1-M4, offering some preferable targets 
of these indices. I conclude that M3 is better than M1 because M1 does not have 
a strong theory to test and AIC and BIC are worse; and better than M2 because 
all fit indices (AIC, BIC, RMSEA, CFI and TLI) are better. Also, exact fit is less 
significant (0.252 vs. 0.065) and equal fit more significant (p-value 0.004) than M2 
(0.013). It is better than M4, although M4 is just for example. 
In addition to residuals, another tool to identify local misfit is modification 
indices. For every parameter in the model, the modification index is the change 
in 2χ  if that parameter (coefficient or residual covariance) were freely estimated 
instead of estimated in its current form. The values are zero for parameters already 
freely estimated and take on positive values for parameters currently fixed (for 
example the effect of IV1 on Y2 in all of the models). Appendix 1-Table A7 lists all 
non-zero modification indices for M2 and M3. Appendix 1-Table A7 suggests that 
estimating a free parameter for the regression of Y2 on IV1 is a way to improve the 
model. The normalized residual between Y2 and IV1 is -1.28 (see Appendix 1-Table 
A6) supporting this claim; however, a much larger gain in model fit would result 
from adding a freely estimated coefficient for Y1 on IV2 (4.374 in M2) than for Y2 on 
IV1 (0.745 in M2). This distinction is not evident from looking only at the residuals. 
Yet, neither of these is possible because the model is not identified with the addition 
of either parameter (as per the rank condition discussed earlier). Here again are the 
current limits of this research.
Modification indices are agnostic statistical scores; they do not identify a theo-
retical problem. Thus, simply freeing parameters in the model might defy, disrupt 
or debunk the causal model that the researcher carefully constructed using theory. 
Modification indices are a tool for researchers to use to re-visit their theories and 
discover what might be missing logically, before making any changes to the model. 
Focusing on M2: In Table A7, the modification indices are identical for the effect 
of IV2 on Y1 and Y2 on Y1, and identical for IV1 on Y2 and Y1 on Y2. This demon-
strates how endogeneity works in the SFM. There is residual covariance between 
Y1 and Y2 (normalized value of 0.197 in M2) and the fit of the model may suffer as 
a result, as the modification index of 4.374 suggests. This essentially means there is 
a statistical relationship (covariance) between Y1 and Y2 not explained by the model 
and if something could account for this unique feedback error, the model would fit 
better; in this case a better or additional instrument for IV2. I did not discuss this in 
Breznau (2017), but this is a useful finding from this excursus pointing at further 
research. 
Explaining Variance
Sometimes a purpose of explaining variance arises in addition to fit testing. In a 
SFM, this is a difficult conceptual task. The loop is the product of both coefficients 
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(effects a and b in Figure 3B and Table 1) running between Y1 and Y2. In M1, the 
loop causal effect of Y2 on Y1 is not 0.715, but includes the effect of Y1 on Y2 of 
0.084 as an indirect effect, and thus (0.715*0.084)=0.06. To calculate this effect 
as a percentage, take 1/(1 – Y1* Y2) = 1/(1 – 0.06) = 1.064 = the original amount 
plus 6.4% (Paxton, Hipp, & Marquat-Pyatt, 2011). One cycle through the feedback 
loop produces about 6.4% of the endogenous variables’ covariance15. To this loop 
causal effect we may apply a Sobel-like test revealing a significance score (z-value) 
of 0.13116. Interpretation is identical to a t-test making this statistic non-significant, 
which is not surprising given that the coefficients are not significant. Normally, 
another cycle would recover an additional 6% of 6% of the original covariance and 
so forth. In SFMs, there is no perpetual looping effect. One loop is the theoreti-
cally specified ‘number of cycles’ for the SFM (Hayduk, 2009). The ideal model 
M3 has a loop causal effect of 2.25% (=0.03*0.75), lower than the 6% found in M1, 
but offering the best theoretical loop causal effect from this research based on fit 
diagnostics.
The loop causal effect only offers the amount of unique covariance explained 
by the loop. The remainder may be of interest to the researcher; however, the 
amount of explained variance of Y1 and Y2, like their path coefficients, are recip-
rocally related17. The error of either Y variable actually contains part error and 
part non-error coming directly from the other endogenous variable’s error and thus 
violating the definition of error in OLS regression. The non-error part is not a com-
ponent of the theory underlying the model, but an implication of the feedback loop. 
Hayduk (2006) proposes a re-specification of r2 to resolve this problem called 
the blocked-error-r-square (beR2). Perfectly appropriate for SFMs, it equals the per-
centage of variance explained by the model when excluding the other error term 
as predictor (i.e., the non-error). The beR2 in M2 is (0.517/0.959=) 0.539 or 53.9% 
for Y1 and (9.887/22.366=) 44.2% for Y2, and for M3 the values are 56.1% for Y1 
and 41.7% for Y2 (see A3-Appendix Three). The results say little about differences 
between the models; in fact, they point out that modeling two very different theoret-
15 The formula accounts for situations with opposite signed coefficients, or coefficients 
greater than one. As in any statistical model, all indirect effects should be calculated 
from unstandardized coefficients, thus the loop causal effect is (0.148*0.403)=0.06. 
Although the causal effect should be identical regardless of calculation method, always 
rely on unstandardized (‘metric’) coefficients.
16 The standard error (SE) of loop causal effect (where the two causal paths a and 
b from Figure 3B are subscripted and normal font “b” is a metric coefficient) is: 
2 2 2 2  ab a a b bSE b SE b SE= + ; the significance test is then /  a b abb b SE .
17 Although beyond the scope here, it is interesting to think about the direction of this 
residual covariance. In infinite looping cycles, a negative covariance approaches zero 
while a positive covariance explodes towards infinity. In the SFM, there is only one 
cycle, but there is an implied force of direction suggesting that unobserved causes push 
away from equilibrium (positive) or towards it (negative).
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ical perspectives leads to similar explained variances. Given the small sample-size-
to-variables-ratio, it is not surprising that these models explain so much variance. 
I did not discuss this in Breznau (2017), that simultaneous feedback accounts 
for just over 2% of the joint distribution of public opinion and social spending. 
This would be trivial in standard r-square logic, but this is literally the explained 
variance unique to the loop itself. The feedback loop is like its own independent 
variable explaining variance in Y1 and Y2. Moreover, this begs the question: what is 
the loop? It represents the simultaneous impact of public opinion and social policy 
on one another. This simultaneity occurs in roughly one-year observation windows. 
Adding more observations should not change this if the loop is stationary at equi-
librium. Therefore, disturbances to opinion or policy at best impart a 2% shift in 
the distribution of opinion and policy. If speaking in terms of majority elections 
this could make the difference in outcomes. In terms of social spending, this would 
impart an increase of 60 units (Dollars, Euro, Yen, etc) if a social benefit provides 
3,000 units for something (pension, unemployment, etc). These potential outcomes 
suggest 2% may be non-trivial.
Further Considerations
Estimators
The task of the estimator is to identify what results most closely fit the implied 
covariance matrix to the observed covariance matrix (Myung, 2003). The most 
common estimator for this task is maximum likelihood (ML), or one of its many 
variants. In econometrics instrumental variables estimation often involves two- or 
three-stage least squares (2SLS or 3SLS) estimators. For SFMs, ML is the least 
biased estimator because it takes into consideration all information in the system 
(i.e., both equations) simultaneously. However, misspecification can lead ML to 
larger bias than 2SLS under some conditions (Paxton et al., 2011). This potential 
tradeoff suggests that the researcher may gain from running sensitivity checks with 
2 or 3SLS to identify misspecification (Kirby & Bollen, 2009), but should not use 
the results because they are counter to a theory of simultaneity. 2SLS violates the 
assumption that the errors are correlated (m in Figure 3) because it removes the 
error through instrumental variable stages. However, as noted long ago by econo-
mists, any adjustment to one outcome variable or its error term feeds back into the 
other and estimating the equations separately misses this process (Hausman, 1983, 
p. 194; Pearl, 2015).
The key is whether unobserved causes (and effects) are randomly distributed 
with respect to the reciprocally causal relationship of Y1 and Y2. If they are not, 
then the researcher can have little faith in the estimation of a and b in Figure 3, 
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and should reconsider the formal model rather than worrying about estimators. The 
default in all three software packages and the default for researchers should be ML. 
Disequilibrium
If there are meaningful changes in the size or direction of a causal force during 
the observation period, then SFMs may not be the appropriate tool. Kaplan, Harik 
and Hotchkiss (2001) demonstrate some risks associated with estimation under 
disequilibrium. They simulated different systems that experienced a shock before 
moving back to equilibrium. They took cross-sections out of the data series to esti-
mate SFMs to test the severity of violating the equilibrium assumption. Their find-
ings reveal that both regression coefficients representing the causal effects between 
endogenous variables (c.f., Y1 and Y2 herein) change somewhat dramatically as the 
system goes from the shock toward its equilibrium point. The error terms follow 
a similar pattern. The change in size of coefficients is gradual and smooth in the 
case of systems that move toward equilibrium without major fluctuations; however, 
when simulating a system with big oscillations the changes to the regression coef-
ficients are sporadic if not chaotic. In either case, the problem is non-ignorable.
A researcher could mistakenly estimate model Figure 2A when in fact the 
correct model is 2D wherein Y1,t-i shapes Y1,t-1 which leads to a new cycle of effects 
between Y1 and Y2, and then Y1,t-1 takes on an entirely new causal effect on Y1,t 
because of whatever transpired in the first loop (arrows between Y1 and Y2) at t-1. 
This means that the model is cyclically recursive instead of nonrecursive (Billings 
& Wroten, 1978). Unfortunately, it is not possible to test for equilibrium, because 
the data needed for such a test are missing by definition. This leaves a strong bur-
den on the researcher to argue for equilibrium. In the case of macro-comparative 
survey research, useful arguments may arise based on stable political and cultural 
systems. For example, the welfare states of Western Europe show a strong degree 
of stability in their political systems after the 1950s; whereas the Communist states 
of Eastern Europe broke down and experienced the shock of market transition in 
the 1990s. 
In cross-sectional survey data, there are somewhat random assortments of 
countries and time-periods available, case-in-point are ISSP data. If the effects and 
system are truly at equilibrium, then it does not matter what random assortment of 
country-time-points are in the analysis. All should reveal the same effects. Subdi-
viding the sample, it is possible that the timing of surveys provides a sensitivity test. 
I demonstrate this by splitting the data into all observations prior to 1998 (Group 
1) and all those 1998 and later (Group 2) (see Appendix 1-Table A8 for covari-
ances). I run M2 and M3 separately on the split data. Table A9 reveals that M3 is 
still preferable to M2 in both groups, and that most effects follow similar patterns 
between the groups. However, the models do not fit nearly as well as when run on 
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the pooled data – as seen from a few basic fit indices. Nonetheless, the 
2χ  p-value 
from the exact fit tests passes and it appears reasonable that effects are stable over 
time, for all non-missing years. The very small sample sizes are likely to blame for 
the troubling other indicators. I compare implied covariance matrices for M3 in 
Appendix 1-Table A10. Here the main test variables in the model (involving IV1, 
IV2, Y1 and Y2) carry similar implied covariances across the two groups. A potential 
problem is X4 (unemployment), which switches signs for some of the covariances 
between the groups. This is evidence that further consideration should be given to 
this variable in future research to see if it is disrupting the stability of the system. 
Also, maybe there was a slightly different size of effects in Group 1 given the model 
fits the Group 2 data better; although, much more work is necessary here. This 
sensitivity analysis does not guarantee stability, and although this procedure is not 
an established method, it follows the art of structural equation modeling to pay 
detailed attention to model diagnostics. 
Other Concerns
Missing values. Strictly speaking missing values should be dealt with in the estima-
tion of the model as opposed to imputing them separately as if they were observed 
values. The reason for this is that missing values are subject to special measurement 
error and ignoring this can produce misleading results. However, contextual-level 
data are not observations in the strict sense of the word. Values for gross domestic 
product or level of democracy for example stem from complex calculations whose 
inputs are not necessarily identical across societies. Researchers at organizations 
such as the OECD take painstaking efforts to make these values as identical as pos-
sible. These values do not represent objective qualities of societies in the way that 
observed variables such as age or height represent objective features of individuals. 
Contextual variables are instead more abstract. If they are missing it is best to take 
the nearest available year. The SFM is not suited for imputing values because of 
endogeneity. 
Aggregation and Comparison. Survey data come from micro-level observa-
tions, but macro-comparative researchers aggregate them in some way. Researchers 
should identify population averages, and then use weights and appropriate mea-
surement models, perhaps performing aggregation in several ways as sensitivity 
analyses. Monte Carlo simulations suggest that idiosyncratic research practices 
related to weighting and measurement easily impact results in small-N studies 
(Breznau, 2016). Furthermore, in order to meaningfully use comparative survey 
data, all questions need the same cognitive meaning in each socio-cultural context 
(Davidov et al., 2014). Researchers should establish measurement invariance before 
using survey data, and correct for measurement error using a measurement model 
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and predicted latent scores that account for differential item functioning when there 
are three or more scale variables. In this example, previous research suggests mea-
surement invariance of the two ISSP questions (Andreß & Heien, 2001)18. Given 
that there are only two items, the loadings are equal. Thus, a predicted ‘factor’ is 
identical in variance with simply taking their mean as I did here. 
Estimation without instruments. Several authors suggest estimating IV models 
without observed instrumental variables. Theoretically speaking this violates the 
exclusion restriction. These methods include estimating a latent or model-implied 
instrumental variable, or finding a subgroup of the total sample where a researcher 
can identify a causal instrument (Bollen, Kolenikov, & Bauldry, 2014; Ebbes et al., 
2005; Heckman, Urzua, & Vytlacil, 2006; Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999). Suffice to 
say it is possible but not recommended.
Nonlinear models. If the endogenous variables are non-linear, SFMs are still 
possible using alternative regression estimation techniques. Simply resorting to lin-
ear probability models may introduce new forms of bias (Finch & French, 2015; 
Terza, Bradford, & Dismuke, 2008)
Conclusion
This excursus shows that data limitations of macro-comparative research are not 
always a burden. With a theory of sub-yearly causal timing, scholars need not 
automatically reject cross-sectional survey data as a source for investigating their 
hypotheses. There are many theoretical forms of reciprocal causality for this. The 
simultaneous feedback model is only one form. Awareness of this method is not a 
sufficient condition to use it. Every step in the process of modeling simultaneous 
feedback must have theoretical argumentation behind it. Theory is a necessary con-
dition for employing a simultaneous feedback model. Without a theory to specify 
the model, there is no identification of the reciprocal effects and probably no identi-
fication of the model. Instrumental variables do not appear through random chance 
or out of thin air. Perhaps those normally running a bunch of correlations or regres-
sions and then trying to explain the results may learn something from simultaneous 
feedback modeling, because theory is not ‘optional’ (Kalter & Kroneberg, 2014).
The impetus for bringing light to this method is the fact that so many macro-
comparative phenomena in survey research appear to have reciprocal causality, and 
the forms of causality are highly complex and unfold in imprecise moments in 
time. There are well established methods, for example cross-lagged, fixed-effects/
random-slope, error correction and vector autoregressive models for fitting longitu-
18 Others find similar questions to be measurement equivalent in the ESS (Roosma, van 
Oorschot, & Gelissen, 2014)
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dinal models. Given the correct research design it is possible to integrate simultane-
ous feedback in a longitudinal model (Geweke, 1982) like an extension of Figure 
2D. Whether or not simultaneous feedback can capture both lagged and instanta-
neous processes is a theoretical consideration, one limited by available data. The 
loop causal effect from a SFM may then impact other outcomes (Hayduk, 1987). 
The loop itself acts as an independent ‘variable’ or a causal force, a consideration 
that researchers hopefully take away from this excursus. 
There are limitations. Although data derive from individual-level sources, I 
am not aware of the possibility to model a SFM using multi-level techniques nor 
individual-level measurement models. Ideally, a measurement model is integrated 
into a path model for a fully parsimonious structural equation model. This would 
have a single variable for each survey item and their relationship with the latent 
scale (here public opinion), and it would have two levels of data analysis. Lacking 
degrees of freedom prevents the former, and a peculiarity of the SFM prevents the 
latter. The loop only exists at the aggregate level because there is no individual-
level variance in social policy. Moreover, public opinion is by definition a group-
level phenomenon, meaning strictly macro-level. 
Theories germane to simultaneous feedback come in two broad types and 
both are debatable, so that researchers should use caution. The first type is where 
forces act upon each other simultaneously in the real world. The possibility of this 
is a philosophical argument. Some argue that by definition there are actions and 
reactions in the world, or that all things are reactions to other things. Meanwhile 
others argue that it is the interaction of objects and actions at the same point in 
time that constitute causal effects (Mulaik, 2009). Although this paper takes no 
philosophical position, researchers working with SFMs are by definition stepping 
on philosophical ground and tapping into debates that stretch throughout the his-
tory of social thought. Thus, awareness of these arguments should help researchers 
defend themselves against epistemological attacks. The second type suggests that 
simultaneous causality exists without theoretically simultaneous forces, but can be 
inferred because the window of observation – usually something around a year 
in surveys – contains enough bi-directional causal forces between two phenom-
ena that it is logical to treat them as simultaneously causal. This means that even 
though all these effects may run in different directions and have different sizes, 
that there is a sum or total effect in their causal loop force that is of theoretical and 
empirical interest. 
Although simultaneity across many countries is an interesting comparative 
perspective to take and test, researchers more often think of comparative research 
as looking for differences. As my sensitivity analysis in A3-Appendix Three shows, 
I can compare two different groups in the data, analogous to a moderation analysis. 
There are theories that opinion and policy will have different sized effects depend-
ing on the institutional context (Wlezien & Soroka, 2012), and this presents an 
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exciting avenue for future implementation of simultaneous feedback in macro-com-
parative survey data in general and specifically in the opinion-policy case.
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Appendix 1: Additional Tables
Table A1 Public Opinion and Social Policy Covariance Structure Dataa
Y1 Y2 X1 X2 X3 X4 IV1 IV2
Means 0.085 21.370 14.830 0.150 7.300 25.600 52.000 0.348
Variance 0.976 22.658 4.537 0.040 13.764 26.936 53.729 0.022
  Standard Deviations 0.988 4.760 2.130 0.200 3.710 5.190 7.330 0.149













Public Opinion Y1 1.000
Social Spending Y2 0.348 1.000
Aged X1 0.413 0.532 1.000
Right X2 -0.141 -0.193 0.052 1.000
Unemp. X3 0.294 0.128 0.017 0.004 1.000
GDP X4 -0.405 0.041 0.082 -0.140 -0.525 1.000
FLP IV1 -0.527 0.003 -0.030 -0.164 -0.585 0.572 1.000
Veto IV2 -0.068 -0.199 0.053 -0.013 -0.064 0.175 -0.191 1.000












Public Opinion Y1 0.976
Social Spending Y2 1.638 22.658
Aged X1 0.869 5.397 4.537
Right X2 -0.028 -0.184 0.022 0.040
Unemp. X3 1.077 2.253 0.003 0.130 13.764 
GDP X4 -2.076 1.015 -0.145 0.902 -10.117 26.936
FLP IV1 -3.818 0.098 -0.241 -0.470 -15.895 21.772 53.729
Veto IV2 -0.010 -0.141 0.000 0.017 -0.035 0.136 -0.209 0.022
a Taken from Breznau (2017).
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Table A2 Variable Names and Definitionsa
Name  Type  Measurement  Source
Public Opinion Endogenous Dependent 
Variable
Two-item scale from 
respondents level of agrre-
ment with the responsibility 
of government to provide 
jobs and reduce income 
differences.





Social Spending Endogenous dependent 
variable measuring 
Social Policy
The amount of spending 
on social policy provisions, 
mostly pensions, employ-
ment, unemployment, and 
health care expressed as a 
percentage of GDP in the 
same year.
OECD (2012); also 
known as “SOCX”




Right Independent variable Percent of national govern-
ment seats held by right 
parties.
Svennson et al. 
(2012); Quality of 
Government Data








Female LFP Instrument for  Public 
Opinion
Percent of the total female 




Veto Points  Instrument for both 
Social Policy variables
 A scale of institutional 
measures for the amount of 
chances a policy has to be 
vetoed. Based on the work 
of Lijphart (1999).
 Svennson et al. 
(2012); Quality of 
Government Data
a This Table is copied from Table 1 in Breznau (2017). See original article for full cita-
tions. All variables are measured simultaneously at the current year of the endogenous 
variables.
b Country-time points are: Australia (‛86,‘90,‘93,‘97,‘98,‘07), Austria (‛86,‘93,‘98), 
Canada (‛96,‘00,‘06), Denmark (‛98,‘08), Finland (‛06), France (‛97,‘98,‘06), Ger-
many (‛86,‘90,‘91,‘96,‘98,‘06), Ireland (‛91,‘96,‘98,‘06), Italy (‛86,‘90,‘96,‘99), Japan 
(‛96,‘98,‘06), the Netherlands (‛91,‘98,‘06), New Zealand (‛91,‘97,‘98,‘06), Norway 
(‛90,‘91,‘96,‘98,‘06), Portugal (‛99,‘06), Spain (‛96,‘98,‘07), Sweden (‛96,‘98,‘06), 
Switzerland (‛98,‘99,‘07), Great Britain (‛86,‘90,‘91,‘96,‘98,‘06), the United States 
(‛86,‘90,‘91,‘96,‘98,‘06).
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Table A4 Results from Separate Unidirectional Regressions
Y1 (public opinion) ON b s.e. β
Y2 (social policy) 0.029 0.020 0.141
X1 (aged) 1.789 0.475 0.362
X2 (right) -0.117 0.039 -0.252
X3 (GDP) -0.044 0.028 -0.165
X4 (unemp) -0.053 0.019 -0.280
IV1 (FLP) -0.067 0.015 -0.495
var(e.Y1) 0.423 0.072 0.441
Y2 (social policy) ON
Y1 (public opinion) 0.559 0.581 0.116
X1 (aged) 11.721 2.573 0.492
X2 (right) -0.417 0.217 -0.187
X3 (GDP) 0.184 0.140 0.144
X4 (unemp) 0.127 0.114 0.138
IV2 (veto) -7.494 2.986 -0.235
var(e.Y2) 13.197 2.231 0.591
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Table A7 Non-Zero Modificaiton Indices
Freed parameter M2 M3
Y1 ON Y2 4.374 2.609
Y1 ON IV2 4.374 2.609
Y1 ON Y1 4.374
a
2.609a
Y2 ON Y1 0.745 0.034
Y2 ON IV1 0.745 0.034
Y2 ON Y2 0.745
a 0.034a
Note. “ON” refers to regression coefficients
a Variable regression on itself is a statistical artifact of having  
structural equations (see text).
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Table A9 Testing Equilibrium Comparing Results by Group
M2 M3
Group 1 (< 1998) Group 2 (1998 +) Group 1 (< 1998) Group 2 (1998 +)
var b s.e β   b s.e β   b s.e β   b s.e β
Y1 ON
Y2 -0.010 - - -0.049 -0.010 - - -0.050 0.030 - - 0.150 0.030 - - 0.146
X1 0.330 0.047 0.632 0.116 0.055 0.278 0.275 0.040 0.534 0.069 0.054 0.162
X2 -0.767 0.435 -0.157 -1.675 0.722 -0.315 -0.681 0.374 -0.142 -1.416 0.707 -0.262
X3 -0.016 0.026 -0.073 -0.027 0.054 -0.089 -0.021 0.022 -0.098 -0.051 0.053 -0.166
X4 -0.052 0.035 -0.193 -0.039 0.027 -0.226 -0.057 0.031 -0.215 -0.041 0.027 -0.234
IV1 -0.079 0.014 -0.585 -0.081 0.031 -0.504 -0.076 0.013 -0.569 -0.089 0.030 -0.549
Y2 ON
Y1 1.500 - - 0.306 1.500 - - 0.302 0.750 - - 0.150 0.750 - - 0.155
X1 0.895 0.335 0.350 1.122 0.277 0.539 1.154 0.341 0.448 1.201 0.266 0.583
X2 -1.960 3.213 -0.082 -5.746 3.369 -0.217 -3.206 3.276 -0.133 -6.519 3.244 -0.249
X3 0.138 0.187 0.126 0.425 0.228 0.282 0.137 0.190 0.125 0.455 0.219 0.305
X4 0.368 0.246 0.277 0.318 0.140 0.366 0.325 0.251 0.243 0.265 0.134 0.309
IV1 -7.442 5.128 -0.216 -8.314 4.211 -0.274 -10.944 5.291 -0.315 -7.897 4.043 -0.263
e.Y1 0.253 0.060 0.243 0.494 0.118 0.547 0.187 0.045 0.185 0.476 0.114 0.512
e.Y2 13.250 3.231 0.532 11.875 2.839 0.532 13.752 3.290 0.544 11.008 2.632 0.504
RMSEA 0.261 0.170 0.177 0.080
CFI 0.934 0.943 0.969 0.987
Exact p   0.034     0.134     0.123     0.295  
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Table A10 Implied Covariance Matricies for M3 by Group 
Group 1 (< 1998)
var Y1 Y2 X1 X2 X3 X4 IV1 IV2
Y1 1.009
Y2 2.610 25.275
X1 1.085 5.512 3.808
X2 -0.036 -0.135 0.002 0.044
X3 1.798 3.457 0.125 -0.191 20.987
X4 -1.296 1.591 1.797 -0.062 -10.711 14.131
IV1 -4.981 -1.630 0.265 0.136 -18.010 17.133 56.940
IV2 -0.009 -0.124 0.027 -0.007 -0.179 0.259 0.079 0.021
Group 2 (1998 +)
var Y1 Y2 X1 X2 X3 X4 IV1 IV2
Y1 0.928
Y2 1.590 21.831
X1 0.728 5.768 5.148
X2 -0.019 -0.147 0.082 0.032
X3 1.173 4.509 1.658 0.041 9.836
X4 -2.522 -3.017 -2.382 -0.016 -9.040 29.578
IV1 -3.188 -5.018 -3.414 -0.298 -12.443 17.113 35.381
IV2 -0.009 -0.066 0.069 0.005 0.022 0.266 -0.082 0.024
Appendix Two and Three
Appendix Two and Three, A2 and A3 available at https://osf.io/gyz6p
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Abstract
One of the central and constantly recurring features of youth participation studies is the 
depiction of young people and adolescents as the future of democratic politics. Accord-
ing to previous research, however, young people exhibit generally lower levels of political 
participation than adults and show decreasing trends in their political activities over time. 
In this study, we argue that, in order to arrive at meaningful conclusions about young and 
adult people’s political participation over time, ‘construct-equivalent’ rather than identical 
instruments of political participation across different age groups and time points should 
be used. Applying the so called ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ for political participa-
tion across three different age groups and the time period 2002-2014 using data from the 
European Social Survey (ESS), our results indicate that (1) the concrete manifestations of 
the concept of political participation differ across young and adult people and over time 
and (2) levels of political participation are quite similar for young and adult people and 
increasing from 2002-2014. Therefore, the commonly employed strategy of applying iden-
tical instruments of political participation across age groups and time points appears at 
least questionable.
Keywords: political participation, youth participation, democracy, measurement equiva-
lence, scale development, Mokken scale analysis, European Social Survey
© The Author(s) 2018. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. Any further distribution of this work must 
maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI.
methods, data, analyses | Vol. 12(2), 2018, pp. 309-334 310 
Direct correspondence to  
Christian Schnaudt, GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Post Box 
122155, 68072 Mannheim, Germany 
E-Mail: christian.schnaudt@gesis.org
Citizens’ participation and engagement in the political process count as a ‘condi-
tio sine qua non’ of any democratic system. Consequently, it is not surprising that 
virtually every discussion about the well-being of democracy is strongly linked to 
debates and complaints about citizens’ disengagement and alienation from politics 
(cf. Verba & Nie, 1972, 1; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, 1). In this context, 
especially young people and adolescents have been singled-out as one of the major 
driving forces behind decreasing participation rates and growing disenchantment 
with the political sphere. Common depictions and characterizations of young people 
and adolescents in previous youth participation studies thus regularly include labels 
and terms such as ‘apathetic’, ‘alienated’, and ‘disengaged’ (cf. Garcia Albacete, 
2011, 2; Martin, 2012, 213). This is especially true in the German context where 
previous youth participation studies have repeatedly highlighted continuously high 
levels of political apathy (‘Politikverdrossenheit’) among the German youth (cf. 
Schneekloth, 2015, 178-82; Sloam, 2014, 664). As Henn and Foard summarize, 
“the message from many such studies is that young people’s levels of political par-
ticipation in general are in decline, and at a somewhat more rapid rate than is the 
case for older adults and also for previous youth cohorts” (2014, 361).
Yet, the validity of such a far-reaching conclusion hinges on several factors, 
as it implies a simultaneous statement about the levels of political participation (1) 
for young and adult people as well as (2) over the course of time. In order to allow 
for this kind of conclusion, a study has to meet at least three criteria. First, it should 
be based on a coherent sample of both young and adult people to facilitate direct 
comparisons of political participation levels across different age groups. Studies 
that rely on different samples for young and adult people remain inconclusive as 
to whether possible differences in political participation levels between age groups 
are ‘real’ or merely an artefact of different sampling frames or survey techniques 
for young and adult people. Second, the sample of both young and adult people 
should be coherent over time to facilitate direct comparisons of participation trends 
across age groups. Third, the measurement of political participation should be a 
valid and reliable representation of the same underlying concept across young and 
adult people as well as over time. This at least necessitates an investigation of the 
underlying structure of the concept of political participation and at best implies the 
development of so called ‘construct-equivalent’ instruments of political participa-
tion (cf. Garcia Albacete, 2011, 17) across different age groups and points in time. 
Studies that simply assume that identical instruments of political participation can 
be uniformly applied across young and adult people as well as over time with-
out checking this assumption empirically might miss important differences in the 
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underlying structure of political participation and are therefore ill-suited to draw 
valid conclusions with regard to young people’s political participation. 
A cursory glance at existing studies dealing with youth political participation 
reveals that none fulfills all of the three criteria mentioned. Pure youth participa-
tion studies by definition violate the first criterion of a direct comparison between 
young and adult people (see, for example, Henn & Foard, 2014; Gaiser, de Rijke & 
Spannring, 2010; Quintelier, 2007). Those studies that conform to the first criterion 
either lack a comparison over time or do not analyze the underlying structure of 
political participation (see, for example, Martin, 2012). Finally, those studies that 
meet the third criterion and assess the underlying structure of political participa-
tion are either restricted to one point in time or only investigate one age group, thus 
violating the first or second criterion (see, for example, Bakker & de Vreese, 2011; 
Quintelier, 2008; Henn & Foard, 2014).
Against this background, the present study offers a re-assessment of young 
people’s political participation by investigating the structure and levels of political 
participation across young, adult and old people in Germany over the period 2002-
2014. Applying the so called ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ (cf. Przeworski & 
Teune, 1966), this study develops age-group and time-point equivalent instruments 
of political participation that allow for meaningful comparisons of political partici-
pation levels across young and adult people as well as over time. In doing so, this 
study sheds more light on contemporary questions of (increasing) political apathy 
among young people and the peculiarities of youth participation in general.
The remainder is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
main findings and strategies of previous studies and identifies common problems in 
research on political participation in general and youth participation studies in par-
ticular. Section 3 introduces the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ for investigating 
the structure and levels of political participation across young and adult people over 
time. Section 4 illustrates the methods and data used. Section 5 presents the results 
of the empirical analysis. Section 6 discusses the most important findings as well as 
their broader implications and concludes.
Research on Political Participation Across Young 
and Adult People: Main Findings, Strategies, and 
Problems
One of the central and constantly recurring features of youth participation stud-
ies is the depiction of young people and adolescents as hope and sorrow for the 
future of democratic politics. As Mycock and Tonge (2012, 141) summarize this 
view, young people are “often discussed within the context of national decline or 
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regeneration, being projected as symbolic of the positive and progressive future or 
typified as a threat and somehow out of control.” Most of the time, however, it is 
the latter perspective that seems to dominate the discussion. Young people are por-
trayed as “apathetic or even as antipolitical, with neither aptitude nor inclination for 
participating in any form of collective social endeavour, and with no sense of civic 
responsibility” (Henn & Foard, 2014, 360; see also Quintelier, 2007, 165; Neufeind, 
Jiranek & Wehner, 2014, 278; Martin, 2012, 213; Cammaerts et al., 2014, 648). 
Empirically, such negative portrayals are often countered by the observation 
that young people, while possibly being alienated from traditional electoral or for-
mal politics, do engage in non-electoral or informal modes of political participation 
that reach beyond the realm of institutionalized politics (cf. Vissers & Stolle 2014, 
937; Cammaerts et al 2014, 657; Sloam 2014, 676). In comparison with adults, then, 
young people’s political participation seems to be less formal, less institutional-
ized, and less hierarchical, and they appear to prefer more individualized, lifestyle-
oriented modes of participation such as signing petitions, protesting, or political 
consumerism (cf. Sloam 2013, 837; Stolle, Hooghe & Micheletti 2005, 250). If these 
assertions are correct, it is clear that a comparison of political participation between 
young and adult people does not only have to consider the level of participation, but 
also the respective modes of participation being used by young and adult people, 
respectively.
As such, the analysis of young people’s political participation is directly linked 
to discussions about the continuous expansion of the political participation reper-
toire and distinctions between different ‘types’ of political participation (cf. van 
Deth, 2014; Vissers & Stolle 2014, 937). Whereas contacting politicians or work-
ing for a political party are usually considered to be specimens of ‘formal’, ‘con-
ventional’, ‘institutionalized’ or ‘elite-directed’ participation, other modes such as 
signing petitions, demonstrating or boycotting are usually labeled ‘unconventional’, 
‘non-institutionalized’ or ‘protest’ participation (cf. van Deth, 2014, 361; Linssen et 
al., 2014, 33-4; Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010, 198). While such distinctions 
between different ‘types’ of participation are well-known and frequently employed 
in research on political participation, there are at least two problems concerning the 
way in which they are being used.
The first problem refers to research on political participation in general and 
touches upon the fact that many studies do not test which of the several modes of 
participation might actually be summarized to form one (or more) coherent type(s) 
of political participation. Instead of investigating the structure of different modes 
of political participation, a lot of studies simply choose to build additive indices (cf. 
Quintelier, 2007, 174; Hao, Wen, & George, 2014, 1226; Wray-Lake & Hart, 2012, 
457) or use self-defined assignments of participation modes to types (cf. Gaiser, de 
Rijke & Spannring, 2010, 440; Martin, 2012, 218-9; Neufeind, Jiranek, & Wehner, 
2014, 285; Soler-i-Marti & Ferrer-Fons, 2015, 101). As a consequence, one and the 
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same mode of participation is oftentimes assigned to different types of participa-
tion across different studies. For example, whereas Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier 
(2010, 198) consider ‘donating money’ to be a specimen of ‘non-institutionalized’ 
participation, Gaiser, de Rijke and Spannring (2010, 440) depict it as a mode of 
‘conventional’ participation. Similarly, Neufeind, Jiranek and Wehner (2014, 285) 
classify ‘signing a petition’ as a mode of ‘conventional’ participation, whereas 
Gaiser, de Rijke and Spannring (2010, 440) label it as ‘unconventional’, Martin 
(2012, 217) as ‘non-electoral’, and Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier (2010, 198) as 
‘non-institutionalized’ participation. As these examples make clear, previous stud-
ies do not assign individual modes to commonly employed types of political partic-
ipation in a coherent manner. These inconsistencies do not only hamper a compari-
son of participation levels and trends across different studies, but also leave open 
the question of whether and which different modes can actually be summarized to 
form one or more coherent types of political participation.
Those studies that do investigate the structure of political participation pro-
vide valuable (empirical) information on which modes form a coherent type of par-
ticipation, but are usually restricted to one point in time (cf. Bakker & de Vreese, 
2011, 457-8; Quintelier, 2008, 359-60; Henn & Foard, 2014, 365). Consequently, 
these studies have nothing to say about possible changes in the underlying structure 
of (different types of) political participation over time which, however, is of cru-
cial importance especially in the context of longitudinal studies (e.g., a previously 
unconventional mode becomes rather conventional over time; see also Linssen et 
al., 2014; 34).
The second problem, which is more pertinent to our focus on young people’s 
political participation, has to do with the applicability or generalizability of com-
monly employed conceptualizations and types of political participation across dif-
ferent age groups. Distinctions between different types of political participation, 
such as ‘conventional vs unconventional’ or ‘institutionalized vs non-institutional-
ized’, belong to the standard toolkit of political participation researchers. The fact 
that these distinctions are so frequently applied is probably one of the major reasons 
why their usage is generally not called into question. However, especially in the 
context of research on youth participation, it appears important to note that these 
conceptualizations and distinctions have been developed primarily with reference 
to the general or adult population, which at least leaves room for the possibility that 
they are not applicable in the same manner to young people as well. As O’Toole et 
al. remind us, “[y]oung people are often seen in conventional accounts of politi-
cal participation as simply a subset of the general population. Analyses of youth 
participation need to consider young people as a specific group with their own par-
ticular circumstances and concerns” (2003, 46). In this connection, Quintelier has 
argued that “young people operate with a very narrow conception of politics that is 
restricted to formal politics only” (2007, 177; see also O’Toole et al., 2003, 52). If 
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we consider this limited and narrow conception of politics to inform their concep-
tion and understanding of political participation as well, young people’s political 
participation may be less facetted and based on fewer modes of participation than 
that of adult people. In a similar manner, changes or delays in youth transition peri-
ods as highlighted by previous studies (cf. Soler-i-Marti & Ferrer-Fons, 2015, 96; 
Garcia Albacete, 2011, 6) might also lead to varying structures of young people’s 
political participation over time. An empirical investigation of the underlying struc-
ture of political participation across age groups and over time therefore becomes 
indispensable in order to shed more light on the differences and similarities con-
cerning the structure, levels and developments of young and adult people’s political 
participation.
The ‘Identity-equivalence Procedure’ for Political 
Participation
For our empirical investigation, we make use of the so called ‘identity-equivalence 
procedure’ which has originally been introduced by Przeworski and Teune, (1966) 
in the context of cross-cultural research. The basic premise of this procedure is 
that, in order to be comparable, measurements of the same concepts do not have 
to be identical but rather equivalent (cf. Przeworski & Teune, 1966, 555-9). More 
specifically, as its name suggests, the procedure is based on two consecutive steps. 
In a first step, it involves the search for a so-called ‘identity set’ of survey items that 
can be regarded as a valid representation of a given concept across all subgroups of 
interest (cf. van Deth, 1986, 265). These subgroups are usually different countries 
but the same underlying logic can be easily extended to include different social 
classes or age groups as well. For example, in the present study we search for a 
common set of survey items that form a consistent scale of the concept ‘political 
participation’ across young and adult people alike as well as over time. This com-
mon set of items constitutes our ‘identity set’ of political participation. In a second 
step, the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ implies the search for additional survey 
items that can be used to extend the identity set of political participation in a sub-
group and time-point specific way. Accordingly, in the present study we search – 
separately for young and adult people as well as time points – for additional survey 
items that can be added to the existing scale of political participation that is based 
on the identity set only. Since the respective survey items to be added to the iden-
tity scale of political participation possibly differ between young and adult people 
and time points, the resulting age-group and time-point specific scales of politi-
cal participation are no longer identical but rather equivalent. Adding age-group 
and time-point specific items to our identity scale helps us to arrive at “longer, 
more reliable and more contextually relevant instruments” of political participa-
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tion (Garcia Albacete, 2011, 29). With this strategy, the ‘identity-equivalence pro-
cedure’ ensures that we are analyzing the same underlying concept across different 
subgroups and time points (due to the identity scale which consists of the same 
items across all subgroups and time points) while at the same time allowing for 
the possibility that manifestations of the same underlying concept might differ in 
specific ways for different subgroups and time points (due to the construction of the 
equivalence scales). As such, construct equivalence is achieved by directly building 
the equivalence scales on the identity scale: “By referring the equivalent indicators 
back to the identical indicators, this procedure introduces safeguards of validity – 
the guarantee that the phenomena examined […] constitute specific occurrences of 
a more general concept” (Przeworski & Teune, 1966, 568). 
While the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ has been developed for establish-
ing equivalent measures across different cultural contexts, we believe that it can be 
fruitfully applied to investigate the underlying meaning and structure of the con-
cept political participation across different age groups and time points as well. In 
contrast to previous studies on youth political participation, we thus do not simply 
assume that political participation exhibits the same underlying meaning and struc-
ture (over time) for young and adult people alike but rather put this proposition to 
an empirical test. 
Methods and Data
For the implementation of the procedure, we rely on Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA) 
(Mokken, 1971). MSA is based on principles of nonparametric item response the-
ory (IRT) and constitutes a probabilistic extension of the Guttman scale (cf. van 
Schuur, 2003, 139). MSA can be used to investigate response patterns to a set of 
survey items that are supposed to measure a certain latent trait, such as ‘political 
participation’ in the present study (cf. Sijtsma & Molenaar, 2002; van Schuur, 2003; 
van der Ark 2007; 2012; Linssen et al. 2014, 39-41; Schnaudt, Walter, & Popa, 
2016, 76). MSA assumes that each respondent has a certain, unknown value on that 
latent trait, so that the probability of a positive response to any of the survey items 
for political participation increases with that unknown value on the latent trait. For 
the construction of political participation scales, the individual survey items have 
to meet certain criteria as implied by the monotone homogeneity model: all item 
pairs have to be positively correlated and the scalability coefficients for each indi-
vidual item have to exceed a certain lower bound (usually item H>0.3). In addition, 
the overall degree of scalability for the resulting scale(s) as indicated by Scale H 
should exhibit a minimum value of 0.3 as well. In MSA, the item scalability coef-
ficients can be compared to discrimination parameters in parametric IRT models, 
whereas the Scale H indicates the average discrimination power with regard to the 
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ordering of all items in the final scales (cf. Mokken, 1971, 184-5; van der Ark, 2007, 
3-4; Sijtsma, Meijer, & van der Ark, 2011, 33). If the assumptions of the mono-
tone homogeneity model hold, respondents and items can be meaningfully ordered 
along a latent continuum of political participation.
1
 While MSA has been success-
fully applied in previous studies of political participation (cf. van Deth, 1986; Gar-
cia Albacete, 2011; Linssen et al., 2014), this study is the first to use it for analyzing 
the structure of political participation across different age groups and time points.
MSA is particularly suitable because it allows us to identify which concrete 
modes of participation might be summarized to form coherent scales or types of 
political participation and whether these modes are constant or varying across 
young and adult people and over time (cf. van Deth, 1986, 265). What is more, it 
gives us information on the ranking or ‘difficulty’ of individual survey items along 
the latent continuum ‘political participation’ and whether we find an identical or 
varying item order across young and adult people and over time (cf. Linssen et al., 
2014, 42-4; Garcia Albacete, 2011, 24). Finally, it allows us to construct equivalent 
scales of political participation across young and adult people and over time and 
thus enables us to draw meaningful conclusions about differences and similarities 
with respect to the levels of political participation across different age groups and 
time points. 
With regard to our empirical analysis, we rely on German data from the first 
seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) covering the years 2002-2014. 
The ESS is a biennial survey covering a wide range of European citizens’ eco-
nomic, moral, social and political attitudes and behaviors and has been conducted 
in more than thirty European countries since 2002 (for a general overview, see 
Schnaudt et al., 2014). Considering the focus of the present study, the advantage 
of using data from the ESS consists in its combination of providing (1) a stable set 
of survey items tapping the concept political participation for a period of twelve 
years and (2) a representative sample of the German population aged 15 and above. 
Relying on ESS data thus remedies at least two possible shortcomings of previous 
studies. First, since it covers the general population aged 15 and above, it enables 
us to directly analyze differences and similarities in political participation between 
young and adult people using only one coherent sample. Such a direct comparison 
between young and adult people allows us to find out more about the specificities 
of young people’s political participation and establishes an advantage vis-à-vis pure 
youth studies (for example, Gaiser, de Rijke, & Spannring, 2010; Quintelier, 2007). 
Second, covering people already from the age of 15, the ESS allows us to depict 
a more realistic and encompassing picture of young people than previous studies 
relying on a sample only with respondents aged 18 or above (for example, Henn & 
1 For a more detailed discussion of MSA, including its properties and underlying as-
sumptions, see Mokken, 1971; Sijtsma & Molenaar, 2002; van Schuur, 2003; van der 
Ark, 2007; 2012; Ligtvoet et al., 2010, 2011.
317 Schnaudt, Weinhardt: Blaming the Young Misses the Point
Foard, 2014; Wray-Lake & Hart, 2012). Germany is a substantively interesting case 
to focus on given previous findings about continuously high levels of political apa-
thy (‘Politikverdrossenheit’) among the German youth (cf. Schneekloth, 2015, 178-
82; Sloam, 2014, 664). In addition, our focus on Germany also reflects a pragmatic 
decision based on sample size and data availability. While the ESS is a survey of 
the general population, sample sizes in Germany are sufficiently high (more than 
2,750 respondents in each of the seven waves) to still allow for meaningful analy-
ses across young and adult people as well as individual waves of the survey (cf. 
Schnaudt et al., 2014, 501-2). Our focus on Germany thus remedies the problem of 
very small sample sizes for the young population that is routinely encountered in 
other studies (cf. Sloam, 2014, 668). 
In our following analysis, we employ a total of seven items that are supposed 
to measure the concept of political participation which we broadly define here as 
“citizens’ activities affecting politics” (van Deth, 2014, 351). While the ESS pro-
vides a higher number of suitable items in certain waves, we select these seven 
items because they are available in all seven waves of the ESS and can be meaning-
fully applied to all respondents aged 15 and above. This implies that we exclude 
the item ‘voting in national elections’ from our analyses as it would lead to the 
exclusion of a substantial and theoretically important subset of our sample, namely 
all young people who did not have the chance to vote in the last general election 
due to their young age (cf. Quintelier, 2007, 169). The seven items selected are: (1) 
working for a political party or action group, (2) contacting politicians or govern-
ment officials, (3) working for another organization or association, (4) wearing a 
badge or campaign sticker, (5) signing a petition, (6) taking part in a lawful demon-
stration, and (7) boycotting products. The ESS asks which of these several activi-
ties respondents have done within the last twelve months.
2
 This question wording 
ensures that responses are not biased against young people who, due to their lower 
age, did not have the same chances of engaging in political activities as adult people 
(cf. Martin, 2012, 215). In the remainder of this section, we analyze the structure of 
these seven items separately for three age groups. In addition to a group of young 
people (aged 15-29) and a group of adult people (aged 30-65), we also investigate a 
group of older people (aged 66 and above). This classification is informed by one of 
the most established findings in participation research according to which political 
participation follows the shape of an inverted U, implying that participation rates 
increase with age and then drop again when people get older and reach retirement 
(cf. Milbrath, 1965, 134). While the cutting point for distinguishing between the 
second and the third age group is rather straightforward (i.e., transition to retire-
ment), the decision to classify people until the age of 29 as belonging to the young-
2 Each of the seven items is binary in nature (1=have done/0=haven’t done). Respondents 
with missing information (‘don’t know’, no answer, or refusal) on any of the items have 
been excluded from the analysis (less than 0.5% for each item).
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est category follows theoretical arguments and empirical findings about a longer 
or delayed transition from youth to adulthood (cf. Garcia Albacete, 2011, 6). As 
“transformations in patterns of youth participation in Western Europe may arise 
more from the lengthening of youth than from any generational change” (Soler-i-
Marti & Ferrer-Fons, 2015, 96), implying that young people reach important stages 
of their life-cycles (e.g., marriage, getting children) at a later point in time as com-
pared to some decades ago, we consider the age of 29 as a plausible cutting point for 
distinguishing between young and adult people.
Empirical Findings
Before we turn to the results of the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ for political 
participation, Figure 1 gives a first descriptive overview of the seven items for polit-
ical participation across the three age groups and seven time points (2002-2014) 
under consideration. 
On average, participation levels are lowest for the oldest age group and highest 
for the group of adults. The group of young people occupies the medium position. 
What is more, the figures indicate an increase in the average participation rates for 
certain items over time across all age groups (e.g., working for an organization, 
signing a petition, boycotting products). Other forms of participation, such as work-
ing for a political party or wearing a badge, remain at rather stable levels across 
time and age groups.
Having a closer look at the participation profiles of each of the three age 
groups over time, Figure 1 shows that for young people working for a political 
party, wearing a badge, and contacting politicians are the least common modes of 
participation across all years and usually do not exceed participation levels of ten 
percent. The remaining four items for demonstrating, working for an organization, 
boycotting products, and signing a petition reach average levels between ten and 
thirty-two percent across all years but show more variability with regard to their 
rank order across time. Overall, the participation profile for the youngest age group 
thus exhibits some internal changes and a certain degree of volatility over time. For 
the group of adults, a different picture emerges. Here, the general participation pro-
file is very stable over time and exhibits only one minor change with regard to the 
rank order of the items for signing a petition and boycotting between the years 2006 
and 2008. Otherwise, the identical rank order of participation modes is evident 
across all years. The least common participation modes are working for a political 
party, wearing a badge, and demonstrating, usually not exceeding average levels 
of ten percent. The most common modes of participation are boycotting, signing 
a petition, and working for an organization, with average levels between twenty 
and forty percent across all years. Contacting politicians occupies an intermediate 
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position with average levels between thirteen and eighteen percent across the seven 
time points. Finally, the participation profile of the oldest age group shows the most 
fluctuations with regard to the rank order of participation modes over time. While 
wearing a badge, working for a political party, and demonstrating are the least 
common modes with average levels below five percent, their relative order changes 
from year to year. The same volatility in the rank order over time holds true for the 
most common modes of signing a petition, boycotting, and working for an organi-
zation, whose levels in all years range between ten and thirty percent. Contacting 
politicians is the only consistent mode of participation occupying an intermediate 
rank across all years with levels between seven and fourteen percent. 
To summarize, the inspection of the seven individual modes of political par-
ticipation as depicted in Figure 1 shows some similarities and common trends 
between age groups and over time. Yet, some differences with regard to the average 
levels and rank order of these seven modes across age groups and time points are 
also evident. The main question of interest concerns whether these differences in 
the frequency distribution and rank order of the seven individual modes indicate 
the existence of different meanings or structures underlying the concept of political 
participation across different age groups and time points.
 Notes: ESS data 2002-2014, data weighted using post-stratification weights.
Figure 1 Average levels of different modes of political participation across 
three age groups and seven time points (percentages)
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To answer this question, we turn to the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ as 
briefly described before. In a first step, we search for the so called ‘identity set’ of 
political participation. The identity set is that set of items which corresponds to the 
properties of a Mokken Scale and is valid across all age groups and time points 
under investigation. Starting first with the pooled data set to get an impression of 
the structure of political participation across all respondents and time points (with 
no distinctions between age groups and ESS waves), MSA yields a uni-dimensional 
scale of political participation consisting of six out of the seven items under consid-
eration. More specifically, with the exception of ‘boycotting products’ all remain-
ing modes of participation can be summarized to form a coherent scale of politi-
cal participation (Scale H=0.35, LCRC=0.66).
3
 This finding also indicates that, at 
least for the pooled data set, commonly employed types of political participation, 
such as ‘institutionalized vs non-institutionalized’, do not receive empirical sup-
port. The interesting question at this point is whether the political participation 
scale found for the pooled data set can be replicated in the same way across all 
age groups and over time to form our ‘identity set’ of political participation. The 
short and clear answer is ‘no’. From the seven items included in our analysis, the 
only set of items that corresponds with the criteria of a Mokken Scale across all 
age groups and time points consists of the three items working for a political party, 
contacting politicians, and working for another organization. Accordingly, these 
three modes of participation can be meaningfully summarized to form our ‘identity 
set’ of political participation. Again, it has to be noted that MSA yields only one 
scale of political participation, indicating that commonly used conceptions and dis-
tinctions between different types of political participation are not supported in our 
data. Table 1 presents the detailed properties of the final three-item identity scale of 
political participation across age groups and time points.
All item scalability coefficients exceed the critical lower bound of 0.3. The 
overall scalability of the resulting scales ranges between 0.35 (young people in 
2004) to 0.55 (older people in 2012). In five out of twenty-one cases, the scale H is 
below 0.4 (indicating a weak scale), in eleven out of twenty-one cases the scale H 
is between 0.4 and 0.5 (indicating a medium scale), and in five out of twenty-one 
cases the scale H is above 0.5 (indicating a strong scale) (cf. Mokken, 1971, 185). 
The reliability coefficients of the resulting identity scales as measured by rho and 
LCRC, respectively, do not reach conventional levels of 0.7, which can be explained 
by the fact that the identity scale consists of only a small number of three items 
which, in addition, also lack a uniform distribution in their difficulties (cf. Garcia 
Albacete, 2011, 27). Lastly, the rank order of the three items within the identity 
scale is the same across all age groups and time points: The most difficult item is 
working for a political party, followed by contacting politicians and working for 
3 The LCRC (Latent Class Reliability Coefficient) is a measure of reliability in MSA (see 
van der Ark, van der Palm, & Sijtsma, 2011). 
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Table 1 Properties of the three-item identity scale of political participation 
across three age groups and seven time points (item frequencies and 


















































































































































































































































































methods, data, analyses | Vol. 12(2), 2018, pp. 309-334 322 
an organization (see also Figure 2 below). This information provides additional 
evidence that the identity scale represents one and the same underlying concept 
(i.e., political participation) across all age groups and time points and thus forms a 
solid basis for meaningful comparisons of the equivalent scales to be built upon the 
identity set in the next step. 
The second step of the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ consists in adding 
further, age-group and time-point specific items to the identity scale. In this step, 
additional items are added as long as the properties of a Mokken Scale hold. More 
specifically, this implies that, in order to qualify as an extension of the identity 
scale, any of the four remaining items (i.e., wearing a badge or campaign sticker, 
signing a petition, taking part in a lawful demonstration, and boycotting products) 
has to meet the following criteria: It has to be positively correlated with the three 
constitutive items of the identity scale, exhibit a minimum scalability coefficient of 


















































































































































Notes: MSA based on three dichotomous items for political participation. ‘Item diff.’ shows 
the frequency of each item with s.e. in parentheses. ‘Item H’ indicates the scalability 
coefficient for each item separately with s.e. in parentheses. ‘Scale H’ indicates the scal-
ability coefficient for the final scale with s.e. in parentheses. Reliability indicated by 
‘rho/LCRC’. No violations of latent monotonicity and non-intersection found. ESS data 
2002-2014.
Table 1 continued
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least 0.3 (scale H) (see also section 4). Any of the four items fulfilling these criteria 
is added to the identity scale to form equivalent scales of political participation that 
are comparable across age groups and time points. With this strategy, longer and 
more reliable scales of political participation can be reached that reflect the specific 
conditions of the respective age groups and time points while still being manifesta-
tions of the same underlying concept due to their inclusion of the same identity set. 
The results of this second step are summarized in Table 2.
In sixteen out of twenty-one cases the identity scales could be enriched with 
age-group or time-point specific items. For the adult age group, with the exception 
of 2008, the scale for political participation could be extended by three additional 
items (wearing a badge, signing a petition, demonstrating). The same holds true 
for the oldest age group in the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2012 as well as for the 
youngest age group in 2008. For the youngest age group it is further noteworthy 
that the identity scale could not be extended at all in the years 2004, 2010, 2012 and 
2014. The item for boycotting products was not scalable in any of the age groups 
across time (item H <0.3). In thirteen out of twenty-one cases, the final equiva-
lent scales of political participation establish weak scales (Scale H 0.3-0.39), while 
in the remaining eight cases they form medium scales (Scale H 0.4-0.49). More 
importantly, however, in all sixteen cases where additional items could be added, 
the reliability of the final equivalent scales in comparison to the identity scale could 
be improved.
Table 2 also provides information on the rank order of the individual modes 
of participation within the final equivalent scales of political participation. While 
this information is negligible for the construction of the equivalent scales itself, it 
provides some additional insights with regard to the differences in the participation 
profiles across age groups and time. As can be seen, even in those instances where 
the final equivalent scales are identical across the three age groups, the rank order 
of the individual modes differs between young, adult, and old people. Using the 
six-item equivalence scale as an example, we see that for young and adult people 
the least popular (or most ‘difficult’) mode of participation is working for a politi-
cal party, whereas for the oldest age group it is wearing a badge. We also observe 
that contacting politicians is more difficult for young people as compared to adult 
and old people, while the opposite holds true for demonstrating. Yet, as the relative 
position of the three items of the identity set (which is the same across all respon-
dents and years) does not change within the equivalence scales, these are still sup-
posed to be comparable across age groups and time points. 
A more detailed investigation of the item ordering across age groups and time 
points is shown in Figure 2. Here we assessed whether the item rank orders as 
shown in Table 2 are the same for all respondents within a respective age group at 
a given point in time. In technical terms, we investigated the existence of an invari-
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ant item ordering (IIO) across respondents as implied by the double monotonicity 
assumption in MSA (cf. Ligtvoet et al., 2010, 2011; Sijtsma, Meijer, & van der Ark, 
2011; Watson et al., 2014). The existence of IIO implies that the item response func-
tions of any pair of items do not intersect and are sufficiently different from each 
other to speak of a meaningful order of items across respondents. For the inspection 
of IIO, Ligtvoet et al. (2010, 2011) have proposed the coefficient Ht which should 
exhibit a minimum value of 0.3 in order to draw meaningful conclusions about the 
existence of IIO of the items within a Mokken Scale (see also Sijtsma, Meijer, & 
van der Ark, 2011; Watson et al., 2014, 74-5).
 
Notes: For further information, see Ligtvoet et al. 2010; 2011.
Figure 2 Inspection of invariant item ordering (IIO) for political participation 
scales across three age groups and seven time points (HT coefficients)
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Figure 2 plots the respective Ht coefficients for the identity and equivalence 
scales of political participation across age groups and time points. With only two 
exceptions, all coefficients exceed the critical value of 0.3 so that we can speak of 
an invariant item ordering and a meaningful order of the different modes of politi-
cal participation across all respondents within the same age group at a given point 
in time. Both exceptions refer to the oldest age group (2002 and 2006) where the 
item response functions for the different items are too close to each other (Ht<0.3) 
to convey any meaningful message about the order of the items across all respon-
dents.
As a final summary of the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ for political par-
ticipation, Figure 3 provides a descriptive overview of the final identity and equiva-
lence scales across age groups and time points. To account for the varying number 
of items in the final equivalence scales across age groups and time points, we have 
standardized all scales to range from 0-1 (cf. van Deth, 1986, 269).
Three observations seem to be notable. First, it can be seen that the identity 
and equivalence scales yield varying participation levels. Especially for the young-
est age group the equivalence scales reveal higher participation levels than the iden-
tity scales (see 2002, 2006 and 2008), while for the oldest age group the opposite 
can be observed. For the group of adults, the equivalence scales sometimes result in 
higher and sometimes in lower participation levels than the identity scales. Second, 
there appears to be an increasing trend in the levels of political participation over 
time for young, adult, and old people alike. Accordingly, for all three age groups, 
the average participation levels are higher in 2014 than 2002. Third, comparing 
the levels of political participation across young, adult, and old people, the oldest 
age group clearly is the least politically active. However, more interesting from the 
perspective of youth participation research is the observation that young and adult 
people in fact show quite similar levels of political participation. With the excep-
tion of 2004, young people’s political participation does not deviate significantly 
from the average participation levels of the overall population. Using equivalent 
instruments of political participation that are based on a common identity set thus 
provides us with a less gloomy picture about young people’s political participation 
than relying on the commonly employed strategy of applying identical instruments.
Summary and Discussion
In applying the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ for political participation across 
different age groups and time points, this study offers a re-assessment of young 
people’s political participation in Germany. As Cammaerts et al. have pointed 
out, “much of the existing social science literature, as well as many journalistic 
accounts of the supposedly low turnout of young people in elections, assumes that 
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Notes: ESS data for the years 2002-2014, data weighted using post-stratification weights. 
The vertical line shows the average level of political participation across all three age 
groups and time points as measured by the equivalence scale.
Figure 3 Average levels of political participation across three age groups and 
seven time points (means with 99% and 95% CIs)
young people today are simply fed up with politics per se and not interested in the 
political questions facing their communities or their countries. However, much of 
this literature fails to provide convincing empirical evidence for such claims and 
critiques” (2014, 650). In this study, we argue that, in order to arrive at meaningful 
conclusions about young people’s political participation, its specificities in com-
parison with adult people, as well as its developments over time, ‘construct-equiva-
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lent’ rather than identical instruments of political participation across different age 
groups and over time should be used.
What are the main insights of the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ for politi-
cal participation across age groups and time points? First, the (empirical) structure 
of the concept of political participation does not reflect commonly employed types 
of political participation, such as the distinction between institutionalized and non-
institutionalized participation. For all age groups and time points under investiga-
tion, MSA yields a single, uni-dimensional scale of political participation. In light 
of this finding, the commonly employed strategy of many previous studies of simply 
applying well-known distinctions between different types of political participation 
without checking their empirical suitability is at least questionable. Second, while 
the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ shows a generally uni-dimensional structure 
of political participation, the concrete composition of the final equivalent scales of 
political participation as well as the rank order of the different participation modes 
within these scales vary across age groups and over time. Overall, the equivalence 
scales contain more items for adult people and are more stable in their composition 
over time when compared to young and old people. This finding might indeed be a 
reflection of a more narrow conception of politics held by young people as pointed 
out in previous research (cf. Quintelier, 2007, 177; O’Toole et al., 2003, 52). In any 
case, it shows that the concrete manifestation of the concept political participation 
differs across age groups and time. Simply applying identical (rather than equiva-
lent) instruments of political participation for young and adult people as well as 
different time points thus appears to be an ill-suited strategy to arrive at meaningful 
conclusions about the levels and trends of political participation. Third, regarding 
the levels and trends of political participation, the results for our final equivalent 
scales show an increase in participation levels over time that is observable for all 
age groups. These results are clearly at odds with the conventional wisdom stating 
that young people are less politically active than adults and are becoming more and 
more politically apathetic and disengaged as time passes by (cf. Henn & Foard, 
2014, 361). Judging from the results based on our equivalent scales of political par-
ticipation, the future prospects of (German) democracy are not as shady as sug-
gested in some previous studies of youth political participation.
What are the implications of the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ for political 
participation across age groups and time points? In light of the results presented, a 
central question concerns the analytical value of commonly employed conceptions 
and types of political participation, such as the distinction between conventional 
and unconventional or institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation. As 
indicated earlier, for none of our age groups and time points under consideration 
the ‘identity-equivalence procedure’ as implemented by MSA yields a solution that 
consists of two (or more) scales and that could be indicative of any of the types of 
political participation mentioned above. Does this mean that we can completely 
methods, data, analyses | Vol. 12(2), 2018, pp. 309-334 330 
eschew these commonly employed conceptions of political participation? Such a 
conclusion would certainly be premature. First, it is clear that (cross-national) sur-
veys such as the ESS are limited in the number and the variety of items to be 
included in the survey. Constructing time-series data for a stable set of items logi-
cally comes at the expense of including new items into a survey when interviewing 
time is limited. This establishes a possible problem, as surveys such as the ESS are 
limited in their capability to adapt to recent changes and developments concerning 
political participation. As a consequence, survey items for newer modes of par-
ticipation, such as ‘guerilla gardening’ or ‘reclaim-the-street parties’ (cf. van Deth, 
2014), which might form the basis of a second dimension of political participation, 
are not available in the ESS. Hence, it might be possible that the uni-dimensionality 
of our equivalent scales establishes an artefact of the particular items used in the 
present analysis.
4
 While there is certainly no easy answer to this problem, cross-
national surveys such as the ESS sooner or later have to find a way to adapt to and 
cover changes in the empirical realities of concepts such as political participation. 
Second, the uni-dimensionality found for our equivalent participation scales might 
also be a direct consequence of the underlying logic of the ‘identity-equivalence 
procedure’. As the procedure requires a common identity set that represents a valid 
scale across all subgroups considered, it might have obscured other, more-dimen-
sional structures of political participation. However, since our goal was to establish 
‘construct-equivalent’ scales of political participation for young and adult people 
over time, we did not inspect any scales that were not based on a common identity 
set for all age groups and time points.
What are the implications of the findings for comparative survey research in 
general and participation research in particular? Researchers investigating differ-
ences and similarities in the political behavior of young and adult people over time 
should ensure that (1) they use reliable samples including both young and adult 
people, (2) they track both groups over time, and (3) the measurement of political 
participation is equivalent across age groups as well as over time. Questions of 
measurement equivalence in the area of comparative survey research usually arise 
in the context of establishing equivalent instruments across countries (cf. Prze-
worksi & Teune, 1966; van Deth, 1986; Garcia Albacete, 2011; Linssen et al., 2014). 
4 To investigate this argument, we checked the robustness of the results presented in 
Table 2 by repeating the same analysis with a broader set of participation items that is 
only available for the first wave of the ESS in 2002. The additional four items encom-
pass (1) buycotting products, (2) donating money to a political organization, (3) par-
ticipating in an illegal protest, and (4) taking part in a referendum. The results confirm 
the uni-dimensional scale of political participation across all age groups. For young 
and old people, the robustness check even yields the exact same equivalence scales as 
shown in Table 2. For adult people, the equivalence scale can be extended by the items 
for buycotting and donating money. Detailed results of the robustness check are avail-
able upon request.
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As this study has pointed out, similar considerations concerning the equivalence of 
instruments may also apply if the main objective is to draw meaningful conclusions 
about differences and similarities between different societal groups and points in 
time. Accordingly, future studies on political participation and beyond should be 
(more) attentive to the fact that the analysis of one and the same phenomenon may 
require the usage of equivalent rather than identical instruments.
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